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''BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS"?:
CHALLENGES AND LIMITS OF
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP
PROGRAMS AND INCENTIVES
Joel B. Eisen*
As one of the most important current topics in environmental law,
the redevelopment of abandoned or underutilized urban properties, better known as brownfields, continues to generate much discussion and
debate. Because most agree that abandoned sites located in aging areas
and the accompanying exodus of industry to the suburbs are undesirable, the federal government and many state governments have created
programs to encourage the redevelopment of these industrial properties.
But often overlooked by the advocates of such programs are the difficult political, scientific, and moral questions associated with
redevelopment.
In this insightful article, Professor Eisen provides the most comprehensive discussion to date of brownfield programs that often exchange increased health risks to the surrounding community for
additional jobs and higher tax revenue. He then draws an analogy between brownfield redevelopment programs and negotiated compensation statutes, which were created to facilitate the siting of hazardous and
solid waste disposal facilities but have experienced only limited success.
Finally, after exposing the shortcomings of the current brownfield programs through this analogy, Professor Eisen concludes that adequate
community input and a revision of CERCLA are but two of the many
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changes that must be made in order to increase the public legitimacy of
brownfield redevelopment programs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The optimism and good intentions of proponents of redeveloping
"brownfields"-the abandoned, contaminated sites in aging industrial
cities-mask political, scientific, and moral questions that state voluntary cleanup programs and federal incentives fail to address. The goal
of brownfield redevelopment programs is laudable, for few would
contend that it is desirable to let a brownfield site remain abandoned. 1
State and federal programs offer a variety of incentives for developers
to make productive use of brownfield sites. The most prominent approaches are those of state voluntary cleanup statutes that attempt to
alleviate developers' fears of liability under environmental laws if they
undertake cleanup and redevelopment activities. States offer relaxed
cleanup standards, streamlined administrative procedures, and reJohnine J. Brown, Brownfield Reform: Steering the Boat Without Any Oars, ILL.
Nov. 1995, at 14, puts it rather pungently: "(L]etting a brownfield sit around
looking ugly and dangerous is about as desirable as finding yet another day-time talk show listed
in TV Guide."
1.
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leases from future liability to spur developers to clean up and reuse
brownfield sites.
The rise of state voluntary cleanup statutes is consistent with the
trend of devolving responsibility for environmental protection to the
states2 and has the EPA's tentative endorsement. 3 Thus, the statutes
are here to stay, and proponents already claim a track record of success.4 But the statutes are too new for their overall effectiveness to be
measured accurately, and they face many obstacles in fulfilling their
proponents' expectations over the long run. There has been little critical analysis of these first steps irt promoting remediation and reuse of
brownfield sites. This article attempts to fill that gap by focusing attention on the complex issues raised by the voluntary cleanup statutes
and federal programs.
The statutes .envision voluntary cleanups that trade increased
health risks to the affected community for the prospect of new jobs
and higher tax revenues. This raises issues about the democratic nature of the process, particularly with respect to participation by the
affected community. 5 Relaxing the rigorous cleanup standards of current laws also shifts risks to the affected community. 6 Some states link
cleanup standards to anticipated future uses of brownfield sites, which
may add to cumulative risks borne by urban communities. 7 This renders a brownfield redevelopment project morally troublesome unless
the affected community voluntarily approves of it. However, the statutes give communities little ability to do this, 8 putting brownfield developers on a collision course with the environmental justice
movement. 9
The states' involvement raises troubling political issues. There is
genuine room for concern about the states' ability to oversee voluntary cleanups. When they implement voluntary cleanup programs,
See infra notes 640-59 and accompanying text .
See, e.g., Superfund Reauthorization (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st
2.
. 3.

Sess. 219"20 (June 15, 1995) (testimony of Timothy Fields, Jr., Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (hereinafter Fields Testimony]; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORffiES, GErnNG
RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 86 (1995) (hereinafter NAPA REPORT) (stating that the trend toward state management of brownfield sites is "encouraged in part by EPA").
4. See infra notes 477-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 513-639 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 529-34 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 533 and accompanying text.
8. The statutes are largely bereft of provisions for effective public participation in determining the fate of an individual brownfield site. See infra notes 382-94 and accompanying text.
9. The communities where brownfields are located are typically lower-income and minority communities. As a result, the brownfield programs raise fundamental questions about the
distributional consequences of a development project that might place an industrial facility in a
lower-income or minority neighborhood. These issues are largely unaddressed in current programs. See infra notes 513-639 and accompanying text.
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states often substitute standardized statewide solutions (developed
with industry input) for local, site-specific decisions; this gives developers the potential to influence state regulators and reject community
input in critical decisions. 10 In many cases, when developers undertake voluntary cleanups, they will act with little or no state .oversight;
the state will often confine its role .to confirming the soungpes~ "-of
what a developer has already done. 11 If this leads to inadequate or
ineffective cleanups, the public will continue to be at risk.
The image of cooperation in cleanups raises an added dimension
of moral hazard. Voluntary cleanup statutes promise to reward developers that evince an intent to cooperate with regulators and communities. If a developer is not required to provide full disclosure about
project risks and benefits, however, it may engage in, dishonest behavior; for example, it may withhold important information that might
damage a project's chances for success. Moreover, not all developers
are "good actors"; some cannot-and should not-be trusted, due to
their shoddy environmental records. 12
Assuming these obstacles can be overcome, the eventual impact
of'the statutes is unclear. The statutes are being oversold as a panacea
for urban redevelopment. States are relaxing the requirements of the
environmental laws, with little empirical analysis of the statutes' potential for spurring job creation and revitalization. 13 Other factors,
such as high crime rates, may hamper redevelopment activities. The
statutes alter the market dynamics at an individual site, which assumes
that piecemeal, site-specific urban development is appropriate. This
may turn out to be inaccurate. 14 Moreover; the states cannot fully
reduce or eliminate the fear of environmental liability associated with
brownfield cleanups. Because federal liability is a main concern of
developers, only the Congress or the EPA can address this issue, by
amending CERCLA or expanding administrative programs to rele~se
developers from CERCLA liability. 15 Legislation pending· in Congress would exempt a developer from federal liability if it cleans up a
brownfield site in an "approved" voluntary cleanup program. 16
Therefore, the EPA's ability to approve or reject a state's program, if
10. For example, some states plan to establish statewide health standards for site cleanups.
Developers can sway cleanup decisions for years to eome by influencing .the development of
these standards. See infra note 581 and accompanying text.
11. Given the lack of state resources to devote to oversight, the states will often-and
intend to-find themselves rubber-stamping developers' decisions. See infra notes 654-59 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 668-76 and accompanying text.
13. Even with voluntary cleanup programs in place, redevelopment may not happen for a
variety of reasons. See infra notes 677-94 and accompanying text.
14. Without regionwide economic development planning, developers may continue to flee
to greenfield locations, regardless of the incentives in a voluntary cleanup program. See infra
notes 679-81 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 683-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text.
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that program would allow cleanups that fail to protect the public's
health and the environment, is crucial to the acceptability of voluntary
cleanups.17
These questions are all critical to the design of a successful
·brownfield program, but have received little attention. None is susceptible to an easy answer, and each requires a more rigorous,
thoughtful, and comprehensive analysis. To begin this analysis, this
article invokes a comparison between the incentives for voluntary
cleanups and the implementation of state "negotiated compensation"
statutes to facilitate the siting of solid and hazardous waste disposal
facilities. These statutes, perceived at the time of their enactment as a
major innovation in environmental policy, have had a rather poor rec~rd of success in addressing difficult issues of the siting process, despite strong theoretical arguments that they might have succeeded. 18
Part I of this article reviews the challenges inherent in brownfield
redevelopment. Part II provides an analysis of state voluntary
cleanup statutes and federal programs. Part III compares voluntary
cleanup programs with the "negotiated compensation" statutes.
Based on recent assessments of the negotiated compensation statutes'
shortcomings, part III concludes that the voluntary cleanup statutes
must be amended in a number of significant respects. This part concludes that states must allow for effective public participation by making affected communities partners throughout the decision-making
process and bolstering each community's ability to evaluate project
risks and compare them to project benefits. 19 States must ensure that
project risks are communicated properly to communities and provide
communities with the nec;essary technical and financial resources to
evaluate projects. Tll.ey must. provide for additional public representation ill the state decision-making process and expand their oversight
responsibilities. To ward off participation in their programs by developers who are not "good actors," they must bar developers with poor
environmental records.
·
. ,· Part III concludes that changes are necessary on the federal level
as well, particularly to Title III of the "Reform of Superfund Act,"
which would exempt from CERCLA liability sites that have been cleaned up in an ·approved state program. At present, this provision
amounts to a license to evade CERCLA's protective cleanup stan17. In particular, Congress should apply a presumption that the relaxed cleanup standards
that states are applying to brownfield sites are not protective enough, and direct the EPA to
reject state programs unless states and developers can· demonstrate the adequacy of cleanup
standards. See infra notes 714-15 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 487-514 and accompanying text.
19. The states should, for example, provide the affected community with the necessary
technical and financial resources to facilitate decision making. See infra notes 609-13 and accompanying text.
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dards and should be amended to provide the EPA with the latitude to
evaluate and approve or reject state programs on substantive grounds.
This article then concludes that with these and other changes, the
voluntary cleanup programs will have increased public legitimacy.
II.
A.

THE

BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM

The Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment

A "brownfield" is best defined as "abandoned or underutilized
urban land and/or infrastructure where expansion or redevelopment is
complicated, in part, because of known or potential environmental
contamination." 20 Brownfield sites include abandoned industrial fa20. The exact definition of a brownfield is a matter of some disagreement. See NATIONAL
ENVTL. POLICY INST., How CLEAN IS CLEAN?: WHITE PAPER ON BROWNFIELDS 38 (1995)
[hereinafter NEPI WHITE PAPER] (stating that "[t]here is no commonly accepted definition of
brownfields"); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS:
PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 3 (1995) (hereinafter OTA
STATE OF THE STATES] (noting that "(b]rownfields have nearly as many definitions as there are
interested parties"). The definition used here, and in the remainder of this article, is that invoked by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in its recent report on brownfield
cleanup programs, and in OTA's congressional testimony. This definition is based on an EPA
official's presentation at an Environmental Law Institute workshop. OTA STATE OF THE
STATES, supra, at 1 (citing Timothy Fields, Jr., Federal Agency Brownfields Initiatives, presented
at the Environmental Law Institute, Mar. 28, 1995); Superfund Reauthorization (Part 2): Hear-

ings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm.
on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (June 15, 1995) (testimony of Jan Linsenmeyer and
Robert Atkinson, Energy, Transportation and Infrastructure Program, Office of Technology Assessment) (hereinafter OTA Testimony]. Because this definition includes properties that are
both actually and potentially contaminated, it reflects the widespread fear of lenders, owners,
and developers that redevelopment is hampered at sites even if contamination has not been
documented there. Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 EcoLOGY L.Q. 705, 707 n.3 (1994);
see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. It is also consistent with the definition adopted in a
recent article on state and federal brownfield programs and a recent "White Paper." See NEPI
WHITE PAPER, supra, at 38; R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfie/ds Restoration and Voluntary
Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENvrL.. LAW. 105, 106 (1995); see also NATIONAL ENvrL.. POLICY INST.,
BEYOND BROWNFIELDS: IDLE LAND, SUBURBAN SPRAWL, AND THE LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
REINVENTING URBAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM (1995) (manuscript
at 6, on file with author) [hereinafter NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS].
Another definition of brownfield is a "previously productive industrial property now unused
due to uncertainty over who bears responsibility for undertaking an environmental clean-up, the
extent of contamination, and the cost of clean-up." Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to

Save Greenfie/ds: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated
Land, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 789, 790 n.2 (1995) (citing Remarks at the Third Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr.
Conference on Real Property Law 123 (Oct. 14, 1994)). Still another commentator defines a
brownfield site as an "abandoned urban property, intentionally ignored for reuse, due to potential contamination and resulting liability." Daniel Michel, The CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's
Response to the Brownfield Problem, 26 U. ToL. L. REV. 435, 435 (1995); cf McWilliams, supra,
at 707 n.3 (a brownfield is "urban property that has been contaminated by prior industrial or
commercial activities, as compared with 'greenfields,' which are untainted by such
contamination").
Each of these definitions assumes too much. The first two definitions imply that environmental contamination is the only factor hampering brownfield redevelopment, which is not accurate. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. McWilliams's definition reflects the
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cilities, warehouses, and other commercial properties such as former
gas stations and dry cleaning establishments. 21 Although brownfields
exist in many areas, 22 they are concentrated in aging, predominantly
minority and lower-income23 neighborhoods of "Rust Belt" cities such
as Newark and Chicago. 24 For decades, manufacturers have been
fleeing these cities and moving to "greenfields" 25 locations in the subwidespread (and mistaken, see infra note 25 and accompanying text) perception that brownfields
are contaminated, while greenfields are not.
Brownfield sites have also been dubbed "TOADS," short for "Temporarily Obsolete Abandoned Derelict Sites." See McWilliams, supra, at 715 n.25 (citing Michael R. Greenberg et al.,
The TOADS: A New American Urban Epidemic, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 435 (1990)); Tondro, supra, at
790 n.2 (citing Michael R. Greenberg, Finding Treasure in TOADS, PLANNING, Apr. 1994, at 24).
21. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6.
22. Urban Land Reclamation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment,
and Aviation, of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 25
(June 9, 1994) (testimony of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Institute) [hereinafter Bartsch Testimony] (noting that "[t]he issue of brownfields has surfaced in
nearly every state across the country, and in numerous small towns as well as most large cities").
23. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 13; Robert s.
Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Challenge of Brownfield
Redevelopment. 3 BUFF. ENvrL. L.J. 69. 72-73 (1995); Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and
the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers ro Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BuFF. L.
REV. 285, 302 (1995).
24. See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1995) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN] (stating that "[v)irtually every city in the
nation's older industrial regions ... grapples with the challenge of unused manufacturing facilities"); GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM 617 (1995) (stating that "[i]n cities such as Newark, New Jersey,
[environmental liability has] had the effect of insuring that old industrial properties could not be
converted into new uses"); NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at
15-16 (quoting statements by Freeman Bosley, the mayor of St. Louis, Missouri, about the
brownfield situation in his city); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4; Berger et al.,
supra note 23, at 73 (noting that the brownfield problem is "a significant environmental and
economic problem" in the Buffalo, New York area); Clement Dinsmore, Recycling Brownfields:
The Legislative Climate, J. URB. TECH., Spring 1995, at 9 (stating that "[b]rownfield sites are
most highly concentrated in older industrial areas of large cites in the northeast and midwest
United States"); Michel, supra note 20, at 436 (stating that brownfield sites are "prevalent in the
Great Lakes region" due to the concentration of manufacturing activities); James T. O'Reilly,
Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11
YALE J. ON REG. 43, 55-56 (1994) [hereinafter O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives] (noting that "[t)he
old plants, visible from the elevated subways of Boston, Chicago, New York, and from the elevated highways of dozens of other inner cities, are· wraiths of inner-city industry that no longer
resemble the nostalgic photographs").
25. A greenfield site is usually described as one located in the suburbs, on land that is
untainted by contamination because it has never been used for manufacturing or commercial
activities. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; THE GREENFIELDS GROUP, PROTECTING GREENFIELDS: THE STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 1 (1995) (copy on file with author); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9 (observing that
'"[g)reenfields' refers to suburban or exurban land that has not yet been developed for nonagricultural uses"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 707 n.3; Tondre, supra note 20, at 791 (stating
that a greenfield site is "land that has never been used for manufacturing or commercial activities and which carries with it none of the potential for environmental liability of a Brownfield");
Solo, supra note 23, at 287.
It is not always true, however, that greenfield sites are pristine. The risk of contamination is
generally less at a greenfield site than at a brownfield site. See, e.g., Solo, supra note 23, at 287
("Greenfields[ J are less likely to have been previously used for industrial purposes and, therefore, have a lower probability of containing hazardous waste."). But a number of sites in the
suburbs and rural areas have been the locations of past commercial activities that created con-
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urbs. 26 The abandonment of inner-city sites27 has left a "witch's brew
of contamination" at abandoned brownfield sites. 28

tamination. Professor Tondro cites Diamond v. Marcinek, 629 A.2d 350 (Conn. 1993), where,
"unbeknownst to its purchaser," underground gasoline storage tanks remained from a prior use
of a farm as a filling station. Tondro, supra note 21, at 791-92. For the purposes of this article,
then, a greenfield site is defined as a site located in the suburbs or exurbs, regardless of its level
of contamination.
26. See Fields Testimony, supra note 3, at 223 (testifying that "migration from 'brownfields'
to 'greenfields' is particularly problematic to certain urban and industrial areas, where the loss of
investment capital and jobs further exacerbates existing economic and social conditions"); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA
60-61 (1994) (noting that the movement of jobs out from central cities is "aggravating central city
problems"); EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 617 (stating that "companies planning expansions
were buying up pristine land in rural areas where there was no chance of liability for existing
contamination"); RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY ON INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS 4-5 (1994); RICHMOND, VA. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEV., BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT, PROGRAM NARRATIVE STATEMENT 1 (1994) [hereinafter RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT
PROJECT STATEMENT] (stating that "[t]he City's experience has been that private businesses tend
to avoid [brownfield locations] ... [and] tend to prefer 'Greenfield' sites in the surrounding
suburbs for their plant expansion sites or new facility developments"); Fran Ansley, Standing
Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J.
1757, 1839 (1993) (stating that "[o]bservers note that many domestic factory relocations involve
moves from urban to suburban and from 'brownfield' to 'greenfield' sites"); Berger et al., supra
note 23, at 73; William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup
Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 39-40 {1995);
Jane F. Clokey, Wisconsin's Land Recycling Act: From Brownfield to Greenfield, 2 Wis. ENVTL.
L.J. 35, 37 (1995); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717 (observing
that "[w]hen companies leave their urban sites, whether to flee the contamination they have
produced or simply to expand or upgrade, they often build new facilities on greenfield sites");
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 55; John Pendergrass, Abandoned Cleanups or
Abandoned Sites?, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 6 (claiming that developers "prefer greenfields
... regardless of whether available industrial sites are actually contaminated or could be cleaned
up"); John B. Casserly, Comment, Minnesota's Land Recycling Act: Solving Problems by Evolving Superfu.nd, 2 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 261, 266 (1995) (noting the increase in development on greenfields in Minnesota, and corresponding increase in the number of brownfields); Solo, supra note
23, at 287.
In Professor Ansley's view, there are many reasons for the out-migration of factory jobs,
including "more favorable taxation, cheaper rent, or lower rates of unionization." Ansley,
supra, at 1839-40. To this list. one should add lower perceived environmental costs and other
advantages. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
27. McWtlliams, supra note 20, at 714 and n.21 (citing CHARLES BARTSCH ET AL., NEW
LIFE FOR OLD BUILDINGS: CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES TO INDUSTRIAL REUSE 1 (1991)) (stating that "[d]ecades of heavy industry in an era with limited environmental awareness have left a legacy of contaminated, often abandoned, industrial structures
located on millions of acres of polluted land throughout the United States"); O'Reilly, Indiana's
Incentives, supra note 24, at 43 (stating that "manufacturers have moved away from the inner
city, taking valuable job opportunities and leaving behind environmentally hazardous sites").
28. William J. Angelo, EPA and Cities See Green in Cleanup of "Brownfield" Sites, ENGINEERING NEws-REc., Nov. 6, 1995, at 31, 34 (stating that "[m]any of the sites contain obsolete,
empty buildings with asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls or oil").
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The number of brownfield sites,29 and the magnitude of contamination at them, is not known. 30 Despite this uncertainty, brownfield
sites have significant potential for redevelopment. 31 Developers32
29. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment recently estimated that there may
be "tens of thousands to 450,000" brownfield sites nationwide. OTA STATE OF THE STATES,
supra note 20, at 2; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that "(s]ome experts
have suggested that more than 500,000 sites nationwide show evidence of at least some contamination which could trigger Superfund rules"); NEPI BROWNFIELDs POLICY FORUM PROCEED·
JNGS, supra note 20, at 6 (stating that "[n]o reliable data exists on the number of brownfield
sites"); Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of Superfund
Liability, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1996, at 27 (stating that the General Accounting
Office estimates the number of brownfield sites at between 150,000 and 500,000); Buzbee, supra
note 26, at 39 n.11; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715 (stating that the EPA "does not know if
10% or 90% of the potentially hazardous waste sites have been identified").
States and localities do not have accurate information about the number of brownfield sites.
Professor Tondro describes the problem in Connecticut:
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) does not know the total
number of affected acres of land. In 1993, the DEP estimated that more than 100 Brownfield sites existed in Connecticut's urban areas. These were identified as part of the then
newly enacted Urban Sites program.... At the conference, Parker estimated that there
were probably a ''couple of thousand" sites in Connecticut.
Tondro, supra note 20, at 789 n.l. Some cities and counties have identified the number of
brownfield sites in their jurisdictions, but the accounting is "far from exact." OT A STA TE OF
THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that Chicago, Cuyahoga County (which includes Cleveland), and Portland have estimated numbers of brownfield sites); see also NEPI BROWNFIELDS
POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra nore 20, at 11 (stating that "[f]or brownfields reform to be
successful, it will be necessary to accurately grasp the number of these sites and their breakdown
by locat10n"); Paul MacClennan, Caution in Order on City "Brownfields" Opportunity, BUFFALO
NEws, Oct. 15, 1995, at G8 (stating that the first task of Buffalo's brownfields group is to develop
a "'city mdex on sites and problems"). The Rhode Island legislature has determined that "Rhode
Island's urban corridor contains nearly two hundred (200) sites that have been found by federal
or state programs to be contaminated [and] many potential sites ... which may have been contaminated by historical industrial activities." R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-l(e)-(f) (Supp. 1995).
A recent survey released by the U.S. Conference of Mayors identified more than 20,000
brownfield sites in 39 cities. Brownfields: Clinton Backs U.S. Mayors in Cleanup Efforts, Greenwire, Jan. 29, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1/29/96 APN-GR 4 [hereinafter Clinton Backs U.S.
Mayors].
30. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20,
at 2 (stating that conditions at brownfield sites "may vary from zero, low, or moderate contamination to extremely hazardous conditions, while many sites have still not been evaluated"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72 (observing that "the degree of contamination [at brownfield sites]
varies greatly"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715 (stating that "(t]he actual scope of this problem is not known").
There are several reasons for the uncertainty about the extent of contamination at brownfield sites. Brownfield sites were often the locations of industrial and commercial facilities that
handled hazardous wastes. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4. Storage and disposal of these wastes generally took place before the advent of modem environmental laws and
was largely unregulated. See, e.g., Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9 (stating that brownfield sites
are "normally assumed to have varying degrees of contamination attributable to waste generation, handling, and disposal practices that prevailed before these practices were regulated in
recent decades"). Governments at all levels have little information on the extent of past
problems. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; see also OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 300
(stating that "information about the extent of the problem and the level of contamination at
many of these sites is limited"). States' records are of "limited usefulness" because they document assessments made at the time of property transfers; properties may not have been transferred, and therefore not evaluated. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715.
31. Charles Bartsch and Elizabeth Collaton, for example, describe a number of successful
redevelopment activities at brownfield sites. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 117-37 (describ-
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propose projects that range from industrial uses 33 to retail uses, 34 technology and office centers,35 airports, 36 and even sports stadiums. 37
Although the costs of continued inactivity at brownfield sites are
potentially immense, they are not well quantified. The types of costs,
however, are well understood. Inner-city neighborhoods fail to benefit from jobs that redevelopment might provide. 38 Cities receive lower
ing brownfield reuses in Akron, OH; Chicago, IL; Minneapolis, MN; Fort Collins, CO; Mesa,
AZ; and Meadville, PA).
32. This article uses the term "developer" to refer to any entity that proposes to take advantage of the incentives contained in a state voluntary cleanup program, whether or not that
entity currently owns the brownfield site in question. Many states' statutes do not restrict the
type of entity that can qualify as a brownfield redeveloper and take advantage of statutory protections. As one commentator has noted, "individuals, companies, associations, partnerships
and municipal governmental entities are all potential beneficiaries." Clokey, supra note 26, at
41-42; see, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1995). Moreover, a majority of states
empower any person or entity to undertake a voluntary cleanup. The statutes often do not
distinguish between present owners and prospective purchasers; both may participate in voluntary cleanup programs if they did not cause the contamination at the site. See infra note 188-90
and accompanying text.
33. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 127-29 (discussing automobile scrapyard in Minneapolis cleaned up and used for an electronics company's production facility); PENNSYLVANIA
DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, PENNSYLVANIA'S LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM, SIX-MONTH
PROGRESS REPORT 2 (1996) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT]
(describing the redevelopment of the "Industrial Center of McKeesport" on the site of the former U.S. Steel National Tube Works in McKeesport, PA); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 71
(describing the thwarted efforts of three proposals to reuse brownfield sites in Cleveland, Chicago, and Detroit for industrial purposes).
34. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 18
(describing the failed proposal to redevelop a site in East St. Louis, IL, for use as a shopping
center); MacClennan, supra note 29 (describing Buffalo's plans to build the Delaware Consumer
Square retail plaza on a site, part of which is "an old Hartwell street toxic dump used by Atlas
Steel and recently delisted by the state but not necessarily lacking in hazardous substances").
35. Pittsburgh, for example, has developed the "Pittsburgh Technology Center" on the site
of the abandoned Jones & Laughlin steel mill, with plans to host the University of Pittsburgh's
Center for Biotechnology and Bioengineering, the Carnegie Mellon Research Institute, and the
engineering and research facility of the Union Switch and Signal Corporation. See Urban Land
Reclamation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the
House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Margaret McCormick Barron, Assistant to Tom Murphy, Mayor, City of Pittsburgh);
Gaines Gwathmey III & William J. O'Brien, States Stimulate "Brownfield" Development, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Sl (describing the Pittsburgh experience); see also COMING CLEAN, supra
note 24, at 119-20 (describing the conversion of a brownfield site in Akron, OH, to the "AES
Business Campus"); Angelo, supra note 28, at 32, 34 (describing the construction of the "125acre Twin Lakes Corporate Center" on a former brownfield site in Roseville, MN).
36. Angelo. supra note 28. at 32 (describing Cleveland's attempt to build a new airport on a
brownfield site).
37. Sue Ellen Christian & John Kass, Gary Plan a Far Cry from Soldier Field; Glitzy Proposal ls Detailed, But Financing Isn't, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1995, at 1 (describing efforts to attract
the Chicago Bears football team to a brownfield site in Gary, IN).
38. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 301; NEPI
BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 21 (quoting Mary Gade, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73 (stating that
"[b]ecause of the difficulty in redeveloping urban industrial sites, rejuvenation of economies in
these areas through job creation is also significantly hampered"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at
717; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56; Solo, supra note 23, at 286-87.
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property tax revenues from brownfield sites, 39 which weakens their
ability to provide basic services such as education. 40 Brownfields are
unsightly and threaten to contaminate drinking water and cause
neighborhood health problems. 41 Vacant properties contribute to
high crime rates 42 and deterioration of urban neighborhoods. 43 They
encourage further environmental abuse, such as "midnight dumping. "44 Finally, brownfields are conspicuous symbols of the decline of
lower-income and minority neighborhoods in which they are overwhelmingly located. They discourage urban investment and contribute to a pervasive sense of poverty and hopelessness. 45
Moreover, there are substantial environmental costs to locating
new commercial or industrial activities at a greenfield site instead of a
brownfield site.46 Greenfield development often devours previously
39. Owners of brownfield sites typically pay reduced amounts of taxes, due to the sites'
marginal market value, or abandon the sites and pay no taxes at all. OTA Testimony, supra note
20, at 301; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; Dinsmore,
supra note 24, at 9-10; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra
note 24, at 48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 789-90; Solo, supra note 23, at 286-87. The recent study
released by the U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that brownfield sites account for between
$121 million and $386 million of lost tax revenue annually. Clinton Backs U.S. Mayors, supra
note 29. The shrinking tax base also has a pronounced impact on remaining businesses in inner
cities, which face increased tax burdens to make up for the lost revenue. O'Reilly. Indiana's
incentives, supra note 24, at 48.
40. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717 (stating that "abandoned and otherwise inactive
properties generate less, if any, tax revenue for schools and city services"); O'Reilly. Indiana's
Incentives, supra note 24, at 48 (stating that "[m]unicipal and urban school budgets lost revenues
from manufacturing facility taxes as plants moved").
41. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6 (stating that "empty structures openly invite illegal dumping of household and hazardous waste, attract both criminal activity and curious children, and pose health
and fire hazards to the surrounding community"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715 (stating that
"[w]ithholding brownfield property from the market contributes to urban decay by ... allowing
contaminated sites to go undetected, thereby threatening the environment, unsuspecting users,
and local residents"); Solo, supra note 23, at 302.
At the National Environmental Policy Institute's Brownfields Policy Forum, one participant
stated that "[t]he kind of things you can get from these abandoned sites is not just the insecurity
and danger of the building itself, but also the continued illegal dumping of hazardous waste
drums." NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting
Henry Henderson, Commission~r, Department of the Environment, Chicago, IL). Commissioner Henderson added that health hazards other than toxic dumping exist, describing a site in
Chicago: "A former bus barn, across from a meat packing company, had been taken over by a
squatter who decided to build an indoor garbage dump. You don't want a rat farm next door to
your meat packing company." Id.
42. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 5; J. Thomas Black, Recycling
Inactive Urban Industrial Sites, URB. LAND, June 1995, 47, 47-48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 790;
Solo, supra note 23, at 287.
43. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 74; Black, supra
note 42, at 47; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at
47 (describing the "social isolation" caused in inner-city neighborhoods by the declining job
base) .
. 44. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Buzbee,
supra note 26, at 39.
45. NEPI BROWNFIELDS PouCY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; McWilliams,
supra note 20, at 715; Solo, supra note 23, at 286-87.
46. Tondro, supra note 20, at 792.
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unspoiled land. 47 Development in suburbs and exurbs exacerbates
their growing pollution problems.48 These developments will have adverse impacts for many years to come, even long after their useful
lives have ended. 49 Stormwater, 50 groundwater,51 and air pollution
from additional traffic52 will increase. 53 Suburban and exurban jurisdictions will have to build54 or expand55 existing infrastructures such
as highways and public water and sewer systems to serve new development. Officials in these jurisdictions are concerned about the financial
47. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73 (stating that "[m]ore rural land is being used for
industrial purposes than would be necessary if industries were encouraged to 'recycle' urban
industrial properties. The direct effect is that more total land is 'industrialized', even though
numerous former industrial sites sit idle and waste away"); Clokey, supra note 26, at 37;
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56; Tondro, supra note 20, at 792 n.12; Solo,
supra note 23, at 304.
48. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 2;
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717-18 (stating that "if industrial owners are allowed to use and
abandon property at will, current greenfield development will spread the legacy of contamination to outlying areas"). For a description of existing environmental problems of suburban
"Edge Cities," see Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism· Lessons from Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 1, 33-35 (1995).
49. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717-18; Tondro, supra note 20, at 792.
50. The stormwater problem, caused in large part by runoff from parking lots and other
impervious surfaces, is already a substantial environmental problem in the suburbs and exurbs.
See generally Eisen, supra note 48. It will only be worsened by further industrial and commercial
development. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 718.
51. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 718.
52. Suburbs depend on the automobile. See generally ROBERT CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUBURBAN CENTERS (1989) [hereinafter CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUBURBAN CENTERS] (analyzing
patterns of traffic and congestion in suburbs and exurbs); ROBERT CERVERO, SUBURBAN
GRIDLOCK (1986) [hereinafter CERVERO, SUBURBAN GRIDLOCK] (describing the inadequate
road and highway infrastructure in the suburbs). As a. result, workers must increasingly use
automobiles instead of mass transit to reach suburban workplaces. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-48. This worsens traffic and congestion, and adds to air pollution.
Berger et al., supra note 23, a°t 73 (claiming that "industrialization of outlying rural and suburban
lands creates a greater need for people to drive to outlying areas to work [with] the negative
environmental effect of promoting greater air pollution"); Clokey, supra note 26, at 37; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 721 (stating that "by siting new facilities in dispersed outlying areas
instead of in concentrated inner cities, greenfield development encourages a car-dependent work
force because mass transit cannot economically serve these low density areas of development");
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 792; Solo, supra
note 23, at 304.
53. McWilliams makes the intriguing suggestion that developers should be required to post
bonds to cover the future costs of environmental liability at greenfield sites:
Any facility where hazardous substances are used and that poses a threat to the environment, should be required to post an environmental bond, or otherwise prove financial responsibility sufficient to cover the potential costs of cleaning up the site, before it can bring
hazardous materials onto the property. If the law required the owner of a facility to return
the property to the market in as good or better condition than when she acquired the property, the costs of the business would reflect the true costs of contaminating activities.
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 719-20.
54. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 720; Tondro, supra
note 20, at 792.
55. The road system in the suburbs and exurbs, for example, was not built to meet the
demands of intensified industrial and commercial activity, and must be expanded to serve it.
Tondro, supra note 20, at 792. See generally CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUBURBAN CENTERS, supra
note 52; CERVERO, SUBURBAN GRIDLOCK, supra note 52.
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burden this imposes on them, 56 a burden that is often alleviated to
some extent by wasteful subsidies (in the form of grants and other
funding) from the federal and state governments. 57
By contrast, brownfield redevelopment can take advantage of existing urban infrastructures. 58 A brownfield site often features excellent water and sewer systems, and rail and highway access to the
metropolitan area, the region, and outlying areas. 59 Densely concentrated urban areas offer better accessibility to workers60 and other advantages. 61 Other potential benefits include aesthetic qualities such as
waterfront access and views, 62 proximity· to downtown business districts,63 public tax and financing initiatives to support development,64
56. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; Berger et al.,
supra note 23, at 73 (stating that "[t]he cost of providing the necessary infrastructure to support
these new developments is strapping the municipalities and counties in which they are located");
Tondro, supra note 20, at 792 (stating that "[f]rom the viewpoint of the public purse, the expenditure necessary to make [a greenfield] site properly accessible, including public utilities, is enormous"); Solo, supra note 23, at 304.
57. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 720:
Local governments, using federal grants and state funds to pay for new utility infrastructure
(e.g., sewers, water, and electric) and secondary roads in outlying areas, are in effect duplicating infrastructures that already exist in urban centers. Thus, federal, state, and local taxpayers subsidize the environmentally suspect spread of industrial development to greenfield
sites.
·
58. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; C6MING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; McWilIiams, supra note 20, at 720; Solo, supra note 23, at 301 (observing that brownfield sites would
"normally have been considered prime real estate and [are] connected to t!Xisting infrastructure"); Black, supra note 42, at 48.
59. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; Black, suprd note 42, at 47; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note
24, at 47 (stating that "[h]ighway access;well developed infrastructure, power and water lines,
easy access to rail tracks and to other modes of transport are all desirable features of existing city
sites"); Tondro, supra note 20. at 790; This is not always the case. See infra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.
· 60. COMING CLEAN, supra· note 24, at 2; Black, supra note 42, at 48; McWilliams, supra
note 20, at 723; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-48; Tondro, supra note 20, at
792. A brownfield redeveloper that creates jobs may hire workers from the area surrounding the
site and provide a tremendous economic boost for affected communities. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives,
supra note 24, at 47-48. Douglas McWilliams.cautions that brownfield redevelopment may not
create jobs for residents of the affected communities unless training programs are implemented
for unskilled workers. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 723-24.
61. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 722 (stating that "concentrated urban job locations may facilitate efficient job training programs because resources are concentrated in a single
facility that is accessible to the targeted urban workforce and to the job placement locations").
62. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Black, supra note 42, at 48.
63. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2;.Black, supra note 42, at 48.
64. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 61-64; Black, supra note 42, at 48. Existing incentives include "tax increment financing" (TIF), which involves borrowing against future expected
tax revenues to finance investments: COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 61-62; CHARLES M.
HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE,
AND REUSE OF URBAN LAND 968, 997 (1989); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 753-54. TIF revenues, as Haar and Wolf note, can be used to fund improvements required to spur an increase in
economic activity. HAAR & WoLF, supra, at 968. Charles Bartsch and Elizabeth Collaton describe a number of other financing options for brownfield redevelopment, including tax abatements, community development block grants, special service areas, use of general obligation
bonds, and other forms of targeted assistance. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 62-64.
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access to major universities and medical centers,65 and ancillary benefits of spending by rejuvenated industries and their workers on local
goods and services. 66

B. The Fear of Environmental Liability
Despite these potential advantages, brownfields remain abandoned or underutilized. In the eyes of many, this is due to widespread
fears of brownfield developers that they will face liability under the
environmental laws67 and that the cost of cleaning brownfield sites to
meet government standards is both so uncertain and so high that it
might outweigh the sites' market value. 68 The literature is replete
with anecdotes about developers who shunned brownfield sites "due
to" the fear of environmental liability. 69 Developers, it is said, de65. Black, supra note 42, at 48.
66. Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Water Resources and
Environment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
601 (June 21, 1995) (testimony of Patricia Randolph Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation) [hereinafter NWF Testimony] (claiming that brownfields redevelopment will "stimulate economic growth of the surrounding areas"); COMING CLEAN, supra note
24, at 2; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 724. Douglas McWilliams cautions that secondary economic benefits may be "diluted" if, for example, "companies provide in-house food service and
shops." Id.
67. Most notable among these are the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, popularly known as the Superfund law) and its state counterparts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. These
"fears" have been invoked as the primary, and perhaps exclusive reason why brownfield sites
continue to remain abandoned. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 28 (noting that
"environmental contamination-or the perceived threat of it-[is often] the principal deterrent
to industrial site reuse"); NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 601 (testifying that "[Superfund] has
inadvertently produced a chilling affect [sic] which has stymied prospective purchasers and lenders from investing in the renewal of abandoned contaminated waste sites"); COMING CLEAN,
supra note 24, at 6; NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 7;
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 25 n.46 (quoting a press release by four Pennsylvania state senators that stated "[c]ompanies in Pittsburgh, Johnstown, and other communities
have deliberately let industrial property stand idle indefinitely rather than even look to see what
contamination might exist because they were afraid to deal with state environmental agencies");
Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715-16; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 54 (stating that "[d]evelopment of the sites and their potential to create
jobs for local residents were hampered by doubt that past environmental effects could be overcome, [as] a direct result of ineffective federal remediation procedures").
68. See infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
69. For example, one article describes three projects purportedly stymied by fear of environmental liability:
The owner of a newspaper in Cleveland looked at several downtown properties for a new
production plant. The company chose an abandoned rail yard on the shores of Lake Erie.
Calling the site "perfect" for its needs, the company spent $60,000 on an environmental
assessment. only to learn that the cost of cleanup would be prohibitive. The "perfect" site
was abandoned and the new plant, along with its 400 jobs, will open soon, in the suburbs.
A Chicago metal-stamping firm wanted to expand in the city, but could not find a large
enough urban site without possible environmental problems. It, too, moved to the suburbs
and forty urban jobs were lost.
An electrical contractor in Detroit wanted to expand his existing building onto a neighboring parking lot. He was not, nor had he ever been, the owner of the parking lot, but his
bank refused to make the necessary expansion loan. Traces of oil, antifreeze and fuel had
dripped onto the lot over the years and the bank was afraid that it could be held liable for
the cleanup of hazardous waste if it held a security interest in the property. Instead of
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mand the lower and more predictable cost of building new facilities in
greenfield locations. 7° From a developer's perspective, the list of obstacles to brownfield redevelopment starts with the threat of liability
under CERCLA. 71 This is widely perceived as the most serious barrier to redevelopment,72 outweighing all benefits. 73 A developer must
also be concerned about the uncertainties caused by state hazardous
expanding in the city, the contractor moved his entire business to an undeveloped rural
area, taking ten jobs away from urban workers. .
Berger et al., supra note 23, at 71; see also Solo, supra note 23, at 297 (citing these three stories
and stating that these "anecdotes merely skim the surface of instances in which urban workers
have lost jobs due to legitimate fears by business owners of becoming liable for contamination
on urban land").
At the National Environmental Policy lnstitute's Brownfields Policy Forum, Mayor Gordon
Bush of East St. Louis, IL, described the failure of a proposed shopping center project in his city:
"The people were ready, the bankers were there. The Department of Commerce and Community Affairs from the State of Illinois was there with their share. All incentives were in
place, but guess what, it had to be cleaned up first." The city worked with the investors to
remediate the property, but the process "was so bad and so protracted that when they went
in, they estimated that they needed $200,000 to clean it up. They ended up spending over $1
million, and it still wasn't clean." As the process dragged on and the costs continued to
mount, the bankers and financial supporters backed out, and the project failed.
NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 18 (quoting Gordon Bush,
Mayor, East St. Louis, IL).
70. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27 (comparing a developer's perspective on
building on greenfield and brownfield sites); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2 (quoting a
developer's statement that "[t]he numbers just make sense [in favor of greenfield sites)").
71. A recent White Paper on brownfields suggests that the requirements of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act's "'corrective action" process could pose more potential
problems at older industrial sites than CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1994) (authority for
corrective action orders); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 41-42 (stating that "if an older
industrial facility wishes to develop its brownfields, it may have a multi-year [RCRA) liability
issue"); Brownfields: RCRA Liability Could Pose Obstacle to Cleanup Greater than Superfund,
Haz. Waste News, July 24, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407345. Professor Buzbee,
noting the overlap between RCRA and CERCLA, claims that the EPA could use its authority to
identify brownfield sites as RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal (TSO) facilities, in which
case the RCRA corrective action provisions would govern. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 66-68; see
also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 11-14. Developers' fears of CERCLA liability appear,
however, to be more widespread, because CERCLA is the principal federal statute governing
hazardous waste cleanups, whereas RCRA 's corrective action scheme generally is limited to
remediation of traditional TSO facilities. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 57.
72. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 6-11; OTA STATE OF THE STATES; supra note 20,
at 7 (stating that "[t)he law most often associated with liability at brownfield sites is CERCLA");
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 30 ("There is a widespread belief that environmental liabilities arising under CERCLA and related law distort the real estate market."); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 725 (claiming that "[t)he magnitude and uncertainty of environmental
liability costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) pose significant obstacles to urban industrial redevelopment"); Michel, supra
note 20, at 435 (stating that "[t)he measures employed by Congress, primarily through CERCLA
... , have been called 'draconian' and have had a chilling effect on lenders, 'would be' developers and purchasers"); Tondro, supra note 20, at 790-91; Casserly, supra note 26, at 266 (stating
that Minnesota's cities "found that the Superfund laws were intimidating prospective purchasers,
while rarely effecting a cleanup in Minnesota's urban centers"); Solo, supra note 23, at 285 (observing that "[f)ear of liability under federal Superfund law may be discouraging use of former
hazardous waste sites even after they have been cleaned up and thus encouraging industrial
development to sprawl onto unpolluted land").
73. The Urban Land Institute's brownfields analyst, Tom Black, has stated that "Superfund
requirements overshadow the many advantages that sites in older industrial areas offer." Black,
supra note 42, at 48.
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waste cleanup programs,74 because it cannot predict at the outset
whether it will be subjected to state or federal regulation. 75 The states
have primary responsibility for sites that do not rise to the threshold
for federal action76 and for sites that states have decided to regulate in
the absence of federal requirements. 77
74. Approximately 45 states have hazardous waste cleanup statutes with requirements
comparable to those of the federal program under CERCLA. OTA STATE oF THE STATES,
supra note 20, at 11; BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRAcnCE § 1.01, at 2
(1991). These statutes include, for example, Minnesota's Environmental Response and Liability
Act. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.Ol-.37 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996), and Wisconsin's Hazardous Substance Discharge Law, popularly known as the "Spill Statute," Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.76 (West
1989 & Supp. 1995). See also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7-8 (noting that
states have independent authority to force brownfield developers to clean up sites). These statutes (which, for the purposes of this article, are referred to as "state CERCLA Jaws") are perceived as having a detrimental impact on brownfield development comparable to that of
CERCLA. See Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources
and Environment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 260 (June 20, 1995) (testimony of Dale Kaplan, President and Owner, Kaplan Cleaners, on
behalf of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony] (stating that "[t]he state, just like EPA, can require a business to pay for the
entire costs of a cleanup, regardless of whether or not the business acted legally"); Tondro, supra
note 20, at 790-91 (stating that state "little CERCLA" statutes have a "chilling effect" on lenders
at brownfield sites). Commenting on the New York law, one report states that although it "differs in significant respects from CERCLA," it is similar enough that it has had a dampening
effect on brownfield development. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 91 (adding that "(t]he New
York State Superfund program, like the federal program, includes exacting liability provisions
and rigorous cleanup standards [and] has had the unanticipated effect of leaving many brownfield sites abandoned and has caused companies to develop greenfields instead").
Professor Buzbee notes that while common-law schemes may create an additional source of
legal uncertainty and potential liability, statutory liability is more significant because "statutebased cleanup costs dwarf provable common law damages from contamination in most instances." Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39 n.10.
75. See NEPI BROWNFIELDS Poucv FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 12 (noting
that "[m]any panelists observed that a high level of uncertainty exacerbates the brownfields
problem"); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2-3 (stating that "[t]he complicated
and often overlapping nature of [state and federal) laws creates an unclear picture of the real
risk of liability, which serves as a disincentive for involvement at a site"); Mcwilliams, supra
note 20, at 733 (observing that "the determination of whether a site will be subject to federal or
state oversight is made well into the site assessment process, making it difficult to anticipate the
regulatory requirements before substantial funds are spent on a redevelopment project").
As Douglas McWilliams notes, there is another area of uncertainty: a site can contain both
"contaminants that are regulated exclusively under state law and contaminants subject to regulation under both state and federal law." McWilliams, supra note 20, at 732; see infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
76. States may set more stringent cleanup requirements than those found in CERCLA.
CERCLA provides that a state may impose "any additional liability or (cleanup] requirements
with respect to the release of hazardous substances" in the state. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(a); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 732. For example, states are free to regulate materials
such as petroleum that are specifically excluded from CERCLA's definition of a "hazardous
substance." See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.6, at 757 (2d ed. 1994).
77. Developers may face liability under state Jaws even if they are not liable under federal
law. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 732. Pursuant to
this authority to regulate the disposal of hazardous wastes, states have identified many more
contaminated sites than are on the National Priorities List (NPL), some of which may be brownfield sites. Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and
Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 876
(June 27, 1995) (testimony of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection
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1.

Uncertainty for Developers
The uncertain nature of developers' responsibilities under CERCLA and its state analogues has a wide-ranging impact on brownfield
developers. 78 First, developers may be held liable for past contamination at sites, even if they did not cause it. Second, the uncertainty
about liability gives rise to concerns about predicting the amount of
cleanup costs, particularly the required standard of cleanup and its
cost. Finally, there is the cost of delays necessitated by a lengthy
cleanup process and the additional cost associated with potential future responsibility after undertaking a cleanup.

a. Liability for Past Contamination
Although dangerous contaminants such as lead and PCBs are
present at some brownfield sites,79 most sites are not seriously contaminated.80 The majority are not listed on the federal National Priorities List (NPL, the list of properties to be cleaned up under the
EPA's supervision to meet CERCLA's standards),81 the "CERCLIS"
database of sites that the EPA is considering for further Superfund
action,82 or comparable state lists of hazardous waste sites. 83 NeverAgency) [hereinafter Browner Testimony] (testifying that "[s]tates have already identified over
100,000 non-NPL sites in their state cleanup inventories"): THE GREENFIELDS GROUP, supra
note 25, at 1; see also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 8 n.19 (stating that "[a]s of
1990, Massachusetts had 15 (federal) NPL sites but 383 on its state priority list. with an additional 1486 on a hazardous site registry"); EPA Sets Goals for Brownfields Clean Up, Redevelopment as Part of CERCLA Reform, Daily Envtl. Rep. News, Oct. 17, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 DEN 200 d9 [hereinafter EPA Goals] (quoting the statement of Mary Gade,
director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, that Illinois has 37 NPL sites and 148
state superfund sites). The sites identified by the states require cleanup under the state analogues to CERCLA.
78. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 725-26; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24,
at 52-53.
79. See PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 7 (noting that the
former Johnson Bronze site, one of the 13 sites where the state has granted final approval to
date, was contaminated by lead and PCBs).
80. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26 (observing that "it is essential to distinguish
between Superfund high priority sites-the worst of the bad with little prospect for economically
viable reuse-and those sites characterized by low and medium levels of environmental contamination-typically, most industrial facilities that were in operation before CERCLA's 1980 enactment"); OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2
(stating that "most sites considered brownfields are not associated with extreme levels of contamination"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 45 n.27; O'Reilly,
Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 53; Solo, supra note 23, at 297-98.
81. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2. The NPL is the list of sites that
receive the highest priority from the EPA in CERCLA cleanup efforts. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1995);
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 720. Sites on the NPL are the only sites eligible for long-term
remedial actions financed by the Superfund. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(l) (1995); RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 722 n.89. The National
Contingency Plan governs studies of the contamination and selection and implementation of
remedies at these sites. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.430-.435 (1995). There are 1,231 sites on the NPL.
40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1995) (listing of NPL sites). Most brownfield sites are not included on
this list. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; Solo, supra note 23, at 298 n.65.
82. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302. CERCLIS is the "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System," a computer database of sites
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theless, cautious developers and lenders assume involvement at any
site will subject them to potential liability,84 because the site may later
be discovered to be seriously contaminated,85 and regulators may decide to target it for a cleanup.
Prospective purchasers and developers fear that if they take ownership of a brownfield site, they will assume liability for past contamination.86 Under CERCLA, the threshold event for liability is the
"release" or threat of a release87 of a "hazardous substance" 88 at a
"facility."89 This is a broad definition that encompasses contaminathat the EPA is investigating to determine whether they must be cleaned up under CERCLA.
See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 711-13;
Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39 n.11. Although a listing in the CERCLIS is no guarantee that a site
is contaminated enough to warrant a cleanup under CERCLA, lenders regularly check the
CERCLIS database as part of their environmental assessments. See RODGERS, supra note 76,
§ 8.4, at 712 ("the real estate and lending enterprises are especially attentive to what listings [in
CERCLIS] foretell about real estate values and cleanup costs"). Even though the EPA added
the notation "No Further Response Action Planned" to the listing, lenders continued to shun
these sites. Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 10.
There are about 13,000 sites on the CERCLIS, compared to almost 38,000 sites listed in
early 1995. As part of its "Brownfields Action Agenda," the EPA deleted approximately 25,000
sites from the CERCLIS to remove the stigma associated with a listing in the database and
announced its intent to delete sites when it decided that no further response action should be
undertaken. Amendment to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances National Contingency
Plan (NCP); CERCLIS Definition Change, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,053, 16,054-55 (1995) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 300.5); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 79 n.144; see infra notes 411-16 and accompanying text.
83. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that Chicago "has identified over 2,000 brownfield sites in its metropolitan region"); EPA Goals, supra note 77 (quoting
the statement of Mary Gade that although Illinois has 148 state superfund sites, it has "an estimated 5,000 brownfield sites-2,000 in Chicago alone").
84. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302 (noting that "any association with a hazardous
waste site implies some level of uncertain liability"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Solo,
supra note 23, at 286, 298.
85. Not all sites that are seriously contaminated have been the subject of regulatory scrutiny. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 25; see also RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4,
at 712 (noting that "CERCLIS remains an incomplete inventory [that] is missing some sites that
are sufficiently serious to be nominated for inclusion on the National Priorities List").
86. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 8; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72;
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 725; Solo, supra note 23, at 287.
87. "Release" is defined in CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994), to include a
broad range of activities, including "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment." Cases
have read this definition broadly to include not only these, but also such activities as drifting of
fibers in the wind, drippings from tanks, and transport of waste by a third party. See RODGERS,
supra note 76, § 8.6, at 751-52 and cases cited therein.
88. A "hazardous substance," as defined in CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), includes substances designated as hazardous in four other environmental laws, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act), the Clean Air Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, and those that the
EPA has designated as hazardous under the authority of CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602. See
also RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 756; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 79 n.10; Solo, supra
note 23, at 291-92.
89. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 79; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 43; Solo, supra note 23, at
291-92. A hazardous waste "facility" is defined as "any building, structure, installation, equipment ... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment ditch, landfill, storage container ... [or] any site
or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located." CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). Courts have interpreted this
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tion at a wide variety of sites, 90 including those where contamination
occurred solely in the past. 91 If a developer spends the money to test
a site and finds some contamination there, it may be required to report the contamination to the EPA,92 which might add the site to the
NPL. 93 CERCLA liability would then attach to the present owner,
even if it did not cause the contamination at the site. 94
Once a site is designated for cleanup under CERCLA, its owner
faces the power of the sweeping authority given to the EPA under
CERCLA and judicial interpretations. 95 The EPA may proceed with
definition of facility broadly to include "virtually any place at which hazardous wastes have been
dumped, or otherwise disposed of," including manufacturing buildings, stables, roadsides, drag
strips, gas stations, private homes, real estate subdivisions, and even dry cleaning establishments.
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 758-61 and cases cited therein; Berger et al., supra note 23, at
79-80; Solo, supra note 23, at 292.
90. For example, CERCLA's definition of hazardous substance subjects a party to liability
for disposal of any of over 700 substances. RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 754 ("The term
'hazardous substance' under CERCLA, like that of 'release,' is known best for its breadth and
inclusiveness."); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 79 (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
1192 (2d Cir. 1992)); Solo, supra note 23, at 291-92.
91. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 769.
92. Under CERCLA, an owner or operator is required to· notify EPA "as soon as he has
knowledge of any release . . . of a hazardous substance." CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(a); see also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 25; RODGERS, supra note 76,
§ 8.5, at 71; WHI1MAN, supra note 74, § 2.02(a)-(c); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715. If the site
is an industrial site with a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994), the permit holder has a continuing obligation to notify federal
officials when it discovers hazardous substances at the site.· 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(6); O'Reilly,
Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 52.
93. There are three ways in which a site may be added to the NPL. See RODGERS, supra
note 76. § 8.4, at 722. The principal way is that the EPA evaluates the danger at a site, using a
system known as the "'Hazard Ranking ,System" (HRS), to decide whether a site should be
placed on the NPL. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6 n.12; RODGERS, supra
note 76, § 8.4. at 714-17 (describing the operation of the HRS); WHI1MAN, supra note 74,
§ 2.02(a)-(c); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 45 n.27; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at
52; see also CERCLA § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (subsection added in 1986 requiring amendments to the HRS to "assure, to the maximum extent feasible, that the hazard ranking system
accurately assesses the relative degree of risk to human health and the environment posed by
sites and facilities subject to review"). The site is first proposed to be added to the NPL. After
evaluating the public comments, the agency determines whether the site should be scored at
greater than 28.5 on the HRS, and if so, the site is listed. Kit R. Krickenberger & Pamela Rekar,
Superfund Settlements: Breaking the Logjam, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2,384 (1989); see also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6 n.12; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 716. The
NPL is "dynamic," with sites added and (less frequently) deleted quite often.' See id. § 8.6, at
754. Thus, there is no guarantee that a brownfield site will not become an NPL site.
94. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 769 n.12 and
cases cited therein; WHI1MAN, supra note 74, § 5.01, at 134; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75;
Solo, supra note 23, at 293. For a typical small business owner's perspective on this aspect of the
CERCLA liability scheme, see Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony, supra note 74, at 258 (testifying that "liability, regardless of responsibility for contamination, ... results in unjust and severely detrimental financial hardship to innocent parties").
95. For discussions of the EPA's comprehensive enforcement powers under CERCLA, see
Beth l.Z. Boland, Consent Decrees Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act,
1987 U. Ctt1. LEGAL F. 451; John C. Butler III et al., Allocating Superfund Costs: Cleaning Up
the Controversy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,133 (1993); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 6166; Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case Law from 1981- ·
1991, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (1991); Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National
Contingency Plan-More Detail and More Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
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the cleanup itself,96 or, acting pursuant to Section 106 of CERCLA,97
order responsible parties to clean up the site. 98 In either case, the
responsible parties are strictly99 and jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of all costs of removal or remedial actions that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan, 100 unless one or more can
sustain the very heavy burden of establishing the divisibility of its contribution at the liability stage. 101 The defenses to CERCLA are nar(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222 (1990); Kurt A. Strasser & Denise Rodosevich, Seeing the Forest for the
Trees in CERCLA Liability, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 493 (1993); William W. Bakke, Note,
Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123 (1988).
96. The EPA is authorized to pursue a short-term removal or long-term remedial action
consistent with the NCP. CERCLA § 104(a}(l}, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a}(l); see RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.1, at 687. This authority is usually
invoked only when no responsible party will undertake the cleanup. Id.
97. 42 u.s.c. § 9606.
98. The EPA 's orders, known as "unilateral administrative orders" (UAO}, may be issued
whenever necessary "to protect public health and welfare and the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 4.9, at 379 n.31; see also HAROLD c. BARNETT, TOXIC
DEBTS AND THE SUPERFUND DILEMMA 261 (1994) (describing the increase in the number of
unilateral orders issued). CERCLA attempts to give the responsible parties an incentive to comply with these orders, by allowing parties who have complied with a UAO to file petitions with
the EPA requesting that the Superfund reimburse the "reasonable costs" of compliance with
such an order. 42 U .S.C. § 9606(b). But the EPA need only grant such petitions if the petitioner
can show "it is not liable for response cost under section 9607(a)" or that "the response action
ordered was arbitrary or capricious or was otherwise not in accordance with law." This is an
extremely heavy burden to meet.
On its face, § 106 is a broadly worded provision that would not limit the EPA 's ability to use
its unilateral order authority against a brownfield developer. See Pollution Control Indus. v.
Reilly, 715 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that § 106 is a broadly written provision that
"enables the EPA Administrator to issue orders as may be necessary to protect public health and
welfare and the environment"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1113 (D. Minn. 1982) ("section 106(a) ... contains no limitations on the classes of persons within
its reach").
99. NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 2; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26,
at 7; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 43; Solo, supra note 23, at 293.
Courts have consistently held that the standard of liability imposed by § 107 of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9607, is strict. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8, at 783 (stating that "[a]lthough
Congress explicitly deleted references to strict liability before the enactment of CERCLA in
1980, the cost recovery cases never have entertained seriously the possibility that liability under
Section 107 requires a showing of negligence or fault"); see also United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (declaring that Congress intended responsible parties to be
strictly liable under CERCLA); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp.
546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). For an excellent discussion of "strict liability" cases litigated under CERCLA, see McSlarrow et al., supra note 95, at 10,367.
The applicability of strict liability under CERCLA has been the subject of intense debate in
Congress's consideration of Superfund reform measures. See, e.g., Lois J. Schiffer, Keep
Superfund Liability Intact, ENVTL F., SeptJOct. 1995, at 25 (Assistant Attorney General for
Environment and Natural Resources arguing against legislative repeal of strict liability); Bob
Smith, Repeal Retroactive Liability, Amend Joint and Several, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 30
(chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control, and
Risk Assessment arguing in favor of a "proportionate" liability system).
100. CERCLA § 107(a)(4}(A}, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4}(A}.
101. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at
764; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 43; Solo, supra note 23, at 293;
see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating
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rowly tailored and rarely available, particularly for lenders and
"innocent" investors. 102 The EPA's broad information-gathering
power under Section 104 of CERCLA may force developers to turn
that CERCLA defendants may escape joint and several liability only by demonstrating that
harm .is subject to reasonable apportionment under the divisibility rule recognized in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 433A (1965)); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (asserting that imposition of joint and several liability promotes CERCLA's
legislative intent); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that CERCLA defendants bear the burden of proving divisibility). Like CERCLA 's imposition of strict liability, the joint and several liability interpretation has been debated in the
Congress. See, e.g., Schiffer, supra note 99, at 25 (arguing against repeal of joint and several
liability); Smith, supra note 99, at 30 (arguing in favor of amending CERCLA to implement a
proportionate liability system).
102. The only statutory defenses to liability under CERCLA are that the release was
"caused solely" by an act of God, an act of war, or "an act or omission of a third party other than
an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship." CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). These defenses are
rarely available in CERCLA cases. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8. at 795-99 and cases
cited therein.
CERCLA's "innocent landowner defense," a subset of the third defense outlined above, has
been construed very narrowly and "has not been effectively utilized." Solo, supra note 23, at 294
n.38; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 7; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26,
at 12 (noting that CERCLA's innocent landowner defense does not "remove uncertainties associated with ownership"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 84-85. Defining the innocent landowner
defense and analyzing its ineffectiveness requires an excursion through several provisions of
CERCLA. First is the basic liability section, § 107(a)(l) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l),
which imposes CERCLA liability on. among others, the "owner or operator" of a "facility." An
owner of contaminated property may therefore be liable for response costs under CERCLA. It
may, however, establish a defense to CERCLA liability by proving that it meets the test of
§ 3107(b)(3) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
The landowner must prove other elements of the defense enumerated in § 107(b)(3) and
cannot use the defense if the release occurred "in connection with a contractual relationship."
Section 101(35)(A) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) specifically defines "contractual relationship" to include ''land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or possession,"
such as leases unless the property was acquired after the disposal or placement of the hazardous
substance which is the subject of the release or threat of release and the landowner establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time he acquired the property, he had no knowledge or reason to know of the disposal of the hazardous substances at the facility. The innocent
landowner defense will then exempt a current owner from liability under CERCLA if the owner
did not contribute to the contamination and undertook "all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial and customary practice."
42 u.s.c. § 9601(35)(B); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8, at 798-99; see COMING CLEAN, supra
note 24, at 7; McWilliarns, supra note 20, at 727; Michel, supra note 20, at 455 n.179.
To avail itself of the innocent landowner defense, then, a lender or prospective purchaser
must not have been aware of the contamination at the site. This is becoming more unlikely,
because an audit of existing conditions at the site is a feature of many commercial real estate
transactions:
As a practical matter, such information is almost always known at the time of sale. Many
states (but not including New York) require that any finding of contamination on a site must
be listed on the deed so that a sale cannot occur without the purchaser knowing about such
contamination. Most lenders also require that an environmental audit be conducted on the
property prior to agreeing to a purchase, partially because of their own fear of future liability. It is, therefore, almost impossible to purchase urban industrial land without first having
been notified of any chemical contaminants on the property. Once the buyer has been
notified of contamination, the innocent landowner defense is no longer available.
Berger et al., supra note 23, at 84-85; see also Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26 (claiming
that better detection methods show more sites to be contaminated and leave fewer buyers able
to use the innocent landowner defense); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 7; RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 26 (assessments typically required in property transactions);
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over detailed information about their financial situations. 103
Although CERCLA contains incentives for the EPA to settle its
claims against responsible parties, 104 the EPA's settlement policies offer little hope to developers of escaping the crushing burden of joint
and several liability.105
b.

Uncertain Cleanup Standards and Costs

Developers fear that potential exposure to liability under CERCLA prevents them from making reliable estimates of site cleanup

RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8, at 798-99 n.111 and cases cited therein; Buzbee, supra note 26, at
48; Solo, supra note 23, at 295-96.
103. Section 104(e)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(2), allows EPA to seek three broad
categories of information:
Any officer, employee, or representative described in paragraph (1) may require any person
who has or may have information relevant to any of the following to furnish, upon reasonable notice, information or documents relating to such matter: (A) The identification, nature, and quantity of materials which have been or are generated, treated, stored, or
disposed of at a vessel or facility or transported to a vessel or facility. (B) The nature or
extent of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant at or from a vessel or facility. (C) Information relating to the ability of a person to pay
for or to perform a cleanup.
If the party refuses to tum over information, it may be ordered to do so. Id. § 9604(e)(5). A
letter from the EPA requesting information under § 104 would probably be a brownfield developer's first exposure to the remedial process at a Superfund site. At this point, the party typically knows little more than that it is involved in an environmental law problem. See Lynnette
Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 83, 84 (1992).
104. Section 122, added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) in 1986, expressly authorizes EPA to enter into agreements which "are in the public interest . . . in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation." 42
U.S.C. § 9622. Section 122 authorizes the EPA to provide certain substantive elements in a
settlement agreement. For example, the EPA is authorized to enter into "mixed funding" or
partial agreements with Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) under which certain costs of the
prospective cleanup will be financed by the government from the Superfund. The EPA also has
authority to grant releases from liability by issuing covenants not to sue. See Buzbee, supra note
26, at 64.
105. Despite the policy of CERCLA § 122 favoring voluntary settlement of Superfund disputes, there are many barriers to settlements, and commentators have been heavily critical of
§ 122 and its limited effectiveness. See Frederick W. Addison, III, Reopener Liability Under
Section 122 of CERCLA: "From Here to Eternity," 45 Sw. L.J. 1081 (1991); Buzbee, supra note
26, at 61-66; Frank B. Cross, Settlement Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 66 OR. L. REv.
517 (1987); James M. Strock, Settlement Policy Under the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 58 U. Cow. L. REV. 599 (1988); Balcke, supra note 95; Peter F.
Sexton, Comment, Superfund Settlements: The EPA's Role, 20 CONN. L. REv. 923 (1988). For
example, within 60 days of receiving a "Special Notice Letter" from the EPA that they are involved with a Superfund site, see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(l), PRPs must organize and decide
whether to submit a good faith proposal to undertake or finance the cleanup operation. Id.
§ 9622(e)(2)(B). At this point there are typically a large number of PRPs with little information
with which to assess how to allocate liabilities and responsibilities among themselves. Professor
Buzbee also cites the statutory requirement to require "reopeners" in Superfund settlements as a
disincentive to finality. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 63-64; see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A).
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costs. 106 They perceive, in particular, that cleanup costs threaten to
exceed the market values of these properties. 107
This uncertainty is attributable in part to the considerable vagueness and uncertainty associated with applicable cleanup standards. 108
For example, it is nearly impossible to determine in advance the required level or cost of a cleanup under CERCLA. 109 The cleanup
106. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony, supra note 74,
at 260 (stating that "[t]he unlimited and undefined costs of a cleanup are a constant impediment
to a small firm's survival"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 50 (using
a hypothetical case to conclude that buyers and sellers of brownfield sites "can only estimate
prospective value and prospective cost; even the best lawyers and consultants cannot tell them
what cleanup plans would legally suffice"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 726 (observing that
"the threat of spiraling environmental assessment and remediation costs creates financial uncertainty and makes predicting future development costs difficult"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives,
supra note 24, at 53; Solo, supra note 23, at 287-88.
107. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 3; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 47 n.33 (noting that
"[w]ith cleanup costs regularly running in the multi-million dollar range, many contaminated
parcels standing alone have a negative value"); Clokey, supra note 26, at 36-37 (stating that
"[b]ecause the risks are both difficult to quantify and potentially enormous, contaminated industrial property frequently becomes unmarketable"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; Tondro,
supra note 20, at 789; Solo, supra note 23, at 298 & n.71 ("In many cases, the cost of liability is
found to 'far exceed the value of the property in an environmentally clean condition."') (quoting
Bonnie H. Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 885, 885 (1992)). The Urban Land Institute's Tom Black calculates that
industrial sites typically range in price from $1 to $6 per square foot: at that rate, assuming a
postdevelopment increase of $2 per square foot in the value of the property, a five-acre site
supports about $370,000 in cleanup costs. Black, supra note 42, at 51. For most contaminated
sites of this size, says Black, this amount must cover the costs of site assessment, cleanup, and
future liability costs. Id.
Cleanups can cost far more than that. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 28 (stating that
"the developer of an inner-city Cleveland parcel ... spent nearly $225,000 per acre for site
testing, remediation, and preparation," over five times the cost of a comparable project in the
suburbs): COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 5 (putting remediation costs for a hypothetical
brownfield site at between $100,000 and $5,000,000); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 94 (observing that "[t]he price of even a small cleanup can run into the millions"); see infra note 115 and
accompanying text. Even the costs to assess existing conditions at the site can be significant. It
has been estimated to take as much as $100,000 to assess the condition of a 20-acre site. See
Michel, supra note 20, at 439 n.30 (quoting Urban Land Reclamation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and
Technology, l03d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Dr. A.E. Moffitt, Jr., Vice
President, Safety, Health and Environment, Bethlehem Steel Corporation)).
Fear of environmental liability also increases the cost of borrowing from lenders, due to
higher transaction costs. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 28 (lending costs have increased "more than three-fold since 1980, according to some practitioners"); COMING CLEAN,
supra note 24, at 14.
108. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27-28; OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 10; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 10; Buzbee,
supra note 26, at 47 (noting that "CERCLA cleanup standards in application are highly variable
and subject to discretionary judgments, and thus yield unpredictable results"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 52; Solo, supra note 23, at 288.
109. NEPI WmTE PAPER, supra note 20, at 6; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26,
at 7 n.13; Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29 U.
RICH. L. REv. 581, 584 (1995); Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1996, at 22, 23 (stating that the cleanup standards of
CERCLA § 121 "remain difficult to determine"); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 59; see also RooGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 724-26 (describing the vagueness of the remedy selection phase).
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standard embodied in Section 121 of CERCLA 110 forces a detailed
inquiry to be undertaken at each site. 111 Establishing the appropriate
level of cleanup requires a wealth of information about the remedies
that might work at each site.11 2 This information is generated in a
lengthy, 113 multistep process 114 that is expensive 115 and has been
called a "slow-motion Kabuki." 116 Cleanups also must comply with
the standards of other federal and state laws th~t are "applicable or
relevant and appropriate" 117 which introduces a maddening complex110. 42 u.s.c. § 9621 (1994).
111. Excellent descriptions of the Superfund remedial process can be found in RODGERS,
supra note 76, § 8.5, at 724-48; Abrams, supra note 109, at 584-88; and Starfield, supra note 95.
The screening of potential remedies illustrates the complexity of the process. Proposed remedies
are screened using nine remedy selection criteria: "(l) health protectiveness, (2) compliance
with relevant laws and standards, (3) long-term effectiveness and permanence, (4) reduction of
toxicity, mobility, or volume through treatment, (5) short-term effectiveness, (6) implementability, (7) cost, (8) state acceptance, and (9) community acceptance." Abrams, supra note
109, at 587; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9621; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 727. As Professor
Abrams notes, this analysis is further constrained
by treating the first two factors as "threshold" criteria that must be met, the next five as
"balancing" criteria that weigh trade-offs among remedies, and the final two as "modifying"
criteria that allow for adjustments in the selection process to accommodate the political
realities in selecting among otherwise viable alternatives.
Abrams, supra note 109, at 587.
112. BARNETI, supra note 98, at 98 (observing that Superfund cleanups require "extensive
technical information on the cost, efficacy, availability, and applicability of alternative remedies
to site specific contamination problems"); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 725; Abrams, supra
note 109, at 586-87; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that "[e]ven an amended CERCLA
would require some degree of site-specific analysis, taking into account a site's geology, population patterns, future use, type and extent of contamination, and the costs of alternative cleanup
techniques and levels").
113. Despite increasing experience with Superfund cleanups, the process can still take a
number of years to complete. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7 n.13 (stating
that "[t]he total cleanup process can take up to ten years"); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at
725-26; Abrams, supra note 109, at 581 (stating that it typically takes about eight years after a
Superfund site is discovered to select a remedy at the site).
114. There are a number of principal stages in the Superfund remedial process, including the
remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), which identifies possible cleanup remedies.
The chosen remedy is embodied in a "Record of Decision" (ROD). Thereafter, the remedy is
implemented through the remedial design-remedial action (RD/RA) phase, in which the specifics of how the chosen remedy will be implemented are designed in detail (RD) and performed
(RA). RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 724-48; Abrams, supra note 109, at 584-88.
115. The cost of cleaning up an average Superfund site is enormous. Each step in the remedial process at an NPL site can cost millions of dollars, and cleanup costs at an average site have
been estimated at over $25 million. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7 n.13;
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 725 (stating that an RI/FS can cost up to $10 million); WHITMAN, supra note 74, at 5-6 (estimated response costs at a typical NPL site include an average of
$1.3 million for a complete RI/FS, $1.5 million for remedial design, $25 million for remedial
action, and nearly $4 million for 30-year operation and maintenance of the site). Moreover, as
Whitman indicates, "[t]hese costs have risen quickly as EPA has applied 'stricter' cleanup standards pursuant to SARA .... " Id. at 6; see also O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at
51 n.42 (citing O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing a $5,800,000 reimbursement settlement to clean up a pig farm formerly used as waste disposal site). Although most
brownfield sites probably would not cost this much to remediate, a developer would not know
this in advance.
116. EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 608.
117. This requirement, known as the "ARAR" requirement, is set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 962l(d). ARARs include the following:
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ity to the process. 118 Furthermore, there is no ability to learn from
past experiences and develop predictability: under the statute, each
site must be analyzed individually.11 9
Proponents advance several justifications for promoting certainty
in cleanup standards. First, they argue that predetermining (i.e., stan~
dardizing) the level of cleanup required can help make project decisions more efficient~ Standardizing cleanup standards allows project
developers to internalize project costs and, therefore, helps to ensure
that only those projects that are efficient will be built. 120 Owners and
prospective investors presumably will be more motivated to invest in
brownfield redevelopment if they can determine in advance whether
they will recoup their expenditures on cleanups. 121 Lenders, once
wary of any involvement at brownfield sites, will open the money tap
and provide the indispensable funding for brownfields. Insurers can
even underwrite the cost of remediation, so that there will be a "cap"
on financial responsibility. 122 Finally, the pace of cleanups can be
more rapid with pre-set standards.
Brownfield redevelopment advocates also say Superfund's
cleanup standards are too strict. 123 They believe that cleanup stan1) Cleanup standards and standards of control of other federal environmental laws (for
example, those of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988)) or state
environmental or facility siting laws that specifically address a hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance found at a CERCLA
site; and
2) Promulgated standards that, while not directly applicable to the substance, location, or
action, addresses problems or situations sufficiently similar to those encountered at a CERCLA site.
See RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5. at 742-43. The use of ARARs "is unique to CERCLA and
has generated controversy and confusion." Starfield, supra note 95, at 10,230; see also Buzbee,
supra note 26, at 59 n.65; Michel. supra note 20, at 439 (terming the ARAR requirement a
"prescription for litigation").
l18. RODGERS, supra nore 76, § 8.5, at 744 and cases cited therein (stating that "[c]ase law
shows some of the difficulties that arise in identifying ARARs and in adjudging compliance").
To take one example, the cleanup might be required to meet the stringent requirements of the
RCRA "corrective action" standard. Id. § 8.5, at 742; Michel, supra note 20, at 452 (stating that
"(b]y imposing RCRA standards in CERCLA cleanup actions, huge costs are imposed, whereas
human health and the environment can be adequately protected for significantly Jess by taking
into account the intended future use of the site"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Initiatives, supra note 24, at
54.
119. RESOURCES FOR 1HE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 10; Abrams, supra note 109, at 584-87.
A number of proposals have been advanced to streamline the Superfund remedy selection process. Professor Abrams discusses the potential for reducing cleanup costs by standardizing certain features of the remedy selection process, and, in particular, by developing an archive of
solutions that have proven to work at NPL sites. Id. at 588-93.
120. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 737.
121. Black, supra note 42, at 48.
122. Id. at 50.
123. Many commentators have asserted that Superfund cleanup standards have failed to
resolve fundamental issues of "how clean is clean," and, in particular, force cleanups to risk
levels far more stringent than necessary to protect health and the environment. See Superfund
Reauthorization (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous
Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (June 15, 1995) (testimony of Becky Norton Dunlop) [hereinafter Dunlop Testimony] (stating that "(t]he Superfund
Jaw has a misplaced emphasis because it employs a standard of hypothetical future risks for sites,
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<lards are based on inaccurate and unrealistic assumptions about the
risks posed by hazardous waste 124 that overestimate the true risks
posed by Superfund sites and produce overly stringent cleanups, particularly because cleanups are required to meet residential standards
at all sites.125 If this view is correct, standards could be relaxed without increasing the actual threat to human health and the environment.
This is particularly true in the brownfield context, many say, given the
intended use of most property for industrial or commercial
purposes. 126
c. Other Uncertainties
Developers and lenders also fear the lack of finality, especially
the inability to obtain releases from liability for contamination existing on the property. 127 If contamination is discovered in the future,
nothing prevents an enforcement action against the developer. 128 Developers who settle state claims may face subsequent enforcement
proceedings from the EPA. 129 Finally, developers fear delays that
without regard for actual or likely risks"); BARNETI, supra note 98, at 274-75 (discussing this
debate); EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 611 (likening Superfund cleanups to searches for "hypothetical perfection"); NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 11
(quoting a panelist's view that "it is reasonable to expect mitigation for identified risks, [but] it is
not reasonable to require remediation for all hypothetical risks"); Joan Glickman, A Superfund
Retrospective: Past, Present and . .. , Pua. MGMT., Feb. 1994, at 4 (describing criticisms of the
EPA's risk assessment process); Michel, supra note 20, at 452 (citing Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious Cycle (1993), for the proposition that "remediators
must spend millions of dollars more than what is pragmatic to achieve pristine standards"); Solo,
supra note 23, at 308. But see Glickman, supra, at 5-6 (stating that "[o]n the other side of the
debate, some residents near Superfund sites argue that risk assessments do not adequately account for the synergistic effects of commingling contaminants and actually underestimate the
effects of these toxics on human health"); Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 568 (1994).
124. The National Academy of Public Administration's recent report on the EPA's operations contains a severe critique of the EPA's risk assessment methodologies. NAPA REPORT,
supra note 3, at 34-49.
125. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 738.
126. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 10 (citing a recommendation to "[s]et reasonable cleanup standard for identified risks and connect them to the
intended use of the property"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740 (stating that "[r]edevelopment
advocates have taken the reform of risk assessment one step further by lobbying for pre-set
tiered standards that reflect current and reasonable future land uses").
127. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 14 (stating the
common recommendation that "[p]roperty owners who complete required cleanups should be
released from further liability"); id. at 27 (citing the statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy
Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Institute, that "other barriers facing redevelopment include[ ] a disheartening lack of certainty and finality in the legal process"); id. at 31 (quoting the statement of
Curtis "Hank" Barnette, Chairman and CEO, Bethlehem Steel Corp., that "in exchange for
cleanup to [redefined] standards, a complete release from further environmental liability must
be provided to the owner of the property and others in the chain of ownership").
128. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27 (stating that a brownfield developer
will "spend the rest of his natural life worrying if some as-yet-undetected contamination will
surface, undermining the value of the property and possibly bringing with it potentially costly
liability claims").
129. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 39-40
(quoting the statement of Tim Vanderver. Senior Partner, Patton Boggs, that "(t]he private law-
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jeopardize the viability of their'projects: 130 A CERCLA cleanup can
take many years to complete, and, in that time, a project that was
initially viable can become inefficient. 131

2.

Uncertainty for Lending Institution.s

Perhaps even more important than the disincentives for developers is the perception of lenders that they face risks for lending on con-·
taminated property. 132 As "the traditional sources of capital for
factory rehabilitation and renovation for start-up companies," 133 their
participation at brownfield sites is crucial to the success of most
projects .. However, lenders often practice "greenlining," routinely refusing to extend loans to brownfield redevelopers. 134
Lenders fear they will become a target for liability under CERCLA if they lend money on brownfield redevelopment projects. 135
This fear is widespread 136 and justified. Recent cases interpreting
CERCLA have held lenders liable for cleanup costs at Superfund sites
yer's worst fear is, after he signs the administrative order on behalf of his client with the state, is
[sic] to have the EPA come in and say 'do it again"').
130. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 76; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 51-52 (stating that "[d]elay is so widely recognized as a flaw of
[CERCLA] that advocates of inner-city rehabilitation are likely to be skeptical when told that
waiting for cleanup under government mandates will suffice"); Solo, supra note 23, at 294 n.41
(describing the "great delays" in Superfund cleanups).
·
131. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 55 (stating that "[t]he pragmatic developer fears that by the time an environmental agency can become satisfied that no further RCRA
and CERCLA remediation duties exist for an industrial location, the manufacturer will no
longer sustain interest in that manufacturing site").
132. id. at 45, 52 (claiming that "[f]ear of liability encourages banks to withhold loans and
opportunities for business development in inner cities"); Solo, supra note 23, at 299.
133. O'Reilly, Indiana's incentives, supra note 24, at 52.
134. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29; Pennsylvaniti Chamber Testimony,
supra note 74, at 260; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39 (noting
that lenders' caution may make property "unmarketable"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 730-31
n.107 (citing Charles Bartsch et al., Restoring Contaminated Sites, lssuEs Sci. & TECH., Mar. 22,
1994, at 74); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 54. The obvious analogy here is to
the practice of "redlining," the systematic refusal of banks to extend loans to prospective home
purchasers in certain neighborhoods. See, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15 (terming
this practice "brownlining"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 731.
135. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15; Solo,
supra note 23, at 299; see also Eric S. Tresh, The Return of Lender Liability Under CERCLA:
What Should Lenders Do?, 3 S.C. ENVTL L.J. 131, 133 (1994) (noting that lenders fear CERCLA
liability by virtue of their involvement).
136. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15 (citing a poll by the American Bankers Association that indicated that "43 percent of small financial institutions ... had stopped making
loans to companies associated with environmental contamination"); RESOURCES FOR THE FuTURE, supra note 26, at 1-2 (citing a survey of its members by the Independent Bankers Association of America found that "seven out of ten indicated that there are some classes of loans their
institution will not write due to environmental liability concerns"); O'Reilly, Indiana's incentives, supra note 24, at 53-54 (citing a study in New Jersey of lenders' fears); John Holusha, EPA
Helping Cities to Revive Industrial Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 1 (citing the ABA survey).
Lenders' fears of liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA were the subject of discussion at a
recent conference on brownfield redevelopment. Uncertainty Greatest Concern of Lenders in
Redeveloping Brownfields, Panel Says, 65 Banking Rep. (BNA) 654 (Oct. 23, 1995) [hereinafter
Uncertainty Greatest Concern].
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as the "owner or operator" of the sites if they are sufficiently involved
in activities at the sites. 137 The scope of "lender liability" is· still a
matter of intense debate. 138
137. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 7-9; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 770; Michel,
supra note 20, at 443-46; Solo, supra note 23, at 299.
CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994), excludes certain lenders from the
definition of "owner or operator," exempting "a person who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." See also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7:
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 770. A number of recent cases, most notably United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991), and Kelley
v. EPA. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 25 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub
nom. American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995), have created considerable uncertainty in the lending community over the scope of this exemption. In Fleet Factors, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the lender was liable as the "operator" of the facility because "its involvement
with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could
affect hazardous waste disposal if it so chose." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558; see RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 26 n.48; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 770; Alfred R.
Light, Deja Vu All Over Again?: A Memoir of Superfund Past, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall
1995, at 29, 32; Michel, supra note 20, at 445-46; Tresh, supra note 135, at 138. Fleet Factors "sent
shock waves through the financial community," subjecting virtually every lender to CERCLA
liability, as lenders usually have the requisite level of control over borrowers. See, e.g., COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 8-9; Tresh, supra note 135, at 138. Recognizing this, lenders began
shunning contaminated property and asking Congress for relief. Light, supra, at 32; Michel,
supra note 20, at 446; Tresh, supra note 135, at 139-40.
Not all courts of appeals followed the rationale of Fleet Factors. The Ninth Circuit held that
a lender must actually participate in the management of the facility before it could be considered
to be an "owner or operator." In re Bergsoe Metals Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 8 (discussing Bergsoe Metals). Bergsoe Metals was of small
comfort to lenders, who believed they would still face liability under the relatively vague test of
"actually participating" in management. Tresh, supra note 135, at 140-41. Moreover, the split in
the circuits' rulings prompted widespread uncertainty. In response, the EPA adopted a rule in
1992 that specifically defined the scope of activities which a lender could undertake without
"participating in management" of a facility and clarified the protections available to a foreclosing lender. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 446-47. For example,
the rule subjected the lender to liability only if it had "undertaken responsibility for the borrower's waste disposal or hazardous substance handling practices," or "exercised control at a
management level ... comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such that
(it) ha(s] assumed or manifested responsibility for the management of the enterprise." 57 Fed.
Reg. 18,344, 18,377 (1992); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 446-47: Tresh, supra note 135, at
144. Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the lender liability
rule in Kelley on the grounds that the EPA was attempting to change CERCLA by regulation
and did not have the authority to promulgate the rule. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d at 1108; see also
Light, supra, at 32; Michel, supra note 20, at 448-49; Tresh, supra note 135, at 145-50. Therefore,
the uncertainty over lender liability persists, and Congress will have to act if lender liability
under CERCLA is to be limited. See Berger et al., supra note 23, at 78; Light, supra, at 32;
Michel, supra note 20, at 449; Tresh, supra note 135, at 149-51 (noting that the Kelley court
stated that even though its decision would cause continued uncertainty, it was necessary, given
the invalidity of the EPA's rule); Solo, supra note 23, at 299-300.
138. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 53; Solo, supra note 23, at 299. Evan
Henry, Bank of America's Vice President and Manager for Environmental Services, stated at a
recent conference that "[t)he environmental liability precedent set by CERCLA is still alive and
well," and "lenders can get tagged for environmental cleanup costs associated with the property
that are above and beyond" the amount of their loans. Uncertainty Greatest Concern, supra note
136, at 654. For recent discussions of lender liability's continued vitality after Kelley v. EPA, and
the call from the financial community for reform, see Sara A. Goldberg, Lender Liability Under
CERCLA: Shaping a New Legal Rule, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 61 (1995); Light, supra note 137, at
32 (stating that Kelley invalidated the EPA's rule intended to "fix" the lender liability problem);
Tresh, supra note 135, at 136. On the subject of lender liability generally, see William R. Mitch-
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There are other considerations besides liability. Lenders fear that
the discovery of contamination at the site will decrease the market
value of their collateral1 39 or compel borrowers to spend large sums
on cleanups, forcing them to default on loans. 140
C.

The Call for Reform

We should be cautious about making generalizations about the
impact of developers' fears of environmental laws and, for that matter, any other assertion.that environmental laws prevent activity that
would otherwise take place. 141 The flight of businesses to greenfield
sites began long before CERCLA's enactment in 1980.142 Researchers have yet to establish a causal link between businesses' location
decisions and perceived environmental costs. 143 Moreover, fear of environmental liability is not the only problem with brownfield sites. 144
A recent study by the nonprofit group Resources for the Future concluded that there are many other reasons besides fear of environmental liability why brownfield sites remain undeveloped. 145 High urban
ell, CERCLA: The Problem of Lender Liability, 7 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 101 (1991); Philip
J. Schworer & Catherine M. White, Environmental Problems and Their Effect on Lending Institutions, 18 N. KY. L. REv. 175 (1991).
139. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 78; Mc Williams,
supra note 20, at 726; Tresh, supra note 135, at 133; Solo, supra note 23, at 299.
140. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26,
at 26 n.48; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 77-78; Patrice Courtney, Urban Alchemy: Turning
Brown to Green, VIRGINIA'S ENv'T, Feb. 1996, at 14 (quoting Stephen Driver, Manager of Construction and Environmental Services, Chase Manhattan Bank, Bridgeport, CT) ("A bank wants
to know that the borrower is not going to go bankrupt."); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 726;
Tresh, supra note 135, at 133; Solo, supra note 23, at 299.
141. The perception that environmental laws have a chilling effect on business location deci- ·
sions may simply be inaccurate. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6 (concluding that "among the conclusions in the literature, the empirical evidence of the effect of
environmental regulation on land use is ambiguous"); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 40 n.12 (stating
that "while uncertainty may play a contributing role in the continuing underutilization of old
industrial properties, ascribing a causal relationship between the two is unwarranted").
In another context, my colleague, Michael Allan Wolf, has questioned the credibility of
"horror stories" cited by advocates of "reforming" the Endangered Species Act. Michael Allan
Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 637 (1995).
142. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 4.
143. Id. (stating that "[r]esearchers in general have yet to find a systematic relationship between environmental regulation and corporate location decisions"); Buzbee, supra note 26, at
114 n.282.
144. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 303 (testifying that "[m]any brownfield stakeholders
are quick to point out that concern about environmental contamination is only part of the problem"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9-10. Clement Dinsmore
lists a number of obstacles to brownfield redevelopment besides fear of liability under state and
federal environmental laws. Id.
145. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY C?N
INDUSTRIAL AND GREENFIELDS DEVELOPMENT (1994). In the view of at least one commentator,
however, this study may be flawed in that it was prepared under contract to the EPA. Interview
with Clement Dinsmore, Clean Sites, Inc., in Alexandria, Va. (July 27, 1995).
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crime rates, 146 obsolescence of existing infrastructures 147 and manufacturing facilities at brownfield sites, 148 and access from greenfield
sites to amenities and recreation 149 are frequently cited as reasons for
developers' flight to greenfield sites.
Nevertheless, it is a widespread-and perhaps even universalassumption that fear of environmental liability is the dominant concern of brownfield developers. 150 As a result, prospective purchasers
of contaminated brownfield properties often shun sites rather than
buy them and face environmental liability. 151 The costs of brownfield
redevelopment are perceived to exceed the benefits, and therefore
worthy development does not take place. Thus, industries and cities
claim that without the incentives provided by voluntary cleanup statutes, the projects will not be undertaken. 152
Ill.

STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP STATUTES AND FEDERAL
INCENTIVES

The EPA and the Congress have been active in brownfield policy
making, but the states have taken the lead in promoting voluntary
146. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 303; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 10; Tondro, supra
note 20, at 790 n.3.
147. Although some brownfield sites have excellent existing infrastructures, see supra note
59 and accompanying text, others are located near infrastructures too deteriorated to support
development activities. See OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 307-08 (testifying that "[t)here are
a number of other factors that hinder brownfield redevelopment," including "poor location" and
"old and obsolete infrastructure"). The fact that businesses are lured to greenfield sites with
promises to construct new infrastructures indicates that this is an important factor in business
location decisions. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 720 n.52 (citing a study of 2000 finns
conducted by the Bureau of Census that found that "the availability of public works facilities" is
characterized as a 'critical' or 'significant' factor in location decisions").
148. For example, Dinsmore states that:
economic or technological obsolescence of the buildings still standing on many of these
lands also affects the economics of recycling the properties. Typically, these are multi-storied buildings that will not permit the large-scale, high-volume assembly and materials handling that industries now use. Demolishing the buildings and transporting and landfilling
the debris adds significant costs to the preparation of sites for alternative uses.
Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 10; see also Tondro, supra note 20, at 790 n.3 ("Frequently ...
[brownfield sites] have obsolete buildings that would be costly to renovate or demolish in order
to make way for modem manufacturing structures.").
149. See, e.g., OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 303 (stating that "other factors such as ...
low-quality amenities ultimately prevent redevelopment of brownfield sites"). JoEL GARREAU,
EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991), contains a number of case studies of the role
of suburban amenities in the growth of suburban and exurban concentrations of activity, popularly known as "Edge Cities."
150. See, e.g., OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that "[u]ncertain
liability associated with federal and state environmental laws is perhaps the most critical" challenge at brownfield sites).
151. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 716 (noting that "[a)s a result, the owner is
encouraged to remove the property from the market, thereby losing the resale value of the
property but escaping the risk of paying for the entire cleanup").
152. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 (noting the substantial support for voluntary cleanup
programs).
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cleanups at brownfield sites. 153 The most common approaches are reforms of property transfer laws 154 and enactment of voluntary cleanup
statutes that cre~te new programs and reform state CERCLA laws.
The voluntary cleanup statutes are the most widespread and receive
the most attention. 155
A.

1.

State Voluntary Cleanup Statutes

The Statutes and Their Common Features

Twenty-nine states have statutes and regulations that establish
programs to provide incentives for voluntary cleanups of contaminated sites, 156 and this number is growing rapidly. 157 Several states,
153. See, e.g., NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 43; Courtney, supra note 140, at 14
(stating that "[t]he most dramatic changes are taking place in the states, not in Washington");
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 103; Bernard A. Weintraub, New Jersey's Approach to the Voluntary
Remediation of Brownfield Sites, N.J. L.J., June 5, 1995, at 16 (noting that "while the federal
government is part of this movement ... , most of the attempts to facilitate the remediation and
redevelopment of brownfield sites are occurring on the state level"). For a description of federal
brownfield activities, see infra notes 407-76 and accompanying text.
154. Property transfer laws condition the transfer of real property (or its ownership or control) on the discovery, identification, investigation, cleanup, or filing of disclosure forms about
contamination at the site. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 12-13; Tondro, supra
note 20, at 793. In 1994, 18 states. including New Jersey and Connecticut, had property transfer
laws. OTA STATE OF nrn STATES, supra note 20, at 12; see, e.g., Tondro, supra note 20, at 792
(~iting the Connecticut Transfer of Hazardous Waste Establishment Act, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN.'§ 22a-134 (West 1995)). These statutes were intended to facilitate the reuse of property by
providing a statutory mechanism for cleanups. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 11. _However,
they often had the opposite effect: chilling cleanups due to the complex process involved in
property transfers. Thus, reforms to these laws may hold promise for brownfield site reuse. Id.
at 807-10.
New Jersey and Connecticut are the two states which have enacted the most comprehensive
statutes to change the disincentives to property reuse in existing property transfer laws. In 1993,
New Jersey enacted the "Industrial Site Recovery Act" (ISRA), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to 14 (West Supp. 1996), which was intended to streamline the cumbersome property transfer process of the state's "Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act" and provide incentives for
site reuse. See OTA STATE OF nrn STATES, supra note 20, at 12-13; Buzbee, supra note 26, at
107 n.254; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740 (describing the amended cleanup standards of
ISRA). New Jersey's voluntary cleanup program applies to low priority sites under the requirements of the ISRA. See N.J. ADMJN. CooE tit. 7, § 26C (WESTLAW through July 15, 1996)
(outlining scope and procedures for remedial activities under Memoranda of Agreement); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82. Connecticut's Urban Sites Remedial Action Program {USRAP), created by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133m (West 1995), operates in conjunction with
the state's Transfer Act. In 1995, Connecticut enacted two laws expanding its voluntary cleanup
program. Id. § 22a-134a (a)-( e), (m) (modifying the requirements of the transfer act); id. §§ 22a452d, -452e, -432, -133k, -134e, -1330, -133p, -134d; 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190 §§ 1-6, 14 (providing for voluntary cleanups and defining the role of licensed professionals); see also Reed D.
Rubinstein, Waiting for the Happy Ending, CONN. L. TRJB., Nov. 13, 1995, at S4.
155. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13-14.
156. States' voluntary cleanup programs operate under a combination of authorities, including statutes specifically intended to promote voluntary cleanups, existing statutory authorities
(typically state CERCLA Jaws), regulations promulgated under the authority of new statutes,
existing regulations, and informal policy and guidance documents. In Oregon, for example, the
Volunteer Cleanup Program has operated since 1991 under the state CERCLA law, OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 465.200-.455 {1992 & Supp. 1996), and the regulations promulgated under it, OR. Ao.
MIN. R. 340-122-010 to -140 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995). In addition, guidance docu-
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including New Hampshire and New York, have programs in place
without direct statutory authority or have pilot projects. 158 These
ments have been issued that amplify specific issues such as numerical soil cleanup standards as
found in OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-045 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995). In 1995, the Oregon
Legislature acted to amend the state CERCLA law to promote voluntary cleanups. See 1995 Or.
Laws 662. However, certain features of the program described in this article such as the public
participation requirements as found in OR. REV. STAT.§ 465.320 (1992) and OR. ADMIN. R. 340122-100 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995), were unaffected by the 1995 act and continue to be
based on existing authority. The list in the appendix contains the authorities upon which each
state bases its program. See infra app.
For general descriptions of state programs, see NEPI WHITE PAPER. supra note 20, at 43-47
(comparing the approaches in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, and California); OTA
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9-24; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9, 10-12; Stephen C.
Jones, Unless Congress Authorizes the EPA to Grant Developers Releases from Liabiliry, New
Inner-City Cleanup Programs May Be of Limited Value, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at B6. Specific descriptions of individual statutes are found in COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 71-115
(describing existing programs according to the EPA Region in which the states are located};
Brian L. Buniva & James R. Kibler, Jr., Virginia Joins National Trend in Protecting Environmental Audits and Encouraging Voluntary Remediation of Contaminated Sites, VA. BAR Ass'N J.,
Summer 1995, at 8 (describing the Virginia statute); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 118-22 app. 1
(listing 19 statutory and several informal voluntary cleanup programs in place by 1995); Casserly,
supra note 26, at 265-74 (describing the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes); Clokey, supra note
26 (describing the Wisci>nsin statute); Thomas J. Helfrich, Missouri Hazardous Substance Environmental Remediation Program: One Year Later, 5 Mo. Envtl. Compliance Update (M. Lee
Smith}, No. 3, at 1 (Sept. 1995) (describing the Missouri program); Michel, supra note 20, at 45464 (describing the Ohio statute); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56-67 (describing the Indiana statute); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121-56 {describing the California, Colorado,
Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia statutes, and the Illinois
program); Rubinstein, supra note 154 {describing the Connecticut statutes); Thomas A. Wackerman, Take Advantage of "New" Relief for Polluted Propeny, MICH. LAW. WKL v., June 26, 1995,
at 6 (describing the Michigan statute); Weintraub, supra note 153 {describing the New Jersey
statute).
Ohio and Pennsylvania maintain comprehensive sites on the Internet's World Wide Web to
assist persons interested in voluntary cleanups. See About the Ohio Voluntary Action Program
(last modified Aug. 22, 1996) <http://www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volunt.html> [hereinafter Ohio Voluntary Action Program]; Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program, (last modified July 23, 1996)
<http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/default.htm>. Other states with
program information available on the Internet include Maine and Massachusetts. Bureau of
Hazardous Materials & Solid Waste Control, Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, The Voluntary
Cleanup Program {last modified July 1994) <http://www.state.me.us/dep/ip-vraphtm>; Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup Home Page {last modified July
10, 1996) <http://www.state.ma.us/dep/bwsc/bwschome.htm>.
157. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that voluntary cleanup programs "are being developed at a rapid pace" with 17 programs adopted since 1991); see also
Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 (stating that "[a]lready 25 states have some sort of voluntary
cleanup program, and the trend is expected to accelerate"). In 1995, for example, states enacting
or substantially modifying their voluntary cleanup statutes included Arkansas, Connecticut
(which expanded its voluntary cleanup statute and enacted substantial amendments to its property transfer act), Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. See infra app.
158. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77-78, 84-85 {describing the New Hampshire and
New York programs); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 92-93 (describing efforts to enact a voluntary cleanup statute in New York). The New York Department of Environmental Conservation
implemented a voluntary cleanup program in 1994, based on a policy memorandum. See CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84-85; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 119 app. 1; Steven G. Brooks,
Cities Look to Brownfields for Greenbacks, NATION'S CmEs WKLY., Sept. 4, 1995, at 5. Proposals have been introduced in the New York General Assembly and State Senate in recent years to
create a statutory voluntary cleanup program. See N.Y. S.B. 3848, 218th General Assembly, 1st
Reg. Sess. (1995); N.Y. S.B. 341, 218th General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). None of these

No. 4)

BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS

917

states and others are considering proposals to adopt voluntary cleanup
statutes. 159 Some states such as Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
and Ohio, have extensive programs tailored to redevelopment of
brownfield sites, whereas others such as North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia, have more limited voluntary cleanup statutes. 160 The
most developed programs are those in the northeastern and midwestproposals has been enacted into law, although Senate Bill No. 3848 did pass one house of the
legislature in 1995. The New York Voluntary Cleanup Program has many of the same features as
statutory programs. For example, a participant in the program may receive a "no further action"
letter from the state regarding the state's intent to avoid pursuing enforcement actions at the
site. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84-85. However, because the New York program is
based on the state's administrative discretion, a participant in it does not have the same guarantees as participants in other states' programs. See Beth Fitting, Environmentalists, Developers,
and the Regulators Finally Seem to Be Pulling in the Same Direction, CENTRAL N.Y. Bus. J., July
10, 1995, at 10 (quoting the statement of Neil Gingold, an attorney with the Syracuse, NY law
firm of Hancock & Estabrook, that "[t]here is no legislation in this state to guarantee freedom
from future liability").
California has both a statutory cleanup program, a pilot project created in the California
Expedited Remedial Action Reform Act of 1994, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE §§ 2539625399.2 (West Supp. 1996), and an informal Voluntary Cleanup Program. See COMING CLEAN,
supra note 24, at 109; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 118 app. 1 (listing the California programs). The
notation "California ERAP" in the charts in this part refers to the statutory pilot project; the
notation "California VCP" refers to the Voluntary Cleanup Program.
As the voluntary cleanup programs in Iowa and Kansas are pilot projects, they are not
counted among the states' programs or considered in this part. See id.; Program Surveys Received from State Voluntary Clean Program Administrators (1996) [hereinafter Survey Results]
(surveys compiled by and on file with author; program information is believed to be current as of
July 1, 1996) (regarding the Iowa program). The Utah statute is included; however, no developer
to date has entered into an agreement to perform a voluntary cleanup in the Utah program. See
ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, VCP/BROWNFIELD RESOURCE GUIDE 31 (1995) [hereinafter ILLINOIS EPA GUIDE]. The state of Utah cautions that its statute is not, strictly speaking,
"written to serve as a voluntary cleanup program," and, as such, "does not contain the usual
elements" of other states' statutes. Survey Results, supra.
159. The Maryland and Oklahoma legislatures are currently considering proposals to create
voluntary cleanup statutes. See 1996 Md. H.B. 5 (bill introduced Jan. 10, 1996, to establish a
voluntary cleanup program in the Maryland Department of the Environment); 1996 Okla. H.B.
2972 (bill introduced Jan. 12, 1996, to create a voluntary remediation program in Oklahoma); see
also Judith Evans, Cleaning Up the Nation's 'Brownfields'; Critics Want Some Assurances Industrial Sites Aren't Re-Polluted, WASH. PosT, Nov. 25, 1995, at El (describing the development of
the Maryland proposal); Maryland: Businesses Push for Brownfields Cleanup Bill, Greenwire,
Dec. 4, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 12/4/95 APN-GR 17 [hereinafter Maryland Proposal].
160. By March 1996, no site had progressed through the Arkansas or Tennessee program to
a final cleanup, and Vermont had only one site in its program; by contrast, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota had each had hundreds of sites enter their programs, and Indiana had 77
sites in the program, with another four to six entering each month. Telephone Interviews with
State Voluntary Cleanup Program Administrators (1996) [hereinafter Telephone Interviews]
(program information is believed to be current as of July 1, 1996); see also Buzbee, supra note
26, at 118-19 app. 1 (noting that states have handled as few as one site (California ERAP) and as
many as 3600 sites (New Jersey)); Jones, supra note 156; cf OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra
note 20, at 19 (noting that as of May 1995, over 100 sites had been cleaned up in the Minnesota
program and limits on liability had been issued for 300 sites); Douglas E. Congdon, Virginia's
Voluntary Cleanup Act: Where's the Beef?, VIRGINIA'S ENV'T, Feb. 1996, at 6 (noting that the
Virginia program is currently handling fewer than a dozen sites); Courtney, supra note 140, at 15
(noting incorrectly that site owners at over 800 sites have received certificates of completion in
Massachusetts since October 1993; this number refers to the number of sites in the program);
Rubinstein, supra note 154 (noting that Illinois regulators were handling 300 sites in the state's
voluntary cleanup program by 1993).

918

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1996

em states 161 of Connecticut, 162 Illinois, 163 Indiana, 164 Massachusetts,165 Michigan, 166 Minnesota, 167 New Jersey, 168 Ohio, 169
Pennsylvania, 170 and Wisconsin. 171
The statutes vary widely in their structure and provisions. Some
consist of amendments to state CERCLA laws or revamped state
CERCLA schemes that encourage voluntary cleanups. 172 Others are
free-standing acts applying to sites and developers meeting statutory
criteria for participation. 173 Some spell out in detail such critical is161. Jones, supra note 156.
162. Cf NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 45 (describing Connecticut's cleanup funding
mechanisms); Rubinstein, supra note 154 (criticizing the new Connecticut statute).
163. See OTA STATE oF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 24; Rubinstein, supra note 154.
164. See O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56-57.
165. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 75-77 (noting that eight to ten covenants already
have been granted).
166. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 23 (stating that the Michigan statute,
together with those of Pennsylvania and Illinois, "characterizes many of the issues at the heart of
the debate on brownfields"); Rubinstein, supra note 154 (stating that "Michigan lawmakers ...
acted decisively ... [and] a few months later, their efforts are already paying off").
167. In 1988, Minnesota started what is generally recognized as the first voluntary cleanup
program, working by administrative discretion within the state's mini-CERCLA _program. The
program's codification in 1992 spurred further growth and development, and Minnesota's program is viewed widely as a "pioneer" and model program. See THE GREENFIELDS GROUP, supra
note 25, at 3; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (terming the Minnesota
program the first voluntary cleanup program, and describing its features); Casserly, supra note
26, at 262; Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6; Solo, supra note 23, at 318 n.177 (terming Minne~
sota's program a "model" voluntary cleanup program). A number of state officials contacted for
this article cited the Minnesota statute as an influential model; the Louisiana statute closely
resembles it. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
168. New Jersey's Industrial Site Recovery Act was not the first brownfield statute. However, the state is generally recognized as one of the first to create incentives for brownfield
cleanups through the use of administrative discretion. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 (crediting New Jersey as the first state to provide incentives for brownfield cleanups); Pendergrass,
supra note 26, at 6 (stating that "New Jersey was the first state to deal with the key problem, that
developers and financers shy away from contaminated sites"); Weintraub, supra note 153, at 16.
169. See Michel, supra note 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 124 (stating that "[t]he Ohio
Voluntary Action Program is perhaps the most comprehensive voluntary cleanup legislation enacted into law").
170. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 15 (stating that the impact of the new Pennsylvania
law may be "far-reaching"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 152-53 (terming the Pennsylvania program "progressive," and "[a]rguably as comprehensive as the Ohio [program]"); Cliff Tuttle, The
New Hot Properties: Old Industrial Sites: New 'Brownfield' Laws Should Entice Developers,
Lenders, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 30, 1995, at 13.
171. See Clokey, supra note 26, at 35 (stating that "[t]he new [Wisconsin] Act alters existing
law in several significant respects and has had an immediate impact upon many real estate and
financial transactions involving contaminated property within the state").
172. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Washington, among others, are states that
have adopted this approach. See 70 Del. Laws ch. 218, amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 9101-9116 (1995), and Delaware Regulations Governing Hazardous Substance Cleanup§§ 115 (1996) [hereinafter Delaware Regulations]; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (West
Supp. 1996) and MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0001-.0996 (WESTLAW through Register No.
794); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 324.20101-.20142 (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.105D.010-.921 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); and WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 173-340-100 to -890
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996).
173. Illinois's "Site Investigation and Remedial Activities Program," for example, applies
separate requirements to sites meeting statutory criteria, with other sites remaining subject to

No. 4]

BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS

919

sues as applicable cleanup standards,174 while others leave these details to rule-making proceedings 175 and administrative discretion.17~
Statutory provisions have evolved rapidly as states learn from one anthe state's CERCLA law. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5158 to 58.12 (West Supp. 1996); cf IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-1 to -23 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.).
174. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.301 to -.304 (West Supp. 1996) (establishing
procedures for determining cleanup standards).
175. A number of states have supplemented their voluntary cleanup statutes with official
regulations promulgated specifically under the new statutes' authority. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit.
10, § 25-15.010 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§§ 3745-300-01, 3745-300-03 to -05, 3745-300-12 to -14, 3745-300-99 (WESTLAW through Aug.
31, 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203-(WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting new rules, 30 TEx. ADMIN.
CODE§§ 333.1-.11). Others rely upon rules developed to implement a state CERCLA law. See,
e.g., MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0001-.0996 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); TENN.
COMP. R. & REGS.§§ 1200-1-13-.01 to -.13 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 173-340-100 to -890 (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); Wis. ADMIN.
CoDE chs. NR 716, 724, 726 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); Clokey, supra
note 26, at 39-44 (referring to provisions of Wisconsin's administrative rules); Casserly, supra
note 26, at 273 (describing the Wisconsin approach); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
Some states provide authority and/or mandates to develop program rules. See, e.g.' DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 9104(b)(2) (WESTLAW through 1st Special Sess. of 138th General Assembly,
1995); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.ll(c) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring rules to be promulgated within nine months after the effective date of the act); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-23
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing rule-making authority); LA.. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 30:2290(B) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 260.571 (West Supp. 1996); OR.
REv. STAT. § 465.315(2) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.104(a) (West Supp. 1996);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-18 (Supp. 1996); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.612
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that public participation may be provided for by rule; notice re·
·
quirement added to rules effective in 1996).
Pennsylvania's Bureau of Land Recycling and Waste Management, together with the Bureau of Regulatory Counsel, is developing rules to implement the Pennsylvania statute. PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 12. The Virginia program will rely
on administrative rules to be promulgated by July 1, 1997, to clarify statutory provisions. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.l(A), -1429.l(B) (Michie Supp. 1996). Until then, the program will be
administered on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 10.1-1429.l(B); see also Buniva & Kibler, supra note
156, at 10. Rules are also under development in Illinois, North Carolina (which currently relies
on a guidance document for most aspects of its program), Oregon, and Rhode Island. D1v1s10N
OF SITE REMEDIATION, RHODE ISLAND DEP'T OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY REMEDIATION AND REUSE PROGRAM: A USER'S GUIDE 2 (1996) (hereinafter RHODE
ISLAND USER'S GuIDE] (stating that Rhode Island is developing soil cleanup standards); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
Ohio's Voluntary Action Program is operating on an interim basis under the 1994.statute
and a first set of program rules; until final rules are developed, the program is limited to 200
cleanups at sites not involving groundwater contamination. See Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 3746.04, 3746.07 (Anderson 1995) (calling for adoption of rules to implement program requirements, and applying interim standards prior to adoption of generic cleanup standards);
OHIO ADMIN. CoDE §§ 3745-300-01, -300-03 to -05, -300-12 to -14, -300-99 (WESTLAW through
Aug. 31, 1996); Department of Emergency & Remedial Response, Ohio Envtl. Protection
Agency, Real Estate Cleanup and Reuse Program (last modified Dec. 19, 1996) <http://
www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volunt.html>.
176. Many states rely on detailed "guidance documents" that supplement the statutes. See
generally Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134-36 (describing the Minnesota approach); Casserly,
supra note 26 (referring to guidance documents used in Minnesota). Although these do not
have the force of law, they can often be important elements in voluntary cleanup programs. This
article cites to guidance documents where possible; the reader should be aware, however, that
specific details of a state's implementation of its statute may be amplified upon in a guidance
doc11ment not described in this section.
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other. 177 The recent Ohio and Pennsylvania statutes arguably represent the most comprehensive and enthusiastic state efforts to promote
voluntary cleanups. 178
Despite widespread variations, there are some common features
in each of the states' programs. All of the programs are voluntary; no
developer is forced to enter into them. 179 The principal mechanism of
each program is a streamlined cleanup process, in which developers
conduct cleanups in a fast-tracked process 180 to meet redefined
cleanup standards. The cleanup process begins with an investigation
to characterize existing conditions at the site. 181 The developer then
prepares a cleanup plan and carries it out, cleaning up the site to meet
specific statewide standards, site-specific standards based on higher
levels of risk than those allowed in the Superfund program, or standards based on background levels of contamination in the area. 182
177. Courtney, supra note 140, at 14. Many state officials contacted for this article indicated
that they had examined one or more existing programs in developing their own programs. Some
relied on programs of adjoining or nearby states, but others (Illinois, for example) had surveyed
a larger number of existing programs. ILLINOIS EPA GUIDE, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
178. See PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 9-11 (reprinting
an article entitled New State Approach Aids Developers in Recycling Old Industrial Sites, first
published in the Harrisburg Patriot on Nov. 24, 1995); Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (terming
Ohio a "leader in this field"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 124, 152. The responses to the Ohio
and Pennsylvania programs are by no means universally positive. The programs have been criticized as "going too far" to promote voluntary cleanups. See, e.g., Pendergrass, supra note 26, at
6:
Sometimes, unfortunately, in their zeal to do something about brownfields, lawmakers go
too far. In May (1995), for example, Pennsylvania enacted a law that essentially treats any
site as if it is a brownfield worthy of special incentives and cleanup standards, regardless of
where it is located or its history.
But see Michel, supra note 20, at 464 (claiming that the Ohio statute "falls short in providing
incentives to volunteer remediators").
179. See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REv.
CoDE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995) (providing that except at sites where voluntary cleanups are prohibited, "any person may undertake a voluntary action ... to identify and address
potential sources of contamination by hazardous substances or petroleum of soil, sediments,
surface water, or ground water on or underlying property and to establish that the property
meets applicable standards"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN._§ 361.602 (West Supp. 1996)
(providing that the program is "restricted to voluntary actions"); INDIANA DEP'T OF ENVTL.
MANAGEMENT, VOLUNTARY REMEDIATION PROGRAM 1 (1996) (hereinafter INDIANA VRP
FACT SHEET]; see also OTA STATE oF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13 (noting that the major
difference between voluntary cleanup programs and other state programs is that "owners or
developers of a site approach the state voluntarily to cooperatively work out a process by which
the site can be readied for development"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 58
(stating that participation in Indiana's program is voluntary).
180. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13 (observing that "[v]oluntary programs are particularly popular because they allow private parties to ... avoid some of the cost
and delays associated with state Superfund or other enforcement driven programs"). The
remediation process is streamlined in a number of ways. Many statutes impose time limits on
critical steps in the decision-making process about cleanup of an individual site. See infra notes
374-78 and accompanying text. A developer's ability to choose a predetermined cleanup standard, see infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text, also shortens the process.
181. See infra notes 204-23 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 231-88 and accompanying text.
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Cl~anups are conducted with varying degrees of state oversight,
with a trend toward less state involvement. 183 A developer whose
cleanup is approved by the state receives some form of protection
against future state enforcement actions, 184 and this limit on liability is
often transferrable. to the developer's successors and assigns. 185 . Several states aim t!J spur redevelopment of brownfield sites further by
providing financial incentives designed to reduce the costs of cleanups.186 Some states also provide for public participation in the decision-making process. 187
· The definition of perspns eligible for participation in some states
is anyone willing to clean up a site. 188 Other states restrict participa-

183. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121; see infra notes 352-73 and accompanying text.
184. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18-19; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121-22;
see infra notes 289-351 and aecompanying text.
185. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text .
.. 186. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18-20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 122.
Firiancial assistance can consist of Io.w-interest loans, grants, or tax incentives for developers. See
infra notes 395-406 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 382-94 and accompanying text.
188. The states allowing anyone to participate include: Arizona (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-285(8) (West Supp. 1996)); California (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 109 (California
VCP has no formal restriction on parties eligible to participate; program includes prospective
purchasers, owners, and responsible parties)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(a)
(WESTLAW through end of lstSpecial'Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (allowing
p~rticipation by "any person who has knowledge of a release of a hazardous substance at. a
facility and agrees to perform a remedy"; state retains discretion to disqualify applicants)); Illi'
nois (415 Ii.L. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.2 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing participation by "remediation applicant," defined as "any person seeking to perform or performing investigative or
remedial activities under this Title, including the owrier or operator of the site")); Indiana (INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 1); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175(1)(a)
(West Supp. 1995)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567(1) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CoDE
REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(1) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Montana
(MoNT. · CODE ANN. § 75-10-733(1) (1995)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15,184
(WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24,
at 77 (regarding New Hampshire)); New Jersey (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82 (New
Jersey has no restriction 6n eligibility)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.9(b)
(1995)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995)); Oregon (OR. REv.
STAT. § 465.325(1) (Supp. 1996); 1995 Or. Laws 662 § 4(1)(a) (allowing participation by any
person, and establishing separate criteria for prospective purchasers who may receive releases
from liability)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.301(a) (West Supp. 1996) (allowing
participation by any "person who proposes or is required to respond to the ·release of a regulated
substance at a site and who wants to be eligible for the [available] cleanup liability protection"));
Rhode Island (R.l. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-7, -3(b), -10 (Supp. 1995) (provides for a liability exemption for a "bona fide prospective purchaser," defined as "a purchaser of a site who intends to
purchase a contaminated property, who had documented their intent to purchase the property in
writing, and who has offered to pay fair market value for the property in the contaminated
state," who also settles with the state);· RHODE ISLAND UsER's GumE, supra note 175, at 3
(participants may include responsible parties, volunteers, and bona fide prospective purchasers;
actions of participants are governed by the DEM's Site Remediation Regulations)); Tennessee
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(a) (Supp. 1995) (allowing participation by any party who is
"willing and able to conduct an investigation and cleanup of an inactive hazardous substance
site"; state has instituted an application procedure to determine if the party is in good standing));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.§ 10.1-1429.l(A) (Michie Supp. 1996) (allowing participation by owners and persons who "own, operate, have a security interest in or enter into a contract for the
purchase of contaminated property to voluntarily remediate releases of hazardous substances,
hazardous wastes, solid wastes or petroleum")); Washington (Telephone Inte~iews, supra note
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tion to a site's prospective purchaser189 or current owner. 190 A developer responsible for existing contamination at the site-usually as a
"responsible person" under a state CERCLA law or as an owner or
operator of a site requiring remediation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-is sometimes disqualified from taking part
in the program. 191 The states also focus on sites believed to be of
160 (Washington imposes no eligibility restriction on participants conducting "independent remedial actions" under WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24,
1996); potentially liable parties also may negotiate voluntary agreements, including consent decrees and "agreed orders," under the procedure set forth in id. § 173-340-510(2)). See also
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 151 n.296 (describing the Virginia provision); Survey Results, supra
note 158 (regarding the New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee provisions); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California, Delaware, Indiana, and Washington programs).
As indicated in notes 192 and 193 and the accompanying text, infra, states may disqualify
persons otherwise eligible because the sites in question are ineligible to participate in the program. See, e.g., Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Maine program, which disqualifies
certain sites subject to RCRA, and the Texas program, which disqualifies certain sites subject to
state enforcement actions).
189. ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 8-7-503(16), -523(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (defining a "prospective purchaser" as ·'a person who expresses a willingness to acquire an abandoned industrial site
and is not responsible for any preexisting pollution at or contamination on the site" and requiring that the prospective purchaser "reuse or redevelop the property for industrial activities to
create employment expansion"); MASSACHUSETrS DEP'T OF ENvrL PROTECTION, CLEAN SITES
INITIATIVE 2 (1995) (hereinafter MASSACHUSETrS CLEAN SITES INmATIVE FACT SHEET] (restricting eligibility to prospective purchasers or prospective tenants); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6602, 6615a(b), 6615a(f)(l)(B) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (allowing participation by an "eligible
person"; restricts participation to prospective purchasers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(1)(c),
(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995) (exempts a "purchaser" from liability, and defines purchaser as "a
person who acquires property in an arm's-length, good-faith transaction ... (who] did not participate in the management of, and was not the owner of, a business or entity that caused the
release of a hazardous substance on the property[;] ... did not own the property at the time of a
hazardous substance was released(; and] ... did not otherwise cause the release of a hazardous
substance on the property"); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Vermont
provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Vermont provision).
190. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Survey Results, supra
note 158.
191. ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-523(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:2285.l(A) (West Supp. 1996) (barring a "responsible person" as defined in id. §§ 30:2271 :2279); MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 2; COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New York excludes responsible parties at state Superfund sites);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 361.610(a) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding a developer that
is a "responsible party" at the time of application); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(c) (Supp.
1996) (excluding a person otherwise liable under the state's hazardous waste cleanup statute);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 123
(citing to the Colorado and Minnesota provisions). In Wisconsin, a responsible person may not
remediate the property, or receive a release from liability, but may perform site investigation
activities.
But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.l 75(6a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that responsible
persons who undertake voluntary response actions may obtain a limitation on liability); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 133. Other states allowing participation by responsible persons include
California ERAP (applying the pilot project to responsible persons who agree to be bound by
program requirements, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25396.6(c)(3) (West Supp. 1996)),
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See SuPERFUND SECTION,
N.C. DEP'T OF ENv'T, HEALTH & NATURAL RESOURCES, INACTIVE HAZARDOUS SITES PROGRAM: GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE PARTY VOLUNTARY SITE REMEDIAL ACTION 1-1 (1996)
[hereinafter N.C. GUIDELINES]; RHODE ISLAND USER'S GUIDE, supra note 175, at 3; Telephone
Interviews, supra note 160; supra note 189 and accompanying text. Although Oregon allows
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lesser regulatory concern. Many prohibit voluntary cleanups of sites
listed on the NPL1 92 or a comparable state list, or exclude sites subject
to certain types of state or federal enforcement action (e.g., state
CERCLA cleanups, RCRA corrective action cleanups, and underground storage tank (UST) cleanups). 193 However, some states such
responsible persons to participate in its Volunteer Cleanup Program in order to obtain a "no
further action" letter, it does not allow them to obtain a release from liability under its new
"Prospective Purchaser Agreement." 1995 Or. Laws 662 § 4(1)(a); Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160. Similarly, responsible parties in Rhode Island may receive a "letter of compliance,"
but not a covenant not to sue. RHODE ISLAND USER'S GUIDE, supra note 175, at 3-4; Telephone
Interviews, supra note 160.
192. States specifically excluding NPL sites include: California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE§ 25396.6(c)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (California ERAP); Telephone Interviews, supra note
160 (California VCP)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(I) (West Supp.
1996)); Illinois (415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.l(a)(2)(i) (West Supp. 1996)); Missouri (Mo.
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(3)(D) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (excludes sites that warrant enforcement action under CERCLA or are being considered for the
NPL based on a completed site investigation that indicates that NPL listing is appropriate));
Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-732(1)(a) (1995) (excludes sites listed or proposed for
listing on NPL)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 7, § 26C-5.3 (WESTLAW through July 15, 1996) (the state, in its discretion, may
"allow a regulatory or enforcement mechanism already in effect at the site to control the
remediation at the site")); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84); North Carolina
(Survey Results, supra note 158); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 3746.02(A)(l)(d) (Anderson
1995)); Oregon (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 111); Pennsylvania (COMING CLEAN, supra
note 24, at 88); Rhode Island (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 79); Tennessee (Survey Results,
supra note 158 (allowing only prospective NPL sites which have not undergone formal HRS
scoring to join the program)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A) (Michie Supp. 1996));
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996) (providing that an NPL site is
ineligible unless negotiations are ongoing for a Prospective Purchaser Agreement prior to April
20, 1995)); Wisconsin (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160). See also COMING CLEAN, supra
· note 24, at 82, 109 (regarding the California VCP and New Jersey programs); Michel, supra note
20, at 454 n.173 (describing the Ohio provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 137 (describing the
Colorado provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Vermont programs); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee programs).
A number of states have entered into agreements with the EPA that allow voluntary cleanups at NPL sites in certain instances. For example, Delaware maintains an agreement with EPA
Region III that allows potential NPL sites to enter the program if the cleanup party is competent
to handle the cleanup. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24; at 86. Washington has a similar agreement with the EPA's Region X. Id. at 113; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
193. States excluding sites with pending state or federal enforcement actions include: Arkansas (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (Arkansas does not at present include UST sites
from participation, but RCRA corrective action sites are handled by the state's RCRA program)); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25396.6(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding
a site from the California ERAP with a "known condition of interim endangerment existing at
the site"); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (UST sites not handled under the California
VCP)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(II)-(IV) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding RCRA corrective action sites, UST sites, and state enforcement sites, in addition to NPL
sites)); Delaware (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 86 (Delaware excludes UST sites, RCRA
corrective action sites, and others; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2010 defines sites eligible for tax
relief to include brownfield sites and exclude enforcement sites)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/58.l(a)(2)(ii)-(iv) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding permitted facilities, RCRA closures, and
UST sites)); Maine (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Maine disqualifies any RCRA corrective
action, TSDFs or RCRA generator sites subject to closure)); Minnesota (COMING CLEAN, supra
note 24, at 98 (Minnesota disqualifies sites under the jurisdiction of other state remediation
programs, UST sites, RCRA corrective action sites, and sites involving the removal of asbestos,
radon, radioactive wastes, or agricultural chemicals)); Missouri (Mo. CODE REGS. tit.10, § 25-
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15.010(3)(D) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (disqualifies sites that are facilities with RCRA permits or interim status, sites subject to state or federal enforcement actions; also disqualifies sites where conditions constitute an imminent and substantial threat to
public health or the environment)); Montana (MoNT. CoDE ANN. §§ 75-10-732(1)(b)-(e), (2)
(1995) (disqualifies facilities subject to certain state enforcement actions; providing, however,
that notwithstanding the provisions of§ 75-10-732(l)(b)-(e), "the department may agree to accept and may approve an application" for an otherwise ineligible site)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77 (New Hampshire excludes UST sites)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN.
CoDE tit. 7, §§ 26C-3.l(b), -5.3 (WESTLAW through July 15, 1996) (excludes enforcement sites,
such as UST sites and landfills)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New York
excludes RCRA sites)); Nonh Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310(2)-(3) (1995) (excludes
RCRA permitted facilities, UST sites, and sites where the Division of Environmental Management or the Department of Agriculture has assumed jurisdiction; state regulates only hazardous
substances as defined in CERCLA)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.02(A)(l)-(5) (Anderson 1995) (disqualifies sites where closure or remediation is mandated by Ohio or federal
law)); Oregon (OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-030(3) (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (excludes
RCRA corrective action sites and UST sites from state CERCLA program; however, cleanup of
the latter may be authorized under OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-215(2)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.904(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1996) (applying cleanup standards developed under
the Land Recycling Act to state Hazardous Sites Cleanup Priority List sites and UST sites, but
providing for cleanups to take place under the administrative requirements of those programs));
Rhode Island (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 79 (Rhode Island excludes UST sites at present, but expecting new regulations to include them; any participant, including responsible parties, may volunteer up until the time that the Department orders cleanup)); Tennessee
(TENNESSEE D1v. OF SUPERFUND, VOAP: A CLEANUP PROGRAM FOR THOSE WILLING AND
ABLE 2 (1996) [hereinafter TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET] (UST sites excluded)); Texas (TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN.§ 361.603(a) (West Supp. 1996); id. § 361.605(a)(l); 21 Tex. Reg.
3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) {adopting a new rule, 30 TEX. ADMIN. CoDE § 333.2 (1996),
that disqualifies the portion of site that is subject to a commission permit or order and providing
that the state may reject application if an administrative, state, or federal enforcement action is
pending that concerns the remediation of the hazardous substance or contaminant described in
the application; state indicates, based on its definition of "pending enforcement action" in
§ 333.2 that several sites which have had some level of enforcement action, up to the issuance of
an order, have been redirected into its program)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6615a(f)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. 1996) (excluding RCRA corrective action sites and underground
storage tanks subject to regulation; UST sites are regulated separately with cleanup funds and
liability limits under Vermont's Petroleum Cleanup Fund; both sites subject to enforcement actions anJ voluntary cleanups under other programs are excluded)); Virginia (VA. CoDE ANN.
§ 10.1-1429.l(A) (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing that rules will apply where remediation has not
"clearly been mandated" under CERCLA, RCRA, state law, or common law; excludes sites with
existing or pending permits, closure plans, administrative orders, court orders, or consent orders)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82, 109, 111 (describing the California VCP,
New Jersey, and Oregon programs); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13 (stating
that "[s]ites that typically enter a voluntary program ... are not currently listed or being considered for the federal NPL or similar state superfund lists"); Buniva & Kibler, supra note 156, at 6
(describing the Virginia provision); Michel, supra note 20, at 454 (describing the Ohio provisions); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 123 & n.126 (citing the Ohio, Colorado, and Pennsylvania
provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 265-66 (stating that "[t]he [Minnesota] program cannot
typically be utilized for cleanup of a property that already falls under the authority of one of the
other state or federal pollution programs"); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Colorado, Delaware, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia provisions); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California VCP,
Delaware, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington
programs). Indiana has discretion to reject an application if a "state or federal enforcement
action that concerns the remediation of the hazardous substance or petroleum described in the
application is pending." IND. CoDE ANN.§ 13-25-5-5 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg.
Sess.); INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 1. One commentator has criticized the
Pennsylvania statute for its application of certain features to virtually any site, whether or not it
is a legitimate brownfield site. Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6; see also Tuttle, supra note 170
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as Michigan allow voluntary cleanups to take place at virtually any
site, 194 and others provide administrative discretion to allow participation at sites that would otherwise be disqualified. 195
The following tables summarize the sites and persons eligible for
each of the state programs.

(stating that "most provisions of the (Pennsylvania] statute are applicable to any property in
need of environmental remediation").
194. In Michigan, virtually any contaminated site is eligible. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20101(1)(/) (West Supp. 1996) (provisions apply to a "facility," defined as "any area, place,
or property where a hazardous substance in excess of the concentrations which satisfy the requirements of section 20120a(l}(a) or (17) has been released, deposited, disposed of, or otherwise comes to be located"}. However, sites containing underground storage tanks are usually
addressed under the state's UST program. Id. §§ 324.21301a-.21330. Washington provides that
the state may clean UST, RCRA, and NPL sites under its program whereas Wisconsin's program
currently allows all sites to obtain a certificate of completion; however, RCRA corrective action
sites and NPL sites may still be the subject of federal actions under CERCLA and RCA; UST
sites are eligible. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 113 (regarding the Washington program);
Survey Results. supra note 158 (regarding the Wisconsin program); Telephone Inter\.iews, supra
note 160 (regarding the Washington and Wisconsin programs).
In Connecticut, the state evaluates sites for participation in the Urban Sites Remedial Action Program, based on factors that include the site's economic development potential, as defined by the state. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(b) (West 1995). Eligible sites may be
NPL, RCRA corrective action, or UST sites. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 72. The state
subdivides sites according to whether the applicant will remediate the property (Type I sites), the
state will draft the cleanup plan and implement it at a site in a "distressed municipality" (Type II
sites), or whether the state will acquire the site and remediate it (Type III sites). CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133m (West 1995); CONN. AGENCIES REGS.§§ 22a-133m-1 to -3 (WESTLAW
through Sept. 24, 1996) (governing Type III site cleanup process); COMING CLEAN, supra note
24, at 72-73. Similarly, the Massachusetts program applies to sites in an "Economic Target
Area," as defined by the state, or sites that present economic development opportunities. MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 2.
195. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14. Indiana does not expressly
disqualify sites targeted for state or federal action, but allows the state to declare such sites
ineligible. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-5 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 Reg. Sess.); see also
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 59-60 (describing the Indiana provision). Likewise, Maine's statute does not disqualify any sites; the state, however, requires that developers
seeking to remediate certain types of sites (e.g., sites with USTs) receive a determination of
eligibility from the state prior to submission of a voluntary response action plan. Maine Dep't of
Env't Protection, The Voluntary Clean-up Program (visited Mar. 6, 1996) <http://
www.state.me.us/dep/ip-vrap.htm> [hereinafter Maine VCP Fact Sheet]. Some statutes bar participation at certain sites but empower the state to allow participation under certain conditions.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-732(2) (1995) (providing that the state "may agree to accept
and may approve an application for a voluntary cleanup plan" for disqualified sites); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995) (providing that the state may allow participation by a
developer at an NPL site if negotiations are underway to culminate in a prospective purchaser
agreement).
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1

PARTICIPANT ELIGIBILITY

Persons Eligible

State

Comments

Any person (except those
involved with
disqualified sites)

Arizona, California VCP,
Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia,
Washington

Oregon, Rhode Island:
responsible parties are
eligible, but only prospective purchasers will
receive release from liability

Prospective purchaser

Arkansas. Massachusetts,
Vermont, Wisconsin

Owner only

Colorado

Colorado: participant may
also be the owner's designated representative

Responsible parties
excluded

Arkansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New
York, Vermont,
Wisconsin

Wisconsin: statutory definition of "purchaser"
limits participation to
innocent parties

Other

Connecticu~ 196 California

ERAP, 19 ' Michigan 198

196. In Connecticut, no site is eligible for the USRAP unless "the state owns the site or
otherwise has or obtains the power to approve the type of development which first occurs on the
site after remediation," which necessarily limits the type of persons who may participate. CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(b) (West 1995). Prospective purchasers may participate at "Type
III" sites, whereby the state purchases property and cleans it up. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a133m(e) (West 1995); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 73. Responsible persons may
participate at Type I sites if they are willing to clean up the sites. Id. at 72. The protection of the
new voluntary cleanup program extends to owners and lessors. 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 3.
197. The California ERAP applies to sites designated by the Site Designation Committee
that have one or more responsible persons. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 25396.6(c)
(West Supp. 1996). As a result, the participants will all be responsible persons.
198. Michigan provides a liability exemption for a prospective purchaser or transferee that
conducts a "baseline environmental assessment" and submits the result to the state, together
with a plan for any necessary remedial action. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20129a (West
Supp. 1996). Because the statute also exempts owners and operators who have not caused
contamination at the site, the new law offers them protection as well, unless they exacerbate the
contamination. Id. §§ 324.20107, 324.20126.
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2

SITE ELIGIBILITY

Sites Eligible

State

Any site is potentially
eligible

Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Washington,
Wisconsin

NPL sites excluded

California ERAP,
California VCP,
Colorado, Illinois,
Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia,
Vermont
Arkansas, California
ERAP, California VCP,
Colorado, Delaware,
Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North
Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia

Sites subject to other
state and federal
enforcement actions
(e.g., RCRA corrective
action, UST sites)
excluded

Comments
Indiana: state has discre-

tion to reject participation at sites with
pending enforcement
actions
Delaware: NPL sites may
enter under certain
circumstances

California ERAP: sites

that qualify for program
are state CERCLA
sites (with pending
enforcement actions)
Maine, Oregon: UST sites

may be included
Montana: state has discre-

tion to approve cleanup
plan for otherwise ineligible site
Texas: basis for rejecting

application; discretionary with state
Eligibility defined by
economic development
potential

2.

Connecticut,
Massachusetts

Distinguishing Environmental Audit Statutes

At the outset, a distinction must be made between the voluntary
cleanup statutes and the growing number of state "environmental audit" statutes 199 designed to promote voluntary compliance with the
199. The first state to enact an environmental audit privilege law was Oregon in 1993. OR.
REv. STAT.§ 468.963 (Supp. 1996). See generally James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON HALL LEGJS. J. 119 (1994) [hereinafter
O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges] (terming the Oregon statute a model for subsequent
state efforts). Other states have enacted or propose to enact similar statutes. See .1996 Alaska
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environmental laws. The audit statutes offer incentives to the owner
or operator of a facility, including an evidentiary privilege, 200 if it evaluates its operations, discovers contamination, and reports violations,
together with a plan for corrective action, to the state. 201 Environmental audit statutes are similar to voluntary cleanup statutes in their
goals and features. 202 For example, both often preclude a state from
taking certain enforcement actions against the owner or operator with
respect to contamination described in a site report and cleaned up in a
timely fashion. 203 The principal difference between the two is that environmental audit statutes are designed to enable a polluter to admit
its mistakes and correct them. A brownfield developer participating
in a voluntary cleanup program, by contrast, typically has not had any
involvement with the site, let alone caused any contamination there.
Therefore, the voluntary cleanup statutes are likely to be more helpful
·
to brownfield developers.
S.B. 199 (bill introduced to establish an environmental audit program in Alaska); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 8-1-303 (Michie Supp. 1995); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5 (West Supp. 1996);
IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 to -811, 9-340 (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2 (West
Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-1 to -10 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg.
Sess.); 1994 N.J. S.B. 1797 and 1994 N.J. A.B. 2521 (unsuccessful proposals to establish an environmental audit privilege in New Jersey); 1996 Kan. Sess. Laws 204 (establishing an environmen·
tal audit program in Kansas); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-.040 (Baldwin 1995); 1995 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 168, §§ 8-19 (West) (creating an "environmental improvement pilot program" in
Minnesota); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to -109
(1995 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.§§ 10.1-1198 to -1199 (Michie Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 35-11-1105 to -1106 (Michie Supp. 1996). For descriptions of these statutes and their
features, see Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement
Policy, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 365, 365-66 (1992); Buniva & Kibler, supra note 156, at 8-10
(describing the Virginia statute); O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges, supra.
In December 1995, the EPA issued its policy on "self-policing" (Incentives for Self-Policing:
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations Notice) offering incentives for
companies to report violations of the environmental laws. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,705 (1995). The
EPA's policy differs from the state statutes in that it offers no privilege or immunity to an environmental audit; the Agency opposes granting a privilege on a number of grounds, including its
contention that granting a privilege would "invite defendants to claim as 'audit' material almost
any evidence the government needed to establish a violation or determine who was responsible."
Id. at 66,710. Thus, the EPA's policy seems destined to produce a lukewarm response. See, e.g.,
Margaret A. Hill & Andreas H. Leskovsek, EPA's Self-Policing Final Policy, VIRGINIA'S ENv'T,
Mar. 1996, at 6 (stating that the EPA's policy "does not ... retreat from EPA's position that
information obtained from environmental audits or compliance programs is not privileged
information").
200. See, e.g., 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168, § 13 (West) (environmental audit privilege in
Minnesota); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (Supp. 1996).
201. Buniva & Kibler, supra note 156, at 8; O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges, supra
note 199, at 119-20 (noting that the "environmental audit" is defined as "a systematic examination of a facility, product line, or corporation as a whole ... [that] functions by measuring compliance with environmental norms and then reporting the results, complete with a set of
corrective actions that are necessary for the facility, product line, or corporation to achieve
compliance").
202. See Dunlop Testimony, supra note 123, at 237 (terming the environmental audit privilege a "companion" to voluntary cleanup statutes); Congdon, supra note 160, at 7 (describing the
relationship between the two types of statutes).
203. See, e.g., 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168, § 13 (West) (deferred or waived enforcement
in Minnesota).
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Features of Voluntary Cleanup Statutes

Site Investigation

The first step in assessing whether and to what extent a brownfield site must be remediated is usually a "site assessment" or similar
investigation. This involves an evaluation of existing environmental
conditions to evaluate the site's condition, determine the existing level
of contamination, and generate information that may be used in
cleanup plans.204 Although the states differ in their approaches, 205
most require all developers to conduct on-site investigations designed
to identify contamination at the site and the risk it poses. 206 To spur
204. OTA STATE OF TIJE STATES, supra note 20, at 14-15.
205. Id. at 14 (noting that states "tailor [site assessments] to address their own specific technical concerns"). Vermont, for example, requires that the site investigation meet these
objectives:
(A) to define the nature, source, degree and extent of the contamination;
(B) to define all possible pathways for contaminant migration;
(C) to present data that quantify the amounts of contaminants migrating along each
pathway;
(D) to define all relevant sensitive receptors, including but not limited to public or private
water supplies, surface waters, wetlands, sensitive ecological areas, outdoor and indoor air,
and enclosed spaces such as basements, sewers and utility corridors;
(E) to determine the risk of contamination to human health and the environment;
(F) to gather sufficient information to identify appropriate abatement, removal, remediation
and monitoring activities; and
(G) to gather sufficient information to provide a preliminary recommendation, with justification, for abatement, removal, remediation and monitoring activities.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(g)(l) (Supp. 1996); cf Clokey, supra note 26, at 39 (detailing the
minimum requirements of the "site investigation" in Wisconsin, under Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch.
NR 716 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aµg. 1996 Release)). States often retain flexibility to
determine the scope of the site investigation. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-050(2)
(WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995).
206. _These include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-503(17) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring a "site assessment," to "identify the location and extent of contamination, the quantity or
level .of contamination, the type of contamination, the probable source of contamination and the
risk or threat associated with the contamination"; state is considering redefining this to include a
"site assessment" (similar to Phase I investigation) and "facility investigation" (similar to Phase
II investigation))); California (CAL. HEALTIJ & SAFETY CODE§ 25319.5 (West 1992) (requiring
a "preliminary endangerment assessment" (PEA) to determine whether response action is necessary; applies to sites in California VCP); id. § 25396.6(b) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a PEA
for sites in the California ERAP)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-16-304(2)(a), 308(2) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring an "environmental assessment")); Connecticut (CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(g) (West 1995) (requiring the state to assess Type II and Type III sites
for cleanups); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2(a) (specifying that licensed environmental professionals may conduct Phase II environmental site assessments and Phase III investigations for
voluntary site remediations)); Delaware (DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(e)(l) (WESTLAW
through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (providing for a remedial
action plan to be "based on any investigation or study conducted by or for the Secretary, the
potentially responsible party, or others"; state accepts forms of investigations that conform to
department guidelines)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.6(b)(l) (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring that remedial applicants conduct on-site investigations in order to identify contamination at the site and the risk it poses)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-2, -3, -7(b)(l)
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring an "environmental assessment," defined as similar to a Phase I assessment, to be submitted with an application; developer must also
perform a Phase II assessment)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2286.l(B) (West Supp.
1996) (requiring an "investigative report")); Massachusetts (MAss. REos. CoDE tit. 310,
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§§ 40.0404(1), 40.0480-.0483, 40.0830 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring an initial investigation, Phase I and Phase II site assessments; requirements may be waived, under the
"technical justification" standard of MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.0193, by a Licensed Site
Professional (LSP))); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(4) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring an "investigation report prepared by an appropriate professional that identifies and describes
the nature and extent of the discharges, releases and threatened releases at the identified area of
real property, methods of investigation, the analytical results and the professional's evaluation of
this information")); Michigan (M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20126(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996)
(providing that an owner or operator is liable under the state mini-CERCLA law unless it conducts a timely "baseline environmental assessment"); id. § 324.20129a (requiring an environmental assessment before a developer may petition for an exemption from liability)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 115B.175(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the voluntary response
action plan must include an "investigation report that describes the methods and results of an
investigation of the releases and threatened releases at the identified area of real property"));
Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567(3) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2515.010(4)(C) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring a Phase I assessment at a minimum to be provided with the application; state's practice is to require at least a
minimal Phase II assessment once the site is accepted into the program)); Montana (MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-733(2)(a) (1995) (requiring an "environmental assessment")); Nebraska
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-15,184(3) (WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.) (requiring applicant to provide "appropriate engineering, scientific, and financial feasibility data")); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77 (New Hampshire requires a site investigation and,
where necessary, an Rl/FS)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 7, § 26C-3.2(c) (WESTLAW
through July 15, 1996) (state may require preliminary assessment and site investigation under a
Memorandum of Agreement)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New York
requires a site investigation)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.1, -310.3 (1995);
N.C. Gu1DELINES, supra note 191, at 2-1 to 2-5 (describing the requirements for remedial investigation phases as site-dependent)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.04(8)(3)-(4),
3746.07(B)-(C), 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995) (mandating that forthcoming rules will determine
minimum standards for Phase I and Phase II property assessments, setting forth interim standards, providing that voluntary actions may include Phase I and Phase II property assessments in
order to ''identify and address potential sources of contamination," and stating that a certified
professional may base the issuance of a no further action letter on property assessments)); Oregon (OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-050 to -080 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (providing that the
state will determine the amount of investigation necessary on a case-by-case basis; simple sites
may require only a Preliminary Assessment or comparable information to be developed, and
complex sites will require an RI and/or FS)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6026.302(b)(2), .303(e)(2), .304(1) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a site investigation for persons choosing to meet any of the three types of available cleanup standards)); Rhode Island (R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-B(b) (Supp. 1996) (requiring "voluntary investigations," consisting of a
"site characterization" at all sites, as defined in § 7 of the Site Remediation Regulations, with an
RI/FS if necessary; forthcoming rules expected to streamline the site assessment process at some
sites)); Tennessee (TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1200-1-13-.09 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX
Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring an initial investigation and site characterization equivalent to
ASTM Phase I Environmental Site Assessment)); Texas (TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 361.606(c) (West Supp. 1996) (describes investigation actions to be taken by developer); 21
Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.7(a) (1996)
that requires an investigation of the "full nature and extent of contamination in all media" unless
the developer demonstrates that a focused investigation is warranted, using an "exposure assessment model")); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(e)(l)(C) (Supp. 1996) (requiring a
preliminary environmental assessment to be submitted with the program application); id.
§ 6615a(g)(l) (requiring a site investigation)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-350
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (RI/FS; complexity varies)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.765(2)(a)(l) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the property seller or developer in Wisconsin to
conduct a thorough environmental investigation of the property, as defined in Wis. ADMIN.
CODE§ NR 750.03(10) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release), and have that investigation approved by the state)). See also CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 83, 86 (regarding
the Delaware and New Jersey programs); INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 2; OTA
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14-15; Clokey, supra note 26, at 39 (describing the
Wisconsin provision and administrative rules); Michel, supra note 20, at 454-56 (describing the
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investigations, states often provide that developers do not face state
"mini-CERCLA" liability by virtue of performing site assessments. 207
Some statutes and regulations specify the use of a two-part site investigation process based on standards implemented by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) for "Phase I" and "Phase II"
environmental review in real estate transactions. 208 If the limited
Phase I review indicates that there is contamination at the site, the
more detailed Phase II review is required. 209
Ohio's scheme of Phase I and Phase II assessments is typical of
the level of effort required. 210 Forthcoming rules for Phase I assessments will require, at a minimum, a review of documents affecting the
site's history such as documents in the chain of title, 211 previous enviOhio provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 135, 137 n.214, 142 n.238 (describing the Colorado,
Indiana, and Minnesota provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 267 (describing the Phase I and
Phase II investigation in Minnesota's program); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas provisions); Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160 (regarding the Arkansas, California, Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin provisions).
207. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126(c)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that
"accessing property to conduct a baseline environmental assessment" is not "occupancy" that
potentially subjects an owner or operator to liability); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.501(b)
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that the developer is not considered a responsible person for conducting an environmental assessment, unless it.fails to exercise due diligence).
208. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15-16. The designation "Phase I" derives
from the ASTM standard for these assessments, AMERICAN Soc'y OF TESTING & MATERIALS,
STANDARD PRAcnCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS: PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL
SITE AssESSMENT PROCESS, STANDARD E 1527-94 (1994). See also Sweeney, supra note 20, at
106. This standard has been adopted in whole or in part by many states. Ohio, for example,
bases its interim standards for Phase I property assessments directly on the ASTM standard.
OHIO REV. CooE ANN. § 3746.07(B) (Anderson 1995); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 454
n.178. The ASTM standard has been influential in other contexts. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 303 (1995) (making CERCLA's innocent landowner defense available to a buyer who
conducts a site assessment according to the ASTM standard or similar procedure adopted by the
EPA); RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 3 (directing site
evaluations in the Richmond pilot project to follow the ASTM standard).
209. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15. But see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CooE § 25319.5 (West 1992) (requiring a "preliminary endangerment assessment," the
equivalent of a "mini-Phase II assessment," for all sites); IND. CooE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-7
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring a Phase II assessment for all cleanups); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(g)(l) (Supp. 1996) (requiring site investigation and corrective action phases analogous to an RI/FS); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a)(l) (West Supp.
1.995) (requiring a "thorough environmental investigation of the property," defined in Wis. Ao.
MIN. CooE § NR 750.03(10) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) as comparable
to a Phase II assessment, in all cleanups); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the
Vermont provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California, Indiana,
Vermont, and Wisconsin provisions).
210. Michel, supra note 20, at 454-56, and Sweeney, supra note 20, at 126-27, describe
Ohio's requirements for Phase I and Phase II site assessments. Compare COMING CLEAN, supra
note 26, at 98 (describing the Phase I and Phase II investigation scheme in Minnesota) and
Casserly, supra note 26, at 267 (describing the Phase I investigation in Minnesota's program)
with Mo. CooE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(2)(A)(7)-(8) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug.
1996 Release) (defining the Phase I and Phase II assessments in Missouri).
211. OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(3)(a) (Anderson 1995).
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ronmental studies of the surrounding area,212 and previous documents
submitted to comply with environmental laws,213 as well as an investigation to determine the nature and extent of contamination at the
site. 214 The average cost of the Phase I assessment has been estimated
to range from $1,000 to $5,000. 215 If this assessment demonstrates that
the site is not contaminated, no cleanup is required and the developer
can request a "no action" letter from the state, a limited form of liability protection. 216
At most sites, the Phase I assessment will demonstrate that there
is existing contamination. 217 In that case, the developer will be required to engage in a Phase II assessment. 218 Under forthcoming
rules, the Phase II assessment will be required to include an examination of the information collected in the Phase I assessment, an analysis
of soil and groundwater samples collected from the site, and a determination of whether the site requires remediation or is suitable in its
current condition. 219 Ohio attempts to control the quality of site assessments, specifying that the developer must use a certified laboratory220 to perform the analyses required in Phase II assessments. 221
212. The developer will be required to review previous environmental assessments, environmental studies and geological studies of the site and any land within two thousand feet of the
site. Id. § 3746.04(B)(3)(b).
213. Id. § 3746.04(B)(3)(c).
214. This includes a review of aerial photographs that reveal prior uses of the property;
interviews with managers of the site who have knowledge of the environmental conditions of the
property; a walkover of the site; and interviews with people who have knowledge of the current
and past uses of the site and adjacent properties. Id. § 3746.04(8)(3)(d)-(g); see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736.
215. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note
24, at 16 (estimating the cost of a "basic environmental assessment" at between $500 and
$2,500); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736 (estimating the cost at between $2,000 and $7,000).
216. A developer can conclude cleanup activities in Ohio when the Phase I assessment demonstrates that "there is no reason to believe that there has been a release of hazardous substances or petroleum at or upon the property." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson
1995); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 454 n.176; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 131; cf COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 98 (stating that developers in Minnesota may receive liability assurances if a Phase I investigation shows limited contamination at the site that does not require
remediation); RHODE ISLAND USER'S GumE, supra note 175, at 3-4; Casserly, supra note 26, at
268 (developers can receive "no action" letters in Minnesota if they demonstrate that no contamination exists); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (noting that a developer can receive a
"letter of compliance" in Rhode Island if the site characterization demonstrates that no contamination exists). For a description of the "no action letter" and other forms of liability protection,
see infra notes 289-317 and accompanying text.
217. One commentator states that "(i]n the case of an industrial site intended for reuse, a
Phase I site assessment is virtually certain to generate sufficient evidence to warrant further
assessment expense." Mc Williams, supra note 20, at 736.
218. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE
STATES, supra note 20, at 15.
219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(4) (Anderson 1995).
220. OHIO ADMJN. CODE § 3745-300-04 (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (specifying
procedures for the certification of laboratories).
221. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.lO(B)(l)(a) (Anderson 1995).
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Phase II assessments can be expensive,222 and their cost alone may
deter some marginally cost-effective projects from consideration. 223
2.

Streamlining Cleanup Procedures and Costs

Assuming a cleanup is required, the next step in the development
process is the preparation of a cleanup plan using the findings from
the site assessments and applying relevant cleanup standards. 224
a.

The Remedial Action Plan

Most states require a developer to submit a work plan for cleanup
actions 225 that is typically accompanied by the site investigation report
and other supporting documents. 226 This plan may be part of, or submitted pursuant to, an agreement with the state to remediate the
site. 227 Indiana, for example, requires a developer to enter into a
222. The cost of a Phase II assessment depends on a number of factors, including the size of
the facility and the number of locations at the site where hazardous substances are found. The
Office of Technology Assessment estimates the cost of a Phase II assessment at between $50,000
and $70,000. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18. Others believe the costs may be
even higher. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736 (stating that "[a] Phase II property assessment on a parcel with prior industrial activity is likely to cost $25,000 to $250,000").
223. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302 (noting that "(i]n some cases, site assessment
costs alone will deter interest in a brownfield property"); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 16;
OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18 (stating that "initial costs to some volunteers
can be prohibitive from the start"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736.
224. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15.
225. This document, which may be designated a "work plan," "remedial action plan," "corrective action plan," or similar term, becomes the blueprint for cleanup activities at the site. Id.
at 16. The states that do not require submissions of work plans are those that enable the developer to proceed with the cleanup on its own, with, in some states, the assistance of a licensed
environmental professional. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
226. Indiana, for example, requires a comprehensive set of information to be submitted in
the voluntary remediation work plan, including:
(1) Detailed documentation of the investigation conducted by the applicant in preparing
the proposed voluntary remediation work plan and a description of the work to be performed by the applicant to determine the nature and extent of the actual or threatened
release.
(2) A proposed statement of work to accomplish the remediation in accordance with guidelines established by the department.
(3) Plans concerning the following:
(A) Quality assurance for the implementation of the proposed remediation project.
(B) Descriptions of sampling and analysis.
(C) Health and safety considerations.
(D) Community relations.
(E) Data management and record keeping.
(F) A proposed schedule concerning the implementation of all tasks set forth in the
proposed statement of work.
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-7(b} (WESTLAW through end of 1996 Reg. Sess.); Survey Results,
supra note 158. But see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.lO(A)-(B) (Anderson 1995) (developer has discretion to decide whether sampling plans and remediation plans are necessary; plans
are reviewed by certified professionals, not the state).
227. States requiring the plan to be submitted pursuant to, or as part of an agreement are:
California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25398.2(b}(l), (e) (West Supp. 1996) (enforceable
agreement in California ERAP to perform cleanup and cleanup pursuant to a remedial action
plan); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (a "voluntary cleanup agreement" in the California
VCP defines the scope and schedule of proposed cleanup)}; Colorado (CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
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§ 25-16-304 (West Supp. 1996) (voluntary cleanup plan)); Connecticut (CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22a-133m(g) (1995) (requiring the state to develop remedial action plans for Type II and Type
III sites); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2 (specifying that licensed environmental professional
may prepare Phase III remedial action plans for voluntary site remediations)); Delaware (DEL.
CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(a), (e)(l) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th
General Assembly, 1995) (settlement agreement provides for a plan of remedial action)); Illinois
(415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.6(d) (West Supp. 1996) (remedial action plan required for a
cleanup to levels below those existing at the site); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (voluntary remediation agreement setting forth
terms and conditions of evaluating and implementing a "voluntary remediation work plan" as
defined in id. § 13-25-5~7)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:2286.1 (West Supp. 1996) (voluntary remedial action plan)); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(5) (West Supp.
1995); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.20118, 324.20120a (West Supp. 1996) (remedial action plan, as defined in id. § 324.20101(1)(aa))); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1158.175(3) (West Supp. 1995) (voluntary response action plan)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.567(5) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(5) (WESTLAW through
ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (remedial action plan)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-733
(1995) (voluntary cleanup plan)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT.§ 81-15,184 (WESTLAW through
end of 1995 Reg. Sess.) (remedial action plan)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note
24, at 77 (New Hampshire requires a remedial work plan)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§§ 26C-2.2, -3.3, app. A (1996) (state may require a remedial action work plan under a Memorandum of Agreement that complies with the technical standards of N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 26E-6.2; state indicates that this is typically done where groundwater contamination is present
or a longer cleanup effort is involved)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New
York requires an agreement or consent order outlining cleanup requirements)); North Carolina
(N.C. GurnELINES, supra note 191, at 1-1 to 1-2 (providing for two different types of cleanups,
with one being a cleanup under an "Administrative Order on Consent," which incorporates a
remedial work plan as outlined in N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 130A-310.9(b) (1995)); Oregon (OR. REV.
STAT. § 465.325(1) (Supp. 1996); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(3) (providing for the state to enter into
agreements for cleanups)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.302(e)(l), -.303(h)(l)
(West Supp. 1996) (notice of intent to remediate under background or statewide health standard
must contain description of proposed remediation measures); id. § 6026.304(/)(3), U) (requiring
a remediation plan if developer chooses to remediate under the site-specific standard)); Rhode
Island (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (Rhode Island requires a remedial action work
plan, as defined in § 9 of the Site Remediation Regulations)); Tennessee (TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. § 1200-1-13-.09 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (RI/FS report));
Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.606 (West Supp. 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203
(WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 333.7 regarding voluntary
cleanup agreements and work plans)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(g), (h) (Supp.
1996) (site investigation work plan and corrective action plan)); Virginia (VA. CooE ANN.
§ 10.1-1429.l(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1996) (calling for rules to establish procedures "to be followed by a person volunteering to remediate a release and by the Department in processing
submissions and overseeing remediation")); Wisconsin (Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. NR 722
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (remedial options report)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82, 86, 111 (describing the Delaware, New Jersey, and Oregon
agreements); OT A STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 137 &
n.212, 143, 149 & n.286 (describing the Colorado, Indiana, and Texas provisions); Survey Results,
supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia provisions);
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California, North Carolina, Oregon, and
Rhode Island programs).
Massachusetts's scheme of work plans and oversight depends on the classification of the site
according to the risk it poses. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0500-.0582 (WESTLAW
through Register No. 794) establishes the tier classification scheme. Tier I sites are those posing
the most risk (sites having scores above 350 on the HRS-like "Numerical Ranking System" of
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.1500-.1516). Id. § 40.0520(3). Tier II sites are those posing
lesser risks. Tier I sites are subdivided into Tier IA sites (the most complicated and serious
sites), Tier IB, and Tier IC sites. Id. (scored according to id. § 40.1500-.1516). At all but Tier IA
sites, response actions may take place under the supervision of an LSP without direct oversight
by the state. See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, THE 1993 MASSACHUSETTS
CONTINGENCY PLAN: A NEW APPROACH TO CLEANING UP DISPOSAL SITES 4 (1993) [hereinaf-
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"voluntary remediation agreement" that sets forth the terms and conditions of a "work plan" for the site. 228 In some states, the plan may
be part of a consent decree entered in judgment to memorialize the
agreement between the state and a developer who is a responsible
party at the site. 229 Under some approaches, the plan may provide for
ter MASSACHUSETIS MCP FACT SHEET]. At Tier IA sites, comprehensive oversight includes the
preparation of a remedial action plan. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0800-.0896
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794). At other sites, the LSP submits any or all appropriate
intermediate reports to the state, with the process culminating in the preparation of a final "Response Action Outcome Statement." Id. § 40.1056 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); see
also Tondro, supra note 20, at 804. As Professor Tondro notes, this allows the LSP's opinion to
function as "a Department 'sign-off' for work completed." Id.
Ohio's scheme also depends extensively on review and oversight of remedial activities by
certified professionals, with the state's review limited to audits of no further action letters; thus,
the state is not involved in reviewing remedial action plans except in cases where it reviews plans
after cleanups have been completed. Omo ADMIN. CODE§§ 3745-300-05, -13, -14 (WESTLAW
through Aug. 31, 1996) (setting forth standards for certification of environmental professionals,
empowering them to issue no further action letters, and setting forth audit procedures); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.lO(A)-(B), 3746.11, 3746.12 (Anderson 1995). At the developer's discretion, it need not even submit the no further action letter to the state EPA and trigger the
possibility of an audit, although it must do so if it intends to receive a covenant not to sue. Omo
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-13(F)-(G).
The Washington program is similar to the Massachusetts program in that it has alternative
courses of action, depending on the administrative procedure selected by the developer. If the
site is not under a state order or decree, the developer (whether or not it is a "potentially liable
party") may proceed by negotiating an "agreed order" or consent decree with the state, or proceeding with independent remedial action at its own risk; if the site is under an order or decree,
only the first two actions are available. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-510(2) (WESTLAW
through July 24, 1996); cf. Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 49-285(8) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that
the developer may request that the state approve the remedial action "at any time before, during
or after the remedial action"). Most voluntary cleanups have been independent remedial actions, though some have taken place after negotiations with the state. Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160. Like a cleanup in Ohio, an independent remedial action in Washington may
take place with limited state involvement, and without a formally approved work plan; the developer need only submit a final independent remedial action report at the completion of the
cleanup. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); see also
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 113. Cleanups pursuant to agree.d orders or consent decrees
will involve the preparation of draft and final cleanup action plans under WASH. ADMIN. Co DE
§ 173-340-360. Survey Results, supra note 158. Similarly, North Carolina allows developers to
proceed with independent cleanups, that is, without entering into "Administrative Orders on
Consent." Id.
228. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); see also
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143. The "work
plan" is "the heart of the [Indiana] program." O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at
61. The work plan must include details of how the site will be cleaned up, including proposed
remediation steps, schedules, quality assurance, and community relations information. IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-7; see also O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61; Sweeney,
supra note 20, at 143; Survey Results, supra note 158.
229. The states in which the plan may be part of a consent decree include: Arkansas (ARK.
CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(d) (Michie Supp. 1995) (remedial action plan becomes an amendment to
the consent administrative order)); Delaware (DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(b) (WESTLAW
through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (settlement agreement
may be a "consent decree, administrative order of consent, memorandum of agreement or any
other form of agreement consistent with regulations"; however, state has indicated that sites are
not handled in the program with consent decrees)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24,
at 84 (in New York, the agreement may take the form of a consent order)); North Carolina (N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 130A-310.9 (1995); N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-1to1-2 (stating that the
applicant seeking state involvement may enter into an Administrative Order on Consent with

936

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1996

a partial cleanup either of certain contaminants or of a portion of the
site. 230
b.

Risk-Based Cleanup Standards

Although some state programs do not change existing cleanup
standards,231 many attempt to implement modified, risk-based standards as an incentive to developers. 232 The Office of Technology Asthe state)); Oregon (1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(3) (providing that participants entering into a Prospective Purchaser Agreement may embody that agreement in an administrative consent order,
"other administrative agreement," or consent decree)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2319.14-8, .14-10, .14-11 (Supp. 1995) (providing for bona fide prospective purchaser or otherwise
performing party to enter into a settlement agreement to be entered as a commitment by the
state and performing party; voluntary cleanup takes place under a remedial action plan)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212-224(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing that a party may enter into
a consent order with the department outlining the steps to be taken for "investigation, cleanup,
monitoring, maintenance and oversight° cost reimbursement")). See also Survey Results, supra
note 158 (regarding the Arkansas. Delaware, Rhode Island, and Tennessee provisions); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee provisions).
230. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2286 (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 343-E(2) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(2) (West Supp. 1995); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 75-10-733(4) (1995); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 361.608(d} (West
Supp. 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW. Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE tit.
30, § 333.7(b)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h)(4) (Supp. 1996) (state may approve a partial
plan if it finds "that the releases or threatened releases that are not abated, removed or
remediated pursuant to the corrective action plan do not pose an unacceptable risk to human
health and the environment").
231. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15 (stating that "[m]any voluntary programs apply the same cleanup standards to voluntary sites that are used under their state
superfund program"). Cleanup standards in this category of states are determined on a site-bysite basis and must follow the requirements of existing state and federal laws. For the purposes
of this article, the term "existing" means that the state requires that all cleanups at brownfield
sites follow the traditional site-specific risk assessment approach; this category does not include
those states that have redefined standards applying to all cleanups under the state CERCLA
law, including voluntary cleanups. See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0900-.0996
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (applying a tiered approach to all cleanups governed by
the Massachusetts Contingency Plan). Several states apply existing cleanup standards: California (CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.4 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the cleanup
must "when fully implemented, place the site for which the plan is prepared in a condition that
allows it to be permanently used for its planned use without any significant risk to human health
or any significant potential for future environmental damage"); id. § 25398.6(a)(4); Telephone
Interviews, supra note 160 (indicating that under the California VCP, cleanup standards of existing state CERCLA law apply}); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.3(d} (1995)
(requiring cleanup levels to be determined in the same manner as under CERCLA/SARA));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(e) (Supp. 1995) (providing for cleanups to follow
existing site-specific criteria established pursuant to TENN. CoDE ANN. § 68-212-206(d); TENN.
COMP. R. & REGS. § 1200-1-13-.08 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h) (Supp. 1996). See also TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET,
supra note 193, at 1 (noting that the criteria for cleanup actions in Tennessee are the same as for
state Superfund sites); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 148 & n.279, 146-47 (describing the California
and Tennessee provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the North Carolina provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Tennessee plans to issue guidance
modifying existing cleanup standards and the Vermont provision).
232. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16; see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 28
(noting that Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin have implemented
"state-approved standardized cleanup levels or methods by which such cleanup levels are
derived"}.
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sessment has termed modifications to cleanup standards "[p]erhaps
the most significant feature in many voluntary programs." 233 Most
states aim to spur redevelopment by redefining cleanup standards in
terms of actual risks posed to human health and the environment. 234
There is widespread variation in the states' approaches to developing
cleanup standards due to differing assumptions about the risk associated with contamination (e.g., toxicity, exposure pathways, and other
factors), the importance of considering the proposed use of the site,
and other considerations such as the effectiveness of engineering controls.235 The ASTM's risk-based corrective action (RBCA, or "Rebecca") approach, a "tiered" process for evaluating the appropriate
level of cleanup at contaminated sites, has been influential in spurring
states' development of cleanup standards. 236
States are developing two general types of cleanup standards: (1)
standardized state-approved generic statewide cleanup standards,
based on assumptions about exposure to contamination;237 and (2)
site-specific standards, requiring a risk assessment to be performed at
every site, but often incorporating consideration of the future use of
the site (i.e., industrial, commercial, or residential) and allowing some
cleanups that result in a public health risk higher than that currently
allowed under CERCLA. 238 In addition, some states continue to require or allow the developer to choose cleanups to meet strict stan233. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16; see also NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra
note 20, at 49 (stating that a model brownfield approach might include "[r]isk-based cleanup
levels based upon land use"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 158 (calling for "flexible, recognized
cleanup standards and procedures" in voluntary cleanup programs).
234. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15-16; Anderson, supra note 109, at 24;
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121; Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 35 (noting that "[a] number of
states have implemented remedial standards based upon the risk to human health and the environment posed by contamination").
235. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15-16.
236. AMERICAN Soc'Y OF TESTING & MATERIALS, EMERGENCY STANDARD GUIDE FOR
RISK-BASED CORRECTIVE ACTION AT PETROLEUM RELEASE SITES, STANDARD E 38-94 (1994)
outlines the "Rebecca" approach. See Robert W. Wells, Jr., Without "Rebecca," Cost-Effective
Environmental Cleanup ls an Oxymoron at Florida's Petroleum Contamination Sites, FLA. B.J.,
Feb. 1996, at 53. The RBCA approach was developed for use at petroleum contamination sites
and has the EPA's approval for this purpose. U.S. ENvrL PROTECTION AGENCY, UsE OF RisKBASED DECISION-MAKING IN UST CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS (1995). The fundamental
assumption of RBCA is that not every site must be cleaned up to meet traditional conservative
cleanup standards. RBCA involves a three-tier approach with different cleanup levels; the highest tier is a site-specific risk assessment, the second and third tiers depend on more generic
evaluations of the sites. The decision to choose any given tier for a cleanup involves a policy
judgment that the standards of that tier are cost-effective and protective of health and the environment. See generally Superfund Reassessment and Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 450 (Apr. 5, 1995) (testimony of Steven J. Milloy,
Director, Science Policy Studies, National Envtl. Policy Inst.) (calling for increased use of "Rebecca" at Superfund sites); Wells; supra, at 53-54.
237. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121.
238. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Anderson, supra note 109, at 23-24
(describing the Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio approaches); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11;
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121; Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the Pennsylvania approach).
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dards based on levels of natural contamination in the surrounding
area, or background standards .239 Increasingly, the states combine
these approaches and allow developers to choose from tiered systems
of cleanup standards. Ohio allows a developer to obtain a variance
from applicable standards in certain instances. 240
The following table illustrates the states' approaches.
TABLE 3
MODIFICATIONS TO CLEANUP STANDARDS

Type of Cleanup Standard
No change from existing
standards

State
California ERAP
California VCP, North
Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont

Comments
Tennessee: forthcoming
guidance may implement a modified riskbased system
North Carolina: applies
cleanup levels determined in same manner
as under CERCLA in
most cases

Modified risk-based sitespecific standards

Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon (forthcoming),
Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island (forthcoming),
Texas, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin

Arkansas: statute calls for
risk-based standards;
tiered system contemplated
North Carolina: applies
only under certain site
conditions
Oregon: developing rules
implementing a modified risk-based
approach
Washington: "Method C"
cleanups generally not
allowed

Option to select background standard

,

Indiana, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Texas,
Virginia

Virginia : rules to take
account of background
levels of contamination

239. OTA STATE OF TIIE STATES, supra note 20, at 15.
240. The variance allows the developer to use less expensive (and, perhaps, less protective)
cleanup techniques. See Michel, supra note 20, at 457. Omo REv. CooE ANN.§ 3746.04(8)(11)
(Anderson 1995) requires the state EPA director to develop rules to govern the application for
and issuance of variances, and § 3746.09 provides guidelines under which variances may be
granted. To qualify, the developer must (1) demonstrate that compliance is not technically feasible or (2) make a showing that the cost of compliance outweighs the benefits. Id.
§ 3746.09(A)(l); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 457.
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Option to select generic
statewide cleanup standard

Option or requirement to
select from tiered system

Other

i.

Connecticut, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island
(forthcoming), Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin
Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri,
Ohio (forthcoming),
Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island (forthcoming),
Texas, Washington,
Wisconsin
Colorado241
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Maine: limited approach
based on experience at
other sites
Oregon: developing rules
to redefine an existing
generic statewide standard approach
Arkansas, North Carolina,
Oregon: considering a
tiered system

Generic Statewide Standards

As an alternative to employing traditional site-specific cleanup
standards, some states allow certain cleanups to meet generic numerical statewide standards. 242 Ohio243 and Pennsylvania,244 for example,
241. Colorado has no specific cleanup standards for soils and will approve cleanup levels
based either on a site-specific risk assessment or the soil standards of the EPA or another state
(e.g., New Jersey or Pennsylvania). COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 108; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
242. The states allowing certain cleanups to meet generic numerical statewide standards include: Connecticut (CoNN. AGENCIES REGS.§ 22a-133k-2 (WESTLAW through Sept. 24, 1996)
(defining generic standards for soil cleanups)); Delaware (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87
(cleanups in Delaware may be to "trigger levels" for specific contaminants derived from the
EPA Region III risk-based concentration tables)); Illinois (415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 51
58.5(d)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (remediation applicant may propose a "Tier I" remediation objective that involves meeting a numeric standard)); Indiana (INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra
note 179, at 3 (providing that cleanups in Indiana may meet levels of generic risk-based standards)); Massachusetts (MASS. REGS. CoDE tit. 310, §§ 40.0970-.0975 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (providing that "Method 1" cleanups may meet the levels of generic soil and
groundwater standards)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20120a{l)-(4) (West Supp.
1996) (providing that the state may establish generic cleanup criteria for categories of sites, including residential, commercial, recreational, industrial, other land use based categories, limited
residential, limited commercial, limited recreational, limited industrial, and other limited categories, replacing the provisions of M1cH. ADMIN. CODE r. 299.5709-.5715 (WESTLAW through
ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) calling for "Type B" cleanups to levels of generic cleanup standards assuming residential land uses)); Missouri (DIVISION OF ENVTL QUALITY, MISSOURI
DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, How CLEAN Is CLEAN? UNIFORM CLEANUP STANDARDS FOR
CONTAMINATED SITES tN MISSOURI (1996) [hereinafter MISSOURI CLEANUP STANDARDS]
(describing Missouri's Tier 1 approach to allow certain cleanups to meet "Uniform Cleanup
Standards")); New Jersey (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 83 (New Jersey maintains and revises guidance on generic soil cleanup standards that can be used at individual sites)); Ohio
(Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(1) (Anderson 1995) (directing that rules be prepared to
develop appropriate generic numerical cleanup standards)); Oregon (OR. REv. STAT.
§ 465.315(1)(f) (Supp. 1996) {directing the state to "identify generic remedies for common categories of facilities ... [taking account of] demonstrated remedial actions and technologies and
scientific and engineering evaluation of performance data")); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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are developing generic standards equivalent in scope, content, and
coverage to applicable standards established by federal environmental
laws and regulations. These standards will address issues such as the
health risks posed by contamination at the site and protection of
workers and nearby residents. 245 However, generic standards offer
two advantages to developers: certainty about the cleanup stan35, § 6026.303(a) (West Supp. 1996) (directing the Environmental Quality Board to promulgate
standards)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-4 (Supp. 1995) (providing for numerical
criteria to be developed by forthcoming rules)); Texas (30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 335.555
(WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996) (providing for cleanups to meet "Risk Reduction Standard
Number 2" by meeting generic cleanup levels)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CoDE § 173-340700(3) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing for cleanups to meet "Method A" by
reference to tables and to meet "Method B" by reference to risk equations specified in WASH.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-340-720 to -750)); Wisconsin (Wis. ADMIN. CODE chs. NR 140, 720
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (providing numeric tables and site-specific
modeling for soils cleanups)). See also Michel, supra note 20, at 463 n.261 (describing the Indiana Volunteer Remediation Program's provisions); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 128, 153 & n.312
(describing the Ohio and Pennsylvania statutes' provisions); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing
the Pennsylvania statute's provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the New Jersey
provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware and Wisconsin provision). A number of states, including Oregon and Rhode Island, are developing rules to provide
for or expand the coverage of existing generic statewide standards. Oregon has generic standards in place for simple soil cleanups. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-045 (WESTLAW through Oct.
31, 1995); Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Maine has a
limited number of numerical cleanup levels, based on experience at similar sites. COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 74; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
243. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson 1995); see also Department of
Emergency & Remedial Response, Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, What's New with the Voluntary Action Program (last updated Dec. 19, 1996) <http://www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volunt.html>
[hereinafter Ohio VAP Update] (stating that a second set of rules, including rules establishing
generic cleanup standards, will be developed in 1996); Michel, supra note 20, at 463 n.261; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 128 (describing the Ohio statute's provision).
244. Pennsylvania's statute empowers two state boards to set generic statewide health standards. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(a) (West Supp. 1996) directs Pennsylvania's Environmental Quality Board (EQB) to promulgate statewide health standards for cleanups for
residential and nonresidential land uses, for medium-specific concentrations other than for discharges into surface water, outside air, or groundwater. See also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 15253 & n.312; Tuttle, supra note 170. The newly created Cleanup Standards Scientific Advisory
Board (CSSAB) is a 13-member board established to provide scientific and technical advice to
the EQB in developing the statewide standards. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.104 -.105 (West
Supp. 1996). The CSSAB's members are appointed by the DEP and the leadership of the Pennsylvania legislature, and are required to have relevant experience or education "that relates to
problems and issues likely to be encountered in developing health-based cleanup standards."
The statute requires board members to be drawn from local governments, the public, academics,
professionals, and the regulated community, with no quota for membership from each of these
categories. The board's actions are to be taken by majority vote. Id. § 6026.105(c). The 13
board members appointed to date include experts in relevant scientific areas such as chemistry
and toxicology. PENNSYLVANIA'S Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 11-12. The
CSSAB has also requested technical assistance from private sector consultants. Id. at 12; see
also Survey Results, supra note 158.
245. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson 1995); Sweeney, supra note 20, at
128, 153 & n.312 (describing the Ohio and Pennsylvania provisions). The generic standards are
being developed using assumptions about exposure to contamination. Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160. The Ohio statute, for example, specifies that the generic numerical clean-up
standards "shall be the concentration of each contaminant that may be present on a property
that shall ensure protection of public health and safety and the environment for the reasonable
exposure for [each] category of land use." OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson
1995).
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dards;246 and, in some states, less "conservative" estimates of risk that
factor in considerations such as the intended use of the property. 247 In
the latter case, the states often specify that separate standards may be
developed for residential and nonresidential uses of sites. 248 The
states will allow higher levels of contamination to remain at sites destined for industrial uses on the theory that there is less human exposure and health risk. 249 Some states apply the generic standards only
to specific media (particularly soil),250 retaining existing numerical
246. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16 (stating that "in cases where generic
standards ... are applied, there tends to be more immediate agreement and certainty"). The
EPA's summary of the perceived advantages of generic standards includes: "an increase in consistency of remedies, and an increase in defensibility of remedy decisions. In addition, settlements may be achieved more quickly, voluntary cleanups may be promoted, and the standards
may allow agencies to address a larger volume of sites due to streamlining." M1ssouRI CLEANUP
STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 3 (quoting Executive Summary, EPA/State Soil Cleanup Levels
Workshop, Oct. 13-14, 1993). A developer, for example, could undertake a more rapid cleanup
by meeting a state-approved standard, without obtaining state approval of a site-specific cleanup
standard. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 15 (describing the Texas approach). One potential
disadvantage of generic standards is that because they apply on a statewide basis, they may be
overprotective at an individual site. M1ssouR1 CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 3
(quoting Executive Summary, EPA/State Soil Cleanup Levels Workshop, Oct. 13-14, 1993).
247. The Ohio statute, for example, called for the development of separate standards "based
upon the intended use of properties after the completion of voluntary actions, including industrial, commercial, and residential uses and such other categories of land use as the director considers to be appropriate." OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(1) (Anderson 1995); cf MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120a(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may establish
generic cleanup criteria for categories of sites, including residential, commercial, recreational,
industrial, other land use based categories, limited residential, limited commercial, limited recreational, limited industrial, and other "limited" categories); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-4 (Supp.
1995) (rules establishing numerical criteria to protect human health and the environment "based
on current and reasonably foreseeable future use of a property and surrounding natural
resources").
248. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(a) (West Supp. 1996). But see WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-740(1) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing that although separate standards for "Method A" [table-based) cleanups of soil may be established for industrial
uses and other uses, the presumption is that unless the site is a qualifying industrial site under
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-745, cleanups must meet residential standards).
249. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that standards based on the proposed use of the site recognize "that old manufacturing properties will often continue to be used
for industrial purposes once cleaned"); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Gwathmey & O'Brien,
supra note 35 (noting that in New Jersey, "(d]ue to the assumption that there is less exposure
and thus less health risk in a non-residential context, risk-based remedial standards (for soil] are
less rigorous for non-residential property uses").
250. Until cleanup standards are promulgated in regulations, Pennsylvania requires that
cleanups of contamination in surface water, groundwater, or air meet all applicable existing standards, these include, for example, maximum contaminant levels (MCL) for drinking water. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(b)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1996). Soil standards may be set separately
for residential and nonresidential land uses. For standards governing direct contact with soil for
residential land uses, concentrations may not exceed either the direct contact soil medium-specific concentration based on residential exposure factors within a depth of up to 15 feet from the
existing ground surface or a soil-to-groundwater pathway numeric value throughout the soil column, the latter to be determined by either a value 100 times the medium-specific concentration
for groundwater, a concentration not producing a leachate in excess of the medium-specific concentrations for groundwater in the aquifer when subjected to the EPA's Synthetic Precipitation
Leaching Procedures, or a generic value determined not to produce a concentration in groundwater in the aquifer in excess of medium-specific concentrations for groundwater based on valid,
peer-reviewed scientific methods. Id. § 6026.303(b)(4); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154
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standards for other media (e.g., air, groundwater, and surface
water). 251 Because soil is the medium most likely to be contaminated
at a brownfield site,252 this will often result in less strict cleanups.
ii.

Site-Specific Standards

The site-specific approach of a number of states253 incorporates
traditional risk assessment methodologies to determine cleanup stann.313. For nonresidential land uses, the direct contact soil standard is to be determined based on
concentrations not to exceed either concentrations based on nonresidential exposure, within a
depth of up to 15 feet from the existing ground surface reflecting worker exposure, or the soil to
groundwater pathway numeric value determined for residential exposures. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6026.303(b)(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1996). Medium-specific concentrations (other than these)
set for carcinogens must be calculated using "reasonable exposure pathway assumptions" and
may be no more strict than an excess upper bound lifetime cancer target risk of between 1 in
10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000, and the concentration to which humans could be exposed "without
appreciable risk of deleterious effects" for systemic toxicants. Id. § 6026.303(c). If the resulting
statewide health standard is numerically less than the applicable background standard, the background standard applies. Id. § 6026.303(d); see also Survey Results, supra note 158.
As with the background standard, developers who select statewide health standards must
demonstrate attainment by collection and analysis of representative samples or statistical testing
results. The developer's final report documenting attainment of the statewide health standard
must include site investigation results, descriptions of cleanup procedures, and summaries of
analyses that demonstrate attainment of the standards. Institutional controls may not be used to
meet the statewide health standards, but may be used to maintain them after remediation occurs.
Id. § 6026.303(a)-(e); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154 n.313.
251. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740 (stating that in New Jersey, soil ''was targeted for
reduced cleanup requirements," which, states McWilliams, "avoids relaxing standards for water
and air, while focusing on the contamination least likely to migrate offsite"); Gwathmey &
O'Brien, supra note 35 (describing the New Jersey approach); see infra notes 266-78 and accompanying text (regarding the approaches of states with "tiered" standards that retain existing standards for air, groundwater, and surface water).
252. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740.
253. States using a "site-specific" approach include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7523(j) (Michie Supp. 1995) (allowing risk assessment as one of the options to determine cleanup
criteria; ecological risk is considered in all scenarios)); Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2516-305 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for remediation to be based on "the actual risk to human
health and the environment currently posed by contaminants on the real property," taking present or proposed uses of the site into account)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133k
(West 1995)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9104(b)(2)(g) (WESTLAW through end of 1st
Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 9
(providing that the state may promulgate and revise rules to identify cleanup levels based on
site-specific risks; state currently applies a risk-based process under Delaware Regulations § 9
that takes land use into account)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d)(3) (West Supp.
1996) (providing that a cleanup may meet a "Tier III remediation objective," following a sitespecific analysis)); Indiana (INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 3); Louisiana (LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2272.l(A) (West Supp. 1996} (minimum cleanup standards for remediation activities to be modified by rule to take into consideration "the location, the surroundings,
the intended use of the property, the potential exposure to the discharge, and the surrounding
ambient conditions"); id. § 30:2286.l(C) (voluntary cleanups to meet these new standards when
developed)); Massachusetts (MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0980-.0988, .0990-.0996
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (Method 2 and Method 3 cleanups based on modeling
(Method 2) or a site-specific risk assessment (Method 3))); Michigan (M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20120a(2) (West Supp. 1996) (calling for site-specific cleanup criteria to "utilize only reasonable and relevant exposure pathways")); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.17(2) (West
Supp. 1995) (providing for cleanups to be conducted under standards with consideration for
planned uses of sites)); Missouri (MISSOURI CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 11-15
(describing Missouri's site-specific Tier 2 "Alternate Cleanup Standards")); Montana (MONT.
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dards at an individual site. In Pennsylvania, for example, developers
electing to clean the property to meet the site-specific standard will
perform remedial investigations254 and risk assessments to determine
CODE ANN. § 75-10-721(2)(c) (1995) (requiring standards for cleanups to take account of "reasonably anticipated future uses," as defined in MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-701(13); state uses the
"waiver" process of§ 75-10-721(4) to modify existing risk-based standards)); New Hampshire
(COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 78 (in New Hampshire, the applicant may propose standards,
reviewed on a case-by-case basis)); New Jersey (Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11 (in New Jersey,
cleanup criteria is based upon site-specific factors, and if the proposed standard will be protective of public health and the environment, state may approve site-specific cleanup standards));
New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 85 (in New York, standards are applied on a caseby-case basis, with consideration for future land use)); North Carolina (N.C. GurnELINES, supra
note 191, at 3-4 to 3-5 (allowing certain cleanups to meet "alternate remediation goals" approved
on a site-by-site basis)); Ohio (OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(2)(a) (1995) (providing for
the development of rules to establish procedures for basing cleanups on site-specific risk assessments)); Oregon (OR. Rev. STAT. § 465.315(1)(b), (2) (Supp. 1996) (requiring the development
of rules adopting a risk-based approach)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304
(West Supp. 1996)); Texas (30 Tex. ADMIN. CODE§ 335.563 (WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996)
(providing for cleanups to meet "Risk Reduction Standard Number 3" by meeting site-specific
cleanup levels)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1996) (rules
adopting methods to establish site-specific standards to be developed, considering "the future
industrial, commercial, residential, or other use of property to be remediated and of surrounding
properties" along with four other factors)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340700(3)(c) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing for "Method C" cleanups based on sitespecific risk assessments to levels for carcinogens based on an estimated lifetime cancer risk of 1
in 100,000; however, use of this "Method C" is generally not allowed)); Wisconsin (Wis. ADMIN.
CODE ch. NR 720 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)). See also COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87 (regarding the Delaware program); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note
20, at 44 (describing the New Jersey approach); Anderson, supra note 109, at 24 (describing the
Massachusetts and Michigan approaches); Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the Minnesota approach); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11 (describing the Ohio and Minnesota approaches); Michel, supra note 20, at 463 n.262; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154-55 (describing the
Pennsylvania approach); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the Pennsylvania approach); Survey
Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Arkansas, Delaware, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington approaches); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware and Montana
programs). Maine's statute does not specify cleanup standards for voluntary cleanups; however,
the state applies a site-specific approach that takes future land use into account. Me. Rev. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(l) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that cleanups must "remove or remedy all
known discharges, releases and threatened releases at an identified area of real property in accordance with a voluntary response action plan"); see also CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 74;
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Rhode Island's forthcoming rules are expected to implement a site-specific approach as one method in a tiered system. D1v1sION OF SITE REMEDIATION, RHODE ISLAND DEP'T OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, ISSUE SUMMARY, SOIL CLEANUP
STANDARDS WORKSHOP I, at 2 (1995) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND SOIL STANDARDS WORKSHOP]; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
254. Pennsylvania requires the submission of a remedial investigation report that includes
the following:
(i) Documentation and descriptions of procedures and conclusions from the site investigation to characterize the nature, extent, direction, rate of movement, volume and composition of regulated substances.
(ii) The concentration of regulated substances in environmental media of concern, including
summaries of sampling methodology and analytical results, and information obtained from
attempts to comply with the background or Statewide health standards, if any.
(iii) A description of the existing or potential public benefits of the use or reuse of the
property for employment opportunities, housing, open space, recreation or other uses.
(iv) A fate and transport analysis may be included in the report to demonstrate that no
present or future exposure pathways exist.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(1)(1)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note
20, at 154 n.315; Tuttle, supra note 170.
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how contaminants will affect surrounding properties. 255 If preliminary
analysis establishes that there are no pathways for the existing contamination to spread beyond the property boundaries, no risk assessment, cleanup plan, or remedy is required. 256 On the other hand,
when this analysis shows that exposure pathways exist, a risk assessment is required in order to develop a cleanup standard and plan. 257
The site-specific approach holds considerable promise for developers.258 A number of states provide explicitly for standards allowing
levels of health risk higher than those permitted under CERCLA. 259
The allowable level of risk for carcinogens can be higher than a 1 in· 1
million (1 x 10"6) lifetime upper bound risk; 260 as high as 1 in 10,000 (1
x 104 ) in some instances.261 Site-specific standards, like generic standards, also consider factors such as the intended use of the property.
A number of states provide explicitly that the cleanup required at a
site must be based on the public health risk that is expected in light of
the site's proposed or reasonably anticipated future use. 262
255. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(a) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note
20. at 154-55: Tuttle, supra note 170; cf ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(j)(l)(B) (Michie Supp.
1995); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-305(1)(b) (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 51
58.5( d)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that actual risk to nearby property is a factor to be
considered in developing "lier III" site-specific risk-based standards); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7510-734(2) (1995) (allowing applicants who wish to meet site-specific standards to perform risk
assessments to determine how contaminants will affect surrounding properties; "default" levels
such as background or EPA soil screening numbers, are used in the alternative); Omo REv.
CoDE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(2)(b) (Anderson 1995) (rules to take account of impacts on surrounding land in establishing site-specific risk assessment methodologies); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 465.315(1)(d)(D) (Supp. 1996); RHODE ISLAND SOIL STANDARDS WORKSHOP, supra note 253,
at 1 (noting that Rhode Island is considering standards based on different land use categories);
see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Montana provision).
256. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(l)(l)(v) (1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at
154 n.315; Tuttle, supra note 170.
257. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(/)(2) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra
note 20, at 154 n.315 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing
the Pennsylvania provision).
258. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 (stating that the flexible site-specific cleanup standards "make it possible to tum a liability into an asset by utilizing a site-specific risk assessment
for redevelopment activities.") (quoting Ronald G. Fender, Principal and Senior Program Director, Environmental Resources Management, Exton, PA); Tuttle, supra note 170 (stating that
Pennsylvania's site-specific standard "offers the greatest opportunity to renew properties previously considered too expensive for voluntary remediation").
259. Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11.
260. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d) (West Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6026.304(b) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154 n.315 (describing
the Pennsylvania provision); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the Pennsylvania provision).
261. See, e.g., 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d) (West Supp. 1996); Omo REv. CoDE
ANN. § 3746.07(A)(2) (Anderson 1995) (providing that carcinogens must be cleaned to meet a
risk level of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000, depending on the intended use of the property); 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 335.563(b) (WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996); see also Sweeney,
supra note 20, at 126 n.147 (describing the Ohio approach).
262. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(j)(2)(A) (Michie Supp. 1995); Cow. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-16-305(1)(a) (West Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 1996)
(providing that this is a factor to be considered in developing "lier III" site-specific risk-based
standards); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2272.1 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115B.17(2a) (WESTLAW through 1995 Sp. Sess.) (providing that in determining the site-spe-
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Background Standards

In some states, certain cleanups will take place to background
levels, either because the developer has the option .to elect to do so or
the state requires it in some instances. 263 This standard requires the
developer to return the property to the condition it would have been
in if the contamination associated with the previous use of the site had
not occurred. 264 However, because it requires a cleanup to natural
conditions at the site, most observers claim that the cost of meeting a
background standard is excessive. 265
cific cleanup standard for a brownfield site, "the commissioner shall consider the planned use of
the property where the release or threatened release is located"); MONT. CoDE ANN. §. 75-10721(2)(c) (1995) (accepting a variety of risk-based standards based on "reasonably anticipated
future uses" as defined in § 75-10-701(13)); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(b) (Supp. 1996) (providing, however, that cleanups must protect against both public health and environmental risks);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(/)(1) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CooE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l)
(Michie Supp. 1996) (rules establishing site-specific standards must consider "the future industrial, commercial, residential, or other use of property to be remediated and of surrounding
properties"); see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the Minnesota provision); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 152 (describing the Virginia provision); id.
at 154 n.315 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the
Pennsylvania provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Montana provision).
263. States allowing or requiring cleanups to "background" levels include: Indiana (INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 3); Minnesota (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 99
(cleanups in Minnesota may be to Department of Health standards, which "tend to reflect background contamination levels")); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (West Supp.
1996)); Texas (30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 335.554 (WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996) (providing
that cleanups may meet background levels to meet "Risk Reduction Standard Number 1"));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing that rules are required to consider "natural background levels for hazardous constituents")). See also Sweeney,
supra note 20, at 151n.297,153 n.312 (describing the Pennsylvania and Virginia provisions). In
Pennsylvania, developers who select the background standard are required to meet that standard
for each regulated substance in each medium, with attainment to be demonstrated by collection
and analysis of representative samples or statistical testing results. The developer's final report
documenting attainment of the background standard must include site investigation results, descriptions of cleanup procedures, and summaries of analyses that demonstrate attainment of the
background standard. If the background standard was not met by removal or treatment methods, the report must also "demonstrate that remaining contaminants on the site will meet Statewide health standards." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney,
supra note 20, at 153 n.312.
264. Tuttle, supra note 170, at 13.
265. See NEPI BROWNFIELDS Poucv FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 22 (citing the
statement of Raymond Loehr, Chairman, Department of Civil Engineering, Univ. of Texas at
Austin, that "[t]he cost of cleaning to background conditions can be enormous, and is often
unnecessary"); Anderson, supra note 109, at 23 (stating that requiring cleanups to background
levels "discourages voluntary site cleanups"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 103 (noting that
"Background Levels represent the more stringent standard"). State officials contacted for this
article also indicated that requiring cleanups to background levels would hamper participation in
voluntary cleanup programs. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Some states have acted to
change an explicit requirement that sites be cleaned to meet background levels of contamination. In Oregon, for example, cleanups have been required to meet background levels unless the
state determined that it was infeasible to do so or the generic soil standards applied; the state's
voluntary cleanup statute requires revision of this requirement. OR. REV. STAT.§ 465.315(1)-(2)
(Supp. 1996); OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-040, -045 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1996); see also
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 112 (describing the Oregon approach prior to the 1995 statutory amendment).
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c. Tiered System of Cleanup Standards
A tiered or similar system has been adopted in Delaware,266 Illi~
nois, 267 Indiana,268 Massachusetts, 269 Michigan,270 Missouri,271 PennSome observers, however, believe that if the surrounding area is contaminated, as will be
the case at many sites in industrial areas, a background standard might be the most lenient
cleanup standard. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 159 (describing the unsuccessful opposition of a
coalition of environmentalists and community leaders to incorporating the background standard
as an option in a proposed voluntary cleanup program in Maryland, for this reason).
266. Delaware's system, although not strictly "tiered," has flexibility for determining the
cleanup standard at a given site. Section 9 of Delaware's CERCLA regulations, the "Delaware
Regulations Governing Hazardous Substance Cleanup," governs the setting of cleanup· standards. Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 9. It calls for the use of "a risk-based approach
on a site specific basis," with cleanups allowed to be based "on current and potential future
resource uses and reasonable maximum exposures expected to occur under both current and
potential future use conditions of areas that could be impacted by a release or imminent threat
of a release of hazardous substances." Id. § 9.1(1)-(2); Survey Results, supra note 158. However, the state has indicated that where contamination is limited, the use of "trigger levels"
derived from the EPA Region Ill's Risk-Based Concentration Tables for specific contaminants
will satisfy the requirements of the regulations. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87; Telephone
Interviews. supra note 160.
267. A developer in Illinois has flexibility to propose "remediation objectives" to clean up
the site to levels developed in accordance with state rules to be promulgated for risk-based
cleanups. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5 (West Supp. 1996). The forthcoming rules will
establish a three-tier process for the establishment of remediation objectives. Id. § 5/58.5( d).
"Tier I" objectives will be to meet numeric standards, and "Tier II" objectives will be to meet
site-specific standards calculated on the basis of numerical modeling rules to be developed. Id.
§ 5/58.5(d)(l), (2). "Tier III" objectives will include methodologies that will be developed to
allow for risk standards for soil or groundwater that account for site-specific characteristics, current and proposed land uses, effectiveness of engineering and institutional controls, and the actual and potential impact of contamination. Id. § 5/58.5(d)(3). Objectives will be site-specific
standards, with residential land uses and nonresidential land uses to be evaluated separately, at
exposures representing an excess upper-bound lifetime risk of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in
1,000,000 (depending on the proposed use of the site, with an excess upper-bound risk for residential uses of 1 in 1,000,000) for carcinogens. Id. § 5/58.5(d). Cleanups may be to levels exceeding existing state groundwater quality protection standards if "exceedance of the
groundwater quality standard has been minimized and beneficial use appropriate to the groundwater ... has been returned; [and any) threat to human health or the environment has been
minimized." Id. § 5/58.5(d)(4)(A)(i)-(ii). Illinois requires the developer to submit a "Remediation Objectives Report" demonstrating the calculation of site-specific standards, if those are chosen. Id. § 5/58.6(c); see also Survey Results, supra note 158.
268. Indiana's cleanup standards, defined in guidance documents, embody a three-tier approach. Tier I involves cleanups to background levels. Tier II involves a generic risk-based
approach, with different exposure assumptions for residential and nonresidential scenarios; this
approach cannot be used for sites where contamination has an adverse impact on critical habitats, including such areas as wetlands and dunes. Tier III standards are based on a site-specific
risk assessment. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 96; INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note
179, at 3; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
269. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0970-.0996 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794)
specifies a three-tier system of cleanup standards. The overriding standard calls for a condition
of "no significant risk" to exist with respect to health, safety, public welfare, or the environment
at each site. Id. § 40.0902 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); MASSACHUSETTS MCP FACT
SHEET, supra note 227, at 4. Three methods of setting cleanup standards are available to meet
the "no significant risk" requirement. "Method 1" standards are numeric standards for over 100
common chemicals in soil and groundwater; "Method 2" allows for site-specific adjustments
(through modeling) to Method 1 standards; and "Method 3" sets standards based on a sitespecific risk assessment. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0970-.0996 (WESTLAW through
Register No. 794); MASSACHUSETTS MCP FACT SHEET, supra note 227, at 5.
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sylvania,272 Texas,273 Washington, 274 and Wisconsin,275 and, due to the
influence of the ASTM RBCA standard, is an increasingly popular
270. Prior to the 1995 statutory amendments, MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 299.5705 (WESTLAW
through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) specified that cleanups of sites in Michigan may be "Type
A." "Type B," or "Type C" cleanups. A "Type A" cleanup is a cleanup to background conditions . .Id. r. 299.5703(p). A "Type B" cleanup is a cleanup to generic statewide standards for
contaminants in groundwater, soil, surface water, and air, defined in id. r. 299.5709-.5715. A
"Type C" cleanup is a cleanup following a site-specific risk assessment. Id. r. 299.5719. This "AB-C" approach was heavily criticized as imposing cleanup standards that had "little bearing on
reality." David H. Fink & Alan D. Wasserman, Winds of Change-Legislative Reform of
MERA, 73 M1cH. B.J. 1060, 1060 (1994). Rules to be developed under the new statutory authority will replace the "A-B-C" approach with a two-tier approach: the developer will have the
option of performing a cleanup to meet generic standards developed for a variety of land use
categories or a cleanup to meet site-specific criteria. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(l)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
271. Missouri's two-tier approach allows for cleanups to meet generic standards (Tier 1
"Uniform Cleanup Standards"), or site-specific, risk-based standards (Tier 2 "Alternate Cleanup
Standards"). MISSOURI CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 9-10. Meeting Tier 1 standards is a "walk-away remediation." Id. at 9; Helfrich, supra note 156, at I. The Tier 1 Uniform
Cleanup Standards for soils are the lower of the Missouri DNR's "Any Use Soil Levels" (ASLs)
or levels for soils listed in the DNR's 1992 corrective action document. The ASLs are risk based,
with a maximum cancer risk for carcinogens of 1 in 100,000. For groundwater, cleanups must
meet background levels, or, if that is technically impracticable, MCLs listed in the Missouri
Water Quality Standards or levels in the corrective action document. M1ssouRI CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 11, app. 1; Helfrich, supra note 156, at 2. The Missouri DNR has
discretion to require that cleanups meet Tier 2 standards in a number of situations such as if
contamination adversely impacts habitat, or a threatened or endangered species. MISSOURI
CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 9-10; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 106.
272. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.301 (West Supp. 1996). Pennsylvania requires the developer to comply with one or more of the following standards: (1) a background standard; (2) a
statewide health standard adopted by the Environmental Quality Board; or (3) a site-specific
standard which achieves cleanup levels based on a site-specific risk assessment. Id.; see COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 89; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 153 n.311; Tuttle, supra note 170;
Brownfields: Pennsylvania Bill Signed into Law; Foes Appeased by Late Provisions, Hazardous
Waste News, May 22, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407234.
273. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 333.8(a) specifies that cleanups in the Texas Voluntary
Cleanup Program (VCP) must meet "appropriate technical standards based upon the site characteristics and site contaminants." 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996). In its preamble to the new rules implementing the VCP, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) provided that the VCP will operate under existing cleanup standards of
the "Risk Reduction Rules" until the TNRCC promulgates rules modifying cleanup standards.
The Risk Reduction Rules, promulgated at 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 335.554-.568 (WESTLAW
through Jan. 1, 1996), allow cleanups to background levels (Risk Reduction Standard Number
1), to meet statewide health standards (Risk Reduction Standard Number 2), or to meet sitespecific standards (Risk Reduction Standard Number 3). The criteria for response action selecting is different, however, from existing requirements under the Risk Reduction Rules. The new
selection criteria under 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 333.8(b) allow a demonstration that the response action "will achieve the response action objectives" for the site, instead of basing the
selection on a comparison with other remedial alternatives. 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW,
Apr. 12, 1996); Survey Results, supra note 158.
274. WASH. ADMIN. CoDE § 173-340-700 (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) provides three
methods for determining cleanup levels. "Method A" cleanups are based on tables for individual contaminants; "Method B" cleanups are based on risk equations; and "Method C" cleanups
are based on site-specific risk information. Method C cleanups may take place only when
"[c]ompliance with cleanup levels developed under the method A or B may be impossible to
achieve or may cause greater environmental harm," or at sites that are qualifying industrial sites.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-700(3)(c) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); see also Survey
Results, supra note 158. Oregon is considering implementing a similar approach in its forthcoming rules. Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
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option. 276 In Pennsylvania, the developer chooses from one of several
approaches: complying with a background standard, a generic statewide standard, or a site-specific standard. There is no hierarchy
among the standards in this tiered system; the developer is free to
choose the standard deemed most efficient. 277 Other states follow the
Rebecca approach more closely, requiring cleanups to be based on
site-specific risk assessments if applying generic standards would result in inadequate cleanups. 278
d.

Presumptive Remedies

Some states modify or reverse the usual statutory preference for
permanent remedies such as destruction of hazardous substances. 279
The preference for engineering controls (measures designed to entomb the contamination at the site, such as placement of a parking lot
over contaminated soil)280 or institutional controls (managerial controls such as fences anu warning signs, and land use restrictions), 281
which reduce cleanup costs significantly, is perhaps the "ultimate relaxation of cleanup standards." 282 States incorporate a variety of provisions regarding engineering or institutional controls. 283 These
275. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. NR 720 (1996) outlines three methods for soil cleanups:
numeric tables, with different standards for industrial and residential uses; site-specific equations
for modeling of contamination; and cleanup levels based on site-specific risk assessments. See
also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 103; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
276. Arkansas, North Carolina, Oregon, and Rhode Island are considering the creation of
tiered systems. N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-3; RHODE ISLAND SOIL STANDARDS
WORKSHOP, supra note 253, at 1, 3 (noting that the tiered approach is similar to the ASTM's
methodologies); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. The forthcoming Ohio rules will offer
the developer the option to meet either generic standards or standards based on a propertyspecific risk assessment. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(1)-(2) (Anderson 1995).
277. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.301 (West Supp. 1996); see also Tuttle, supra note 170.
278. States continue to experiment, however. Illinois has adopted an approach that modifies the "Rebecca" standard; cleanups based on site-specific risk assessments will only be required if the state determines in writing that the background level of contamination poses an
"acute threat" to human health or the environment. 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(b) (West
Supp. 1996).
279. The general rule for cleanup remedies under CERCLA is that "[r]emedial actions in
which treatment which permanently and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility of
the hazardous substances ... are to be preferred over remedial actions not involving such treatment." CERCLA § 12l(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(l) (1994); see RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5,
at 735-36; Anderson, supra note 109, at 23.
280. Engineering controls include such measures as caps, covers, leachate collection systems,
groundwater containment systems, and treatment systems intended to control or contain migration of hazardous substances. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25396(f) (West Supp.
1996).
281. "Institutional controls" is the general designation for measures such as fences, warning
signs, and land use restrictions, undertaken to limit health risks. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 6026.103 (West Supp. 1996).
282. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740.
283. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120a(16) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that
a cleanup must be for residential use or provide for land use controls); id. § 324.20120b(3) (land
use controls required for all cleanups other than residential unless the cleanup is for a use in a
"limited" category, and the state determines that these controls are "not necessary to protect the
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controls are either presumed to meet redefined cleanup standards284
or specified to receive heightened consideration.285 Provisions calling
for consideration of the cost-effectiveness of the proposed remedy286
or its technical feasibility 287 also enhance the likelihood of using these
forms of controls.
The use of these controls usually requires some means for recording and transferring this information to future users of a site, such as
deed notices and restrictions on future use of the site. 288

public health, safety, or welfare, or the environment and to assure the effectiveness and integrity
of the remedial action"); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(b) (Supp. 1996).
Michigan allows the use of institutional controls such as fences and warning signs for "limited" land use categories, when "the department determines that exposure to hazardous substances may be reliably restricted by an institutional control in lieu of a restrictive covenant, and
that imposition of land use or resource use restrictions through restrictive covenants is impractical." M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120b(5) (West Supp. 1996).
284. In Pennsylvania, engineering and managerial controls may be used to meet the sitespecific standard. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) (West Supp. 1996); Tuttle, supra note 170.
However, the state is directed to "disapprove a site-specific remediation plan that consists solely
of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions unless the site-specific standard is developed on the basis of exposure factors which are no less stringent than those which would apply
to the site at the time the contamination is discovered." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(i)
(West Supp. 1996); Tuttle, supra note 170. Pennsylvania does not allow the use of managerial
controls to meet the background standard; however, they may be used to maintain the background standard after remediation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(b)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523U)(2)(E) (Michie Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 75-10-721(2)(c)(iv) (1995) (providing that engineering controls are to be given "due consideration"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) (Anderson 1995) (providing for
cleanup standards based on site-specific risk assessments to consider the existence of institutional and engineering controls); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(c) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 6026.304(j)(l)(iv) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie
Supp. 1996) (providing that rules establishing site-specific standards must consider this); see also
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 151 n.297 (describing the Virginia provision). But see CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CoDE § 25398.6(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that no special preference is to be
given to engineering and land use controls; state must evaluate merits of response options reasonably available in light of site-specific conditions); WASH. ADMIN. CooE § 173-340-360(5)
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (requiring preference for permanent cleanup solutions, with
cleanups based primarily on institutional controls allowed only when it is not technically possible
to select a more permanent cleanup alternative).
286. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-523G)(2)(C) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-721(2)(c)(v)
(1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.315(l)(d)(E) (Supp. 1996).
287. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523U)(2)(C) (Michie Supp. 1995); Cow. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 25-16-305(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20118(6)(a) (West
Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may approve a remedial action plan relaxing cleanup standards in this fashion if compliance "is technically impractical"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10721(2)(c)(iii) (Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(d)(B) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6026.304U)(4) (1996); VA. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1995) (providing
that rules establishing site-specific standards must consider this); see also Sweeney, supra note
20, at 151 n.297 (describing the Virginia provision).
288. See, e.g., OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16-17; RHODE ISLAND SOIL
STANDARDS WORKSHOP, supra note 253, at 1 (noting that the use of institutional controls will be
restricted to sites where some form of deed notice is provided); Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra
note 35.
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Limiting Future Liability

Most voluntary cleanup programs allow developers and lenders
to obtain some form of immunity from liability for contamination at
the site. 289 One commentator has termed this a "fundamental requirement" to spur developers' participation in a state program. 290
Liability assurances for developers and, in some instances, lenders,
come in a variety of forms and with a wide range of conditions and
qualifications. 291
a.

Forms of Liability Protection

The most common forms of liability protection include "no action" letters, covenants not to sue, releases from state CERCLA liability, and certificates of completion (a state's certification that the
cleanup meets applicable standards), all extended to developers upon
completion of cleanup activities. Some states also alter the liability of
owners and lenders under the state CERCLA law. Michigan has gone
the furthest of any state in this regard by changing the structure of its
CERCLA law to provide blanket protection from liability to an owner
that is not responsible for causing the contamination at the brownfield
site. 292
The following table illustrates the forms of liability protection offered by each state.

289. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16-19; Anderson, supra note 109, at 2426; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 97-100 (describing the types of liability releases); Dinsmore,
supra note 24, at 11 (noting that liability protection is available in a number of states for prospective purchasers and current owners who undertake cleanup activities); Sweeney, supra note
20, at 121-22 (discussing covenants not to sue, certificates of completion, and no further action
letters generally); Casserly, supra note 26, at 273 (contrasting Wisconsin's statute and rules,
which contain no provisions for liability protections for developers who do partial cleanups, with
Minnesota's law, which does allow developers to limit their liability under these circumstances);
Solo, supra note 23, at 311 (citing to provisions in the Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon
statutes).
290. Solo, supra note 23, at 318-19; see also Anderson, supra note 109, at 25 (asking "what
would motivate an owner to cleanup and sell his property if his potential liability was unending?"); Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6 (stating that "[o]ne of the key features of Minnesota's
program is that it will release voluntary parties from liability by issuing 'no action' letters and
'certificates of completion"'); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 163 (terming written liability assurances "integral to the success of a Brownfields restoration and voluntary cleanup program").
291. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16.
292. M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20126(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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FORMS OF LIABILITY ASSURANCES

State

Comments

"No action" letter or
determination

Arizona, California VCP,
Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois,
Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Washington

Washington: applies to
"independent remedial
actions"

"Good neighbor" letter

Colorado, Minnesota

Minnesota: also features a
"no association" letter

Covenant not to sue or
release from state
CERCLA liability

California ERAP,
Connecticut, Delaware,
Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia (forthcoming),
Washington, Wisconsin

Oregon: release and covenant not to sue applies
only to parties to a prospective purchaser
agreement

Type of Limit on Liability

Certificate of completion

California VCP,
Delaware, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia
(forthcoming),
Wisconsin

Lender liability limits
(protected if voluntary
cleanup takes place)

Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota

Lender liability limits
(overall limits on
liability)

Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island,
Wisconsin

Rhode Island: no release
for a responsible person
Washington: applies to
parties entering into
consent decrees with
state oversight of cleanups

Wisconsin: also limits the
liability of qualifying
municipalities
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Arkansas: statute
provides for consent
order to establish
cleanup liabilities and
obligations; state considering implementing
some form of liability
assurance

No Action Letter

The "no action" letter, or its equivalent, is available in a number
of states. 293 It assures a developer that the state will not pursue an
293. A no action Jetter or its equivalent is available in: Arizona (ILLINOIS EPA GUIDE,
supra note 158, at 2 (stating that in Arizona a "letter of completion" is available for the remedial
action plan and for completion of cleanup)); California (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 110
(under the California VCP, a "no further action" letter is available to a developer that completes
a PEA showing that no cleanup is necessary)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307
(West Supp. 1996) ("no action determination")); Connecticut (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at
73 (indicating that in Connecticut, a letter of completion of remediation activities is available));
Delaware (Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, §§ 4.3(c), 5.3(c) ("no further action" letter
available if no remedial action is necessary)); Illinois (415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5158.10 (new
law makes a "No Further Remediation letter" available after completion of cleanup: letter is
"prima facie evidence that the site does not constitute a threat to human health and the environment and does not require further remediation under this Act, so long as the site is utilized in
accordance with the terms of the [letter]")); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(9)
(West Supp. 1995)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.20129a (West Supp. 1996) (Jetter
of determination available after a baseline environmental assessment)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1158.177-.179 (West Supp. 1996) (provides for "off-site source determination letter";
state also offers several forms of written assurances, including a "no action letter," and "no
association letter")); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.573 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CooE REGS.
tit. 10, § 25-15.010(6) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Montana (MONT.
CODE ANN. 75-10-738 (making a "letter of completion" available after a "petition for closure"));
Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15,186 (WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.)); New
Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 78 (New Hampshire provides for a no further
action Jetter)); New Jersey (NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.3, app. A § V(7) (WESTLAW
through Aug. 19, 1996) (developer may receive a "no further action statement")); New York
(COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 85 (a developer may receive a no further action letter in New
York)); North Carolina (N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-2 to 1-3 (noting that a "no further action" Jetter is available to any party conducting a site cleanup upon completion of all
cleanup actions)); Ohio (Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.lO(A), 3746.11 (Anderson 1995) (providing for the certified professional to review the cleanup and issue a no further action letter);
Omo ADMIN. CoDE § 3745-300-13 (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (defining the scope and
content of "no further action" letters)); Oregon (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 112 (before
the 1995 amendment in Oregon, a "no further action" letter was available to participants in the
Volunteer Cleanup Program, but not to parties who have entered into a prospective purchaser
agreement)); Rhode Island (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 80 (indicating that in Rhode
Island, a "letter of compliance" is available to any performing party who completes a remedy));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(g) (Supp. 1995)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 173-340-550(7)(a)(i) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing that the department may
provide a "written determination regarding the adequacy of the remedial actions performed at a
site" where an independent remedial action has taken place; state issues "no further action"
letters under this authority)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 83-84, 87, 98 (describing the Delaware, Minnesota, and New Jersey letters); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 45
(describing the New Jersey Jetter); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (describing the Minnesota letters); TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET, supra note 193, at 1 (noting that a
"Letter of Completion" is available when voluntary activities are completed); Anderson, supra
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enforcement action or require more cleanup activities at the site294
and is typically available in two situations:295 (1) if an initial or Phase
I assessment reveals contamination at the site at levels too low for
regulatory concern or no contamination at all296 or (2) if contamination exists at levels exceeding applicable standards, and the developer
completes an approved cleanup. 297 Ohio, which allows developers to
request a "variance" from cleanup standards, allows no action letters
to be issued to these developers as well. 298
Variations of the "no action" letter include the "off site source
determination" (or "good neighbor") letter available in Colorado and
Minnesota299 and Minnesota's "no association" letter. 300 The good
note 109, at 25; Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the Ohio letter); Sweeney, supra note
20, at 134-35, 138 (describing the Minnesota and Colorado letters); Casserly, supra note 26, at
268 (describing the Minnesota letters); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Rhode Island letters); Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160 (regarding the California, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee
provisions). Arkansas is considering extending some form of no action letter to developers.
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
Unlike its other forms of liability protection, Minnesota's no action letter is not expressly
provided for in the statute, but in a guidance document under the state's inherent authority to
exercise discretion in enforcement actions. See Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134 n.188 (citing
MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY: VOLUNTARY INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP, GUIDANCE DocuMENT No. 4 (rev. Jan. 1994)); Casserly, supra note 26, at 268. This is the approach
taken by Oregon and Rhode Island, Telephone Interviews, supra note 160, as well as the states
such as California, New Hampshire, and New York that conduct voluntary cleanup programs
without express statutory authority.
294. See, e.g., OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (describing this feature of
Minnesota's no action letter). The no action letter can often be tailored to the specific circumstances of a cleanup (e.g., when a developer undertakes a cleanup of only part of the site, or
investigates and cleans up a limited type of contamination). Id.; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 135
n.195; Casserly, supra note 26, at 268 (describing the Minnesota "limited no action" letter).
295. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995); see also OTA STATE
OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (describing the Minnesota letter); Michel, supra note 20,
at 455 n.189, 456 n.202 (describing the circumstances under which the certified professional may
issue a no further action letter in Ohio); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 138 (describing the Colorado
"no action determination").
296. In Ohio, for example, the developer can conclude cleanup activities when the Phase I
assessment demonstrates "that information indicates that there has been a release of hazardous
substances or petroleum at or upon a property, but that the release is not in excess of applicable
standards." Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-13(A)(3) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996); see
also Michel, supra note 20, at 455 n.189 (describing the Ohio statute's interim provision); cf
Maine VCP Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 1 (providing that the party may receive a letter indicating that no remedial actions are necessary at the site under similar circumstances).
297. In the latter case, a developer usually requests a no action letter only after performing
an approved cleanup. See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(6)(8) (WESTLAW through
ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-13(A)(4) (WESTLAW through
Aug. 31, 1996); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 456 n.202 (describing the Ohio statute's interim
provision). Maine also issues a "no-action assurance" letter at the plan approval stage, stating
that if the cleanup is done properly, the state will not take enforcement action. Maine VCP Fact
Sheet, supra note 195, at 2. Ohio, unlike most other states, provides that the "no further action"
letter is issued by a certified professional, not the state agency. Omo ADMIN. CODE § 3745-30013(A) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996).
298. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(11) (Anderson 1995). For a description of the
Ohio variance process, see supra note 240 and accompanying text.
299. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(2)(a)(II) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1158.177 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the site owner may receive this type of letter if
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neighbor letter informs the developer that contamination on the site
was caused by activities on a nearby property and that the state will
protect the developer if it does not hinder the cleanup activities on
that property. 301 The no association letter informs the developer that
it did not cause the contamination at the site and that its planned activities will not contribute to contamination at the site. 302
In most states, a no action letter indicates only that the state will
not pursue further enforcement actions. It does not release the developer from liability; it simply reduces the likelihood of future state actions. 303 If new information about the site unknown at the time of the
letter is discovered, the state is not precluded from requiring a

"the commissioner finds that the release originates from a source on adjacent or nearby real
property and that the person is not otherwise responsible for the release"); see also OTA STATE
OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 20 (describing the Minnesota provision); Sweeney, supra note
20, at 138, 134 (describing the Colorado and Minnesota provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at
269 (describing the Minnesota provision). Colorado makes this form of its no action determination available to a developer whose site does not contribute to groundwater contamination. Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
300. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.178 (West Supp. 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES,
supra note 20, at 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134; Casserly, supra note 26, at 270.
301. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.177(l}(b) (West Supp. 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE
STATES, supra note 20, at 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134; Casserly, supra note 26, at 269.
Minnesota conditions the issuance of its good neighbor letter on the following:
(1) agreement by the person to allow entry upon the property to the commissioner and the
authorized representatives of the commissioner to take response actions to address the release, including in appropriate cases an agreement to grant easements to the state for that
purpose;
(2) agreement by the person to avoid any interference with the response actions to address
the release taken by or at the direction of the agency or the commissioner, and to avoid
actions that contribute to the release;
(3) invalidation of the determination or agreement if the commissioner receives new information indicating that the property owned by the person is a source of the release or that
the person is otherwise responsible for the release; and
(4) any other condition that the commissioner deems reasonable and necessary to ensure
that the agency and commissioner can adequately respond to the release.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.177(1){b) (West Supp. 1995); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134
n.188; Casserly, supra note 26, at 270 n.68.
,
302. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.178 {West Supp. 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES,
supra note 20, at 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134; Casserly, supra note 26, at 270. The no
association letter is available to determine that "certain actions proposed to be taken at real
property subject to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant will not constitute conduct associating the person with the release or threatened
release." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.178(1) (West Supp. 1995).
303. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 20; Anderson, supra note 109, at 25;
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134 {describing this feature of the Minnesota letter); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
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cleanup. 304 Thus, the no action letter is of questionable utility for
developers. 305
ii.

Covenants Not to Sue

Several states offer a developer a covenant not to sue. 306 Because
it offers express protection from future state administrative or enforcement actions for contamination found at the site,307 the covenant
not to sue affords more protection to the developer. 308 Typically, a
developer may obtain a covenant not to sue in the same fashion as a
no action letter: by undertaking a state-approved site investigation
and voluntary cleanup. 309 States often require a developer to obtain a
304. The no action letter will usually include a "reopener" provision allowing the state to
take action against the developer if contamination that was not uncovered in the site investigation and cleaned up is found later, the cleanup remedy fails to work, or other new information
becomes available (e.g., the discovery of fraud or other misrepresentations in the developer's
reports to the state). OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 20; see, e.g., COMING CLEAN,
supra note 24, at 99 (describing this feature of the Minnesota letters). For a broader description
of conditions under which liability protections may be void or voidable, see infra notes 333-44
and accompanying text.
305. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 305 (claiming that a no action letter is less effective
than a covenant not to sue, which provides a release from liability); OTA STATE OF THE STATES,
supra note 20, at 17 (stating that letters of assurance other than covenants not to sue "vary in
terms of their value"). But see Casserly, supra note 26, at 268-69 (stating that Minnesota regulators claim that "no action" letters "have been sufficient to allow property transactions to occur"). A number of state officials contacted for this article indicated that there had been no
subsequent actions taken in their states with respect to recipients of no action letters. Telephone
Interviews, supra note 160.
306. States offering covenants not to sue include: California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25398.2(b)(l)(C) (West Supp. 1996) (making covenants not to sue available in the
ERAP)); Connecticut (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 73 (indicating that Connecticut issues
covenants not to sue to new owners)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18 (WESTLAW
through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that a covenant must be given to a recipient of a
certificate of completion; covenant bars all liability, including future liability)); Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A(j)(l) (West Supp. 1996)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§ 324.20133(1) (West Supp. 1996)); Ohio (Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 3746.12(A) (Anderson
1995) (providing that a.developer may submit the "no further action" letter to the state to receive a covenant not to sue)); Oregon (1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4; OR. REv. STAT. § 465.325(7)(a)
(Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may extend a covenant not to sue to parties entering into a
prospective purchaser agreement)); Rhode Island (R.l. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-10 (Supp. 1995)
(making "covenants not to sue" available only to bona fide prospective purchasers)); Washington (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.040(4)(c) (West Supp. 1996)). See also MASSACHU·
SETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 1 (noting that covenants not to
sue are available to participants in the Clean Sites Initiative); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra
note 20, at 19-20; Anderson, supra note 109, at-;:75 (stating that the trend in recent statutes is to
incorporate a provision for availability of a covenant not to sue); Andrew, supra note 29, at 28
(describing the Minnesota provision); Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the Ohio provision); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 58 (describing the Indiana provision);
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 122 nn.113, 125, 136, 143, 152 (citing the Massachusetts, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana, and Virginia provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Rhode
Island provision).
307. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 98;
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 122.
308. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17 (stating that covenants not to sue are
more effective than letters of assurance because they release developers from liability).
309. See, e.g., Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the
Ohio provision); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 58 (describing the Indiana pro-
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no action letter or "certificate of completion" as a condition precedent
to receipt of a covenant not to sue. In Ohio, for example, a developer
may obtain a covenant not to sue from the state after it receives a no
action letter. 310
iii.

Certificates of Completion

In a number of states, the developer may obtain a "certificate of
completion," a state approval of successful completion of cleanup activities.311 The developer is usually required to receive confirmation
from the state that the cleanup has been performed properly312 and
promise to work with the state in the future (e.g., by maintaining and
monitoring the site and by cooperating with the state in future cleanup
vision); cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20133(l)(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1996) (making the covenant not to sue available for "a person who proposes to redevelop or reuse a facility, including a
vacant manufacturing or abandoned industrial site" who meets statutory conditions, including a
condition that the covenant "would, when appropriate, expedite response activity consistent with
the rules promulgated under this part"). But see COMING CLEAN, supra note 24. at 76; MASSACHUSE"ITS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 2-3 (covenant not to sue is
available upon determination that developer is eligible for the program).
310. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A)(l) (Anderson 1995); see also Michel, supra note
20, at 457; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 129. Indiana requires that the developer obtain a certificate of completion before receiving a covenant not to sue. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143; Survey Results,
supra note 158.
311. States offering certificates of completion include: California (COMING CLEAN, supra
note 24, at 110 (indicating that a certificate of completion is available after a satisfactory cleanup
under the California VCP); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.15(a) (West Supp. 1996)
(certificate of completion available in the ERAP)); Delaware (DEL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware
Regulations, supra note 172, § 11 (certification of completion of remedy)); Indiana (IND. CODE
ANN.§ 13-25-5-16 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 30:2287.l(A) (West Supp. 1996); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(5) (West
Supp. 1995)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(5) (West Supp. 1995)); Texas (TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.609 (West Supp. 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW,
Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.10 (1996))); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 6615a(k) (Supp. 1996)); Virginia (VA. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(3) (Michie Supp. 1996)
(directing rules to provide certificates of satisfactory completion of remediation "where voluntary cleanup achieves applicable cleanup st~ndards or where the Department determines that no
further action is required")); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995)
(certification that property has been satisfactorily restored)). See also OTA STATE OF THE
STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Andrew, supra note 29, at 28; Clokey, supra note 26, at 38 (describing the Wisconsin provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 136 n.206, 143 n.240, 148-49 n.280, 150
n.289, 152 n.303 (describing the California ERAP, and Indiana, Minnesota, Texas, and Virginia
provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the Minnesota provision); Survey Results,
supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware and Virginia provisions); Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160 (regarding the California VCP).
312. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.765(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a developer in Wisconsin may receive a certificate of completion only by obtaining a certification from
the state DNR that the property has been "satisfactorily restored and that the harmful effects
from a release of a hazardous substance have been minimized"); see also OTA STATE OF THE
STATES, supra note 20, at 20 (describing the Minnesota provision); Clokey, supra note 26, at 38
(describing the Wisconsin provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143 (describing the Indiana
provision); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the Minnesota provision).
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activities). 313 The certificate of completion provides broad liability
protection for a developer, particularly when it is accompanied by an
exemption from liability under the state's CERCLA law. 314 It is also
the only form of liability protection that may shield the developer
against further action by the state if additional contamination is discovered at the site. 315
iv.

Release from State CERCLA Liability

In a number of states, protection from future state enforcement
action for a developer who performs a site investigation and/or completes a state-approved cleanup takes the form of an express release
from liability under the state CERCLA law. 316 For example, a developer in Michigan may petition the state within six months of comple313. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a
developer in Minnesota that receives a certificate of completion must agree "to cooperate with
... response actions necessary to address remaining releases or threatened releases, and to avoid
any action that interferes with the response action"); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.765(2)(a)(4) (West
Supp. 1995) (providing that a developer in Wisconsin that receives a certificate of completion
must maintain and monitor the property as required by the DNR); see also Clokey, supra note
26, at 38 (describing the Wisconsin provision); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the
Minnesota provision).
314. For example, a recipient of Wisconsin's certificate of completion is exempted from liability under the state Hazardous Substance Discharge Law (the "Spill Statute") for contamination at the site prior to acquisition. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2) (West Supp. 1995); see also
Clokey, supra note 26, at 37-38 (describing the Wisconsin provision).
315. This is the case, for example, in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Wisconsin's exemption from
liability applies even if any of the following occur:
1. Statutes, rules or regulations are created or amended that would impose greater responsibilities on the purchaser . . . [;]
2. The purchaser fully complies with the rules [and cleanup plan] ... but it is discovered that
the cleanup fails to fully restore the environment and minimize the effects from a release of
a hazardous substance[; or]
3. The contamination from a hazardous substance that is the subject of the cleanup ... is
discovered to be more extensive than anticipated by the purchaser and the department.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995); see also Clokey, supra note 26, at 38
(describing the Wisconsin provision); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the Minnesota
provision).
316. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9105(f) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess~ of the
138th General Assembly, 1995) (exempting the holder of a certificate of completion); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 30:2285.l(A) (West Supp. 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(6) (West
Supp. 1995); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20129a(5) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115B.175(1)(a) (West Supp. 1995); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(1) (providing for a release for a
qualifying participant that enters.into a prospective purchaser agreement); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6026.501(a) (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-7(b) (Supp. 1995) (providing an
exemption for persons "who are define.ct as bona fide prospective purchasers and who enter an
enforceable settlement agreement"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.610(a) (West
Supp. 1996) (making release available; statute indicates that there is no requirement .that developer purchase property prior to issuance of the certificate of completion); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6615a(c) (Supp. 1996) (providing an exemption for an "eligible person" who obtains a certificate of completion); VA. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-1429.2 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing immunity
from state enforcement actions to the holder of a certificate of completion); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.765(2) (West Supp. 1995); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 90 (describing the
Pennsylvania provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 155 n.323, 150 n.290, 152 n.306 (describing
the Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the
Texas provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Oregon provision).
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tion of a "baseline environmental assessment" for a "letter of
determination" that it warrants a release from liability under the
Michigan CERCLA statute. 317
b.

Protection for Other Parties

i.

Lenders

Some states extend the benefit of the liability protections in their
voluntary cleanup statutes to lenders. 318 Some of these states and
others have amended their CERCLA laws to provide sweeping protections similar to those found in the EPA's invalidated lender liability
rule, 319 which redefined the situations in which a lender is "participating in the management" at a site. 320 The apparent rationale for such
provisions is that they facilitate a developer's efforts to persuade a
lender to loan money for cleanup and redevelopment activities. 321
One commentator terms the various forms of liability protection for
lenders "mandatory for redevelopment of urban industrial sites." 322
Other states, however, appear to be relying on the liability protection
that they extend to developers to alleviate lenders' fear of extending
credit at brownfield sites. 323 Several major voluntary cleanup pro317. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20129a (West Supp. 1996).
318. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 30:2288.l(D) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting the lender unless it
is a ··responsible person" as defined in id. § 30:2276); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343E(6)(8)-(C) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(6) (West Supp. 1995); see also
Anderson, supra note 109, at 25 (describing the Minnesota provision); Pendergrass, supra note
26, at 6; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 136 n.200 (describing the Minnesota provision); Casserly,
supra note 26, at 265 n.37 (describing the Minnesota provision).
319. The EPA's rule was invalidated in Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see
supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
320. This approach has been adopted in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(b) (West Supp. 1996) (redefining the situations in which a lender is exempt or released from liability at a site); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (West Supp. 1996); M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20101b (West
Supp. 1996) (exempting a lender from liability if it has not "participated in the management of a
property," as defined in id. § 324.2010la); 0Hto REV. CooE ANN. § 3746.26 (Anderson 1995);
OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-120 to -140 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (providing, however,
that the state will review these rules to determine if they should be amended); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 6027.5 (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.76(9m) (West Supp. 1995); see also
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 88 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Anderson, supra
note 109, at 25-26; Clokey, supra note 26, at 36 n.6 (describing the Wisconsin provision); Michel,
supra note 20, at 459 (describing the Ohio provision); Survey Results, supra note 158. Wisconsin
also exempts municipalities from liability in certain situations. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§ 144.76(9)(e)
(West Supp. 1995).
321. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 25; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 136 (stating that the
Minnesota provision for lender protection "creates incentives for redevelopment").
322. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 161. The National Environmental Policy Institute's "model"
state brownfield approach would include liability relief for lenders. NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra
note 20, at 49.
323. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17 (noting that "[s)ome lenders have
voiced approval of certificates of completion and no further action letters as easing concerns
involving loan decisions"); Congdon, supra note 160, at 7 (noting that a developer's receipt of a
certificate of completion in Virginia's voluntary cleanup program "should reassure nervous lenders and investors").
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grams, including Indiana's, provide no liability protection for
lenders. 324
States extending the benefits of liability assurances to lenders
often specify what a lender can do to protect itself without incurring
liability. 325 As noted above, this is intended to avoid the uncertainty
associated with lenders' liability for taking actions to protect their security interests. 326
ii.

Transferees, Successors, and Assigns

The statutes often extend liability protection to the developer's
transferees, successors, and assigns, such as subsequent owners. 327
324. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 145, 151 (noting that the Texas statute also incorporates no
specific provisions to protect lenders).
325. Illinois's "No Further Remediation Letter" protects not only the "remediation applicant" or other person to whom it was issued, but also a financial institution that acquires ownership, operation, management, or control of a site through foreclosure or other means of
protecting a security interest. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(d)(l), (d)(lO) (West Supp.
1996).
326. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
327. Those states extending liability protection include: Arkansas (ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7523(p) (Michie Supp. 1995) (extending protection to subsequent owners if they were not or are
not responsible for causing or contributing to contamination)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
7, § 9105(e) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995)
(extending protection of a certificate of completion to "any person who owns, operates or otherwise controls activities at the facility after the date of issuance of the certification ... provided
such person does not interfere or permit any interference with any aspect of the remedy addressed by the certification of completion of remedy")); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 51
58.lO(d) (West Supp. 1996) (a No Further Remediation Letter applies to a successor-in-interest
as well as other defined parties)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18(b)(2) (WESTLAW
through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (protection of covenant not to sue extends to transferee of
the certificate of completion or the property to which it applies)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2288(A)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting an owner if it "is not responsible for any
discharge or disposal or threatened discharge or disposal identified in the approved voluntary
remedial action plan"); id. § 30:2288(A)(2) (person who "acquires or develops" the site), id.
§ 30:2288(A)(3) (successor or assign of any person exempt from liability)); Maine (ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(6)(E) (West Supp. 1995) (protection from state liability); id. § 343E(9)(B) (no action determination extends to successors and assigns "bound by the conditions in
the determination or agreements")); Minnesota (MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175(6a)(c)(l)-(3)
(West Supp. 1995) (protecting owners, purchasers, successors, and assigns in the same fashion as
the Louisiana statute); id. § 115B.l 77(2) (protection of "good neighbor" letter extends to successors and assigns if they "are not otherwise responsible for the release and are bound by the
conditions in the determination or agreement")); Ohio (Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3746.12(E)
(Anderson 1995) (covenant not to sue remains in effect so long as property meets standards that
were in effect when cleanup took place)); Oregon (1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(5) (benefits and burdens run with the land to successors who agree to be bound by prospective purchaser agreement)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN.§ 6026.501(a)(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1995) (current or future
owner who participates in cleanup, developer, successor or assign, or public utility)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-10 (Supp. 1995) (covenant not to sue may be transferred "to
successors or assigns who are not otherwise found to be a responsible party," as long as they
agree to any performance requirements, such as operation or maintenance)); Texas (TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN.§ 361.610(c) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting an owner or lender
that becomes involved with the site after a certificate of completion is issued, unless it was originally a "responsible party")); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(c)(2) (Supp. 1996) (exemption from liability extends to successors)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(3) (West
Supp. 1995) (exemption from liability applies to successors and assigns unless they know that
certificate of completion was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation)). See also Anderson,
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States may protect all successors and assigns or only future purchasers
and owners. In order for the state's approval to extend to future buyers, the statutes usually require some form of notice to the purchaser.328 The typical means of notice is recordation of institutional
controls, such as a restriction of the site to industrial uses, with the
deed to the site. 329 This puts subsequent purchasers on notice that
certain activities at the site are restricted and some contamination
may remain at the site. 330 At sites cleaned to levels suitable for industrial uses, subsequent purchasers desiring to use the sites for residential purposes are required to notify the states and, in some cases,
undertake additional cleanup activities. 331 Other states incorporate
supra note 109, at 25; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143 n.243, 156 n.325 (describing the Indiana
and Pennsylvania provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Arkansas and
Rhode Island provisions).
328. See, e.g., O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 64 (describing the Indiana
provision).
329. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523(0) (Michie Supp. 1995) (required for "industrial activities
and compatible uses"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398.7(a) (West Supp. 1996) (land use
controls, if any, must be recorded); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9115(b) (WESTLAW through end
of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (certificate of completion must be
recorded); 415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.8(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1996) (remediation applicant
receiving a ''No Further Remediation Letter" must record it for it to be effective); IND. Co DE
ANN. § 13-25-5-16(c) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requirement to record
certificate of completion); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20120b(4) (West Supp. 1996) (restrictive covenant running with the land required to be recorded if cleanup relied on land use restrictions); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3746.14 (Anderson 1995) (recording of no further action letters
and covenants not to sue required); 1995 Or. Laws 662 § 4(5) (recording required of prospective
purchaser agreement); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 361.609(c) (West Supp. 1996); 21
Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 333.9 which
requires certificate of completion to be recorded in order to satisfy existing deed certification
requirements); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h)(6), (k)(3) (Supp. 1996) (recording required for
approved corrective action plans and certificates of completion); see also Anderson, supra note
109, at 25 (stating that Indiana's covenant not to sue runs with the land to "lenders, successors or
assigns of the protected entity"); Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the Ohio provision);
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 149 n.283 (describing the California provision for the recording of
land use controls); id. at 154 (noting that the Pennsylvania exemption from deed notice requirements for sites cleaned up under the background or statewide health standard allows a site to
"be sold and redeveloped free and clear of any indicia of past or present contamination"); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Texas provisions). In Michigan, if the state approved
institutional controls instead of land use restrictions in a restrictive covenant, these controls may
be the subject of a local ordinance published in the same manner as zoning ordinances. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120b(5) (West Supp. 1996). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6026.302(d), -.303(g) (West Supp. 1996) (if background or statewide health standard met, no
deed notice required).
330. Michel, supra note 20, at 457; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 164.
331. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(q) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE
§ 25398.7(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that "terms and conditions of a land use control may
be modified only with the express written consent of the department"); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/58.8(c) (West Supp. 1996) (site with a land use limitation may not be used in a manner
inconsistent with the limitation unless investigation and/or new cleanup performed, and new "No
Further Remediation Letter" obtained and recorded); MICH. Cm1P. LAWS ANN. § 324.20116(3)
(West Supp. 1996) (transferor required to disclose applicable land or resource use restrictions);
id. § 324.20120b(4) (restrictive covenant with land use restrictions binds successors, assigns, and
lessees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.505(4), -.903 (West Supp. 1996) (state must approve
requests to change the property from nonresidential to residential land uses, and may require
additional cleanup if risk increases by a change from nonresidential to residential land uses);
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provisions designed to ensure that engineering and managerial controls are maintained properly. 332
c.

Qualifications and Limitations

Situations Voiding the Limit on Liability
Many statutes provide that if the developer fails to properly perform the cleanup activities called for in the remedial action plan, 333
aggravates the contamination, or interferes with cleanup activities,334
it will not receive protection from liability. States also retain their
i.

TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE ANN. §361.610(c) (West Supp. 1996) (no liability protection for
"a person who changes land use from the use specified in the certificate of completion if the new
use may result in increased risks to human health or the environment").
332. See also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16.
333. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 25398.2(b)(l)(D) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for
the removal of a site from the list of eligible sites for the ERAP upon failure to comply with
program requirements); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-16-306(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996) (failure to
"materially comply" with the plan renders approval "void"); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108(a)
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (state may
condition certificate of completion on "the performance of additional remedies in the event that
the remedial goals contained in the final plan of remedial action are not achieved as required by
the plan"); 415 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(e) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-519 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (state may withdraw approval of a work plan
upon failure to substantially comply with terms and conditions of work plan or voluntary
remediation agreement); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20133(3)(c) (West Supp. 1996); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 260.569(3)(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1996} (constituting grounds for termination for
cause); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 75-10-736(10)(a) (1995) (failure "of the applicant or the applicant's
agents to materially comply with the voluntary cleanup plan" renders approval void}; N.J. Ao.
MIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.3, app. A, § IV(l} (WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 1996) (state reserves
the right to terminate the developer's participation if the developer violates the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(4}(d) (no release for party to prospective
purchaser agreement in the event of "failure to exercise due care or take reasonable precautions
with respect to any hazardous substance at the facility"); see also Survey Results, supra note 158
(regarding the Indiana, Missouri, and New Jersey provisions).
334. ARK. CooE ANN.§ 8-7-523(n) (Michie Supp. 1995) (specifies that "the purchaser shall
take all the steps necessary to prevent aggravating or contributing to the contamination of the
air, land, or water, including downward migration of contamination, from any existing contamination on the site"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2289(1) (West Supp. 1996) (no exemption for a
"person who aggravates or contributes to a discharge or disposal or threatened discharge or
disposal that was not remedied under an approved voluntary remedial action plan"); Mrctt.
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20133(3)(b) (West Supp. 1996) (covenant not to sue does not bar claims
for "[i)nterference with or failure to cooperate with the department, its contractors, or other
persons conducting response activities"); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(7)(1) (West Supp. 1995)
(no exemption from liability for "a person who aggravates or contributes to a release or
threatened release that was not remedied under an approved voluntary response action plan");
1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(1)(c), (4)(b)-(c) (no release from state liability for party to prospective
purchaser agreement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(3) (Supp. 1996) (no limit on liability
for "eligible person" or successor if that person "engages in activities that are inconsistent with
or interfere with monitoring, investigation, abatement, removal or remediation activities, or conditions or restrictions in a certificate of completion"); id. § 6615a(d)(5) (no limit on liability if an
"eligible person or successor worsens an existing release or threatened release prior to the issuance of a certificate of completion, and that release or threatened release is not abated, removed, remediated or monitored pursuant to an approved corrective action plan prior to the
issuance of a certificate of completion"). Michigan also imposes an affirmative obligation on an
owner or operator who has knowledge that a site has been contaminated by hazardous substances to do all of the following, with fines and penalties for a failure to comply:
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authority to respond to imminent hazards. 335 Even in states where
liability assurances protect the developer against the discovery of additional contamination, the developer is not protected if it caused that
contamination. 336 This may be difficult to discern; as one commentator notes, "The longer the party has conducted operations on the site,
the more difficult it may be to document that contamination is not the
result of that party's activities. " 337
Once the developer receives protection from liability, many states
provide that the liability assurance is either void automatically or
voidable at the state's election in certain circumstances. In many
states, protection from liability is offered only with respect to contamination known about at the time of site assessment and remediation
activities. 338 This is intended to provide an incentive to discover and
(a) Undertake measures as are necessary to prevent exacerbation of the existing
contamination.
(b) Exercise due care by undertaking response activity necessary to mitigate unacceptable
exposure to hazardous substances and allow for the intended use of the facility in a manner
that protects the public health and safety.
(c) Take reasonable precautions against the reasonably foreseeable acts or omissions of a
third party and the consequences that foreseeably could result from those acts or omissions.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20107a(l) (West Supp. 1996). But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:2287(1) (West Supp. 1996) (no liability for "aggravating or contributing to any discharge or
disposal or threatened discharge or disposal identified in an approved voluntary remedial action
plan" if work performed in a "workmanlike" manner); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343E(6)(F) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a person who, "while implementing the voluntary
response action plan and exercising due care in implementation, causes, contributes or exacerbates a discharge or release [may be released from liability] provided that the discharge or release is removed or remediated to the satisfaction of the commissioner"); see also Survey
Results, supra note 158 (stating that in Maine, a developer that does not remove or remediate
the "contribution or exacerbation" is disqualified from the program).
335. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-19(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg.
Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.569(3)(1) (West Supp. 1996) (constituting grounds for termination
for cause).
336. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1995); see also Clokey, supra note 26, at 43
(describing the Wisconsin provision).
337. Clokey, supra note 26, at 43.
338. States that offer protection only for known contamination include: Arkansas (ARK.
CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(m) (Michie Supp. 1995)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
58.10(e)(6) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that discovery of additional contamination that represents a threat may result in voidance of "No Further Remediation Letter")); Indiana (IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-25-5-18(c)(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (covenant not to sue
may not apply to future liability for contamination "not known to the commissioner at the time
the commissioner issued the certificate of completion")); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 343-E(l) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that liability protection applies only to "known" releases)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.573 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that additional
cleanup may be required)); Montana (MoNT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-736(7) (1995) (approval "applies only to conditions at the facility that are known to the department at the time of department approval")); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-15,186 (WESTLAW through end of 1995
Reg. Sess.)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(2) (West Supp. 1996) (state may
require additional cleanup)); Rhode Island (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Rhode Island typically requires that any grounds for disqualification be written into the settlement agreements));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.l-1429.l(A)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (providing for the certificate
of satisfactory completion of remediation to be based on existing conditions and available information)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(l)(B) (Supp. 1996)). See also Maine VCP
Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 3; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 98; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 145
n.253 (describing the Indiana provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Illinois
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clean up all contamination. 339 The states are typically empowered to
deny liability protection in a number of other situations: if the
cleanup remedy fails to eliminate the risk to health or the environment;340 if the developer contaminates the site later;341 if the developer fails to maintain controls at the site; 342 or if a ·change in land use
at the site, usually from industrial to residential uses, would result in
the violation of applicable standards. 343 Many states also provide that
fraudulent statements or misrepresentations in program documents
will void the liability protection. 344
and Virginia· provisions). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(c)(3)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1996)
(providing that the release from liability extends to protect the developer in three instances: (1)
if existing contamination is discovered later by methods not recognized as standard at the time of
cleanup plan approval; (2) if contaminants are first regulated as hazardous after plan approval;
and (3) if additional cleanup activities would otherwise be required by more stringent cleanup
standards that became effective after plan approval).
339. See Berger et al., supra note 23, at 98; Solo, supra note 23, at 314 n.155.
340. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(C)(2) (Anderson 1995) (providing that the state may
deny a covenant not to sue if a remedy identified in the "no further action" letter fails to protect
health and the environment); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(3) (West Supp. 1996); see also
Michel, supra note 20, at 458 (describing the Ohio provision).
341. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(k) (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20133(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); NEB. REv. ~TAT.§ 81-15,186 (WESTLAW through end of
1995 Reg; Sess.); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(4)(a) (providing no limit on liability for releases at the
facility after the date of acquisition for party to prospective purchaser agreement, and developer
has the burden to prove that contamination existed before the date of acquisition); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.504 (West Supp. 1996); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 361.610(a)
(West Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(l)(A) (Supp. 1996) (extending liability
limit to "releases and threatened releases which result from the nonreckless performance of an
approved site investigation work plan or an approved corrective action plan and which are
abated, removed, remediated or monitored pursuant to an approved corrective action plan prior
to the issuance of a certificate of completion"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a) (West Supp.
1995) (providing that exemption from liability applies only to a release occurring "prior to the
date of acquisition of the property").
However, Wisconsin's liability exemption applies even if:
1. Statutes, rules or regulations are created or amended that would impose greater responsibilities on the purchaser than those imposed under par. (a)2.
2. The purchaser fully complies with the rules promulgated by the department and any contract entered into under those rules under par. (a)2 but it is discovered that the cleanup fails
to fully restore the environment and minimize the effects from a release of a hazardous
substance.
3. The contamination from a hazardous substance that is the subject of the cleanup under
par. (a)2 is discovered to be more extensive than anticipated by the purchaser and the
department.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
342. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(E) (Anderson 1995) (providing that a covenant not
to sue is voidable upon the developer's discontinued maintenance of engineering controls); see
also Michel, supra note 20, at 458.
343. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(4) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may
require additional cleanup activities if land use changes alter exposure patterns); TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 361.610(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that a release from liability in
Texas is void if a change in the land use increases the risk to human health or the environment);
see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 90 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Sweeney,
supra note 20, at 150 n.290 (describing the Texas provision).
344. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-306(3)(b) (West Supp. 1996) (rendering the approval
of a voluntary cleanup plan void); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9111(a) (WESTLAW through end of
1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (voiding any limitation on liability); 415
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.10(e)(5) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that fraud or misrepresentation
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Limited Utility of Liability Assurances

The various forms of liability assurances protect the developer
from state enforcement actions but are not com~ehensive. As a result, they are of limited utility to a developer. 5 In all. but a few
states, they do not provide immunity from private party suits. 346 They
also do not provide complete release from CERCLA liability. 347 The
EPA has taken steps to minimize the likelihood of a CERCLA enforcement action at a site cleaned up in a state program348 but some
risk remains.
in obtaining a "No Further Remediation Letter" may result in its voidance); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2289(3) (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(7)(C) (West Supp.
1995) (extending to a successor or assign with knowledge); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20139(2) (West Supp. 1996) (imposing criminal penalties for false statements and misrepresentations in cleanup documents and applications); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(7)(3) (West
Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-736(10)(b) (1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3746.12(C)(3) (Anderson 1995) (providing that the state shall deny a covenant not to sue if the
no further action letter was submitted fraudulently); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(1) (West
Supp. 1996) (providing that state may require additional cleanup actions if fraud was committed
in meeting a cleanup standard); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 361.610(b) (West Supp.
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(2) (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a)(6)
(West Supp. 1995); see also Suryey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Montana provision).
345. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26 (stating that "state assurances
may not go far enough for some stakeholders to promote further brownfield cleanups and
redevelopment").
346. Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin, among others, do not bar private party
lawsuits over contamination at brownfield sites. See, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 74
(regarding the Maine program); MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra
note 189. at l; Clokey, supra note 26, at 38 ("[T)he [Wisconsin) legislature stopped short of
barring private party claims for recovery of remediation costs brought under federal or state
law"); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160; see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note
20, at 16 (stating that state liability assurances do not protect developers from third-party
actions).
Indiana and Pennsylvania are among the states providing that satisfactory completion of
cleanup activities insulates a developer from certain third-party lawsuits. IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 13-25-5-18(b), -20(b) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 6026.502(a) (West Supp. 1996) (applying only to sites located in "special industrial areas"); see
also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 123 (describing the Indiana and Pennsylvania provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana provisions).
347. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26; Michel, supra note 20, at 458; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165. One commentator calls a state covenant not to sue an "implicit shield
against the threat of federal cleanup action suits," because a developer that qualifies for the
covenant presumably also will be meeting federal cleanup standards. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 59; see also Michel, supra note 20, at 458 n.213 (quoting this statement).
But there are circumstances under which this would not be the case, such as when the developer
obtained a variance from Ohio's statewide cleanup standards. Michel, supra note 20, at 458
n.216.
348. The EPA 's Region V has entered into an amended "Superfund Memorandum of
Agreement" (SMOA) with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), which designates
the MPCA as the lead agency for cleanups at sites in the state. Under the SMOA, the EPA only
will respond under CERCLA at sites cleaned up in the state program that pose an "imminent
threat or emergency situation." OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19; see also
Andrew, supra note 29, at 27 (terming EPA's Region V "one of the first EPA regional offices to
respond officially to the issue of brownfield redevelopment"). Region V also has developed
SMOAs with Indiana and Illinois, and a number of other EPA Regions, including Region VI
(developing an agreement with Texas), and Region VII (with Missouri) are developing similar
memoranda of agreement with states. Anne Slaughter Andrew, IDEM and EPA Sign Superfund
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Developers may be deterred from taking part in voluntary
cleanup programs and seeking liability protection for other reasons.
Because they receive no advance guarantee of liability protection,
they may perceive that cleanups are too lengthy and expensive to warrant the effort of obtaining protection from liability. 349 This is particularly likely to be true in states that apply cleanup standards of existing
laws at brownfield sites. 35° Finally, the costs of continuing state involyement (e.g., monitoring of the site and a~sociated reporting requirements) may deter some developers. 351
4.

State Oversight and Responsibility
a.

Varying Levels of Involvement

The voluntary cleanup programs vary considerably in the extent
of state agency involvement in the process of evaluating and remediating each brownfield site. States usually require the developer to pay

Memorandum of Agreement, 6 Ind. Envtl. Compliance Update (M. Lee Smith), No. 1, at 5-6
(Jan. 1996) {describing the Region V agreement with Indiana); Telephone Interviews, supra note
160.
Colorado's statute attempts to provide additional assurances to developers regarding federal action. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-309 {West Supp. 1996) (providing that if the EPA
"indicates that it is investigating a site which is the subject of an approved voluntary cleanup
plan or no action petition, the department shall actively pursue a determination by the United
States environmental protection agency that the property not be addressed under the federal
act"); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 139 & n.221 {claiming that the Colorado provision
"creates a cause of action in mandamus" if the state fails to take action). But see IND. CODE
ANN. § 13~25-5-l{b) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that "[t]his
section does not affect a person's legal obligations set forth in 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. (CERCLA]
regardless of a person's participation in this chapter"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2285.l(C)
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that a developer receives no exemption from federal liability).
349. Clokey, supra note 26, at 43; Casserly, supra note 26, at 269-70. The certificate of
completion is not a "pre-approval"; the developer has to wait until the completion of a cleanup
to obtain it. The site investigation and cleanup process will often take six to twelve months or
more, during which time the developer has no assurance that it will be exempted from liability.
See Clokey, supra note 26, at 43. Andrew, supra note 29, at 31, reports that this has led some
developers in states such as Minnesota and Indiana to criticize the voluntary cleanup programs,
"claiming that the time and money it takes to obtain a final cleanup does not result in an economic incentive for the redevelopment of a brownfield."
350. In 1995, the Minnesota legislature recognized this disincentive to development, amending the state voluntary cleanup statute to provide that the planned use of the property be taken
into account in determining the cleanup standard at each site. See Andrew, supra note 29, at 28;
supra note 254 and accompanying text. Previously, Minnesota had applied existing cleanup standards at sites participating in its voluntary cleanup program. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES,
supra note 20, at 19; Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6.
351. See Clokey, supra note 26, at 43.
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of state oversight and

352. Application fees are required in: California (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (the
California VCP requires a deposit of up to half of estimated oversight costs)); Colorado (COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(4) (Supp. 1996) (fee not to exceed $2,000)); Delaware (Survey
Results, supra note 158 (Delaware has no fee, but requires a deposit of $5,000 to cover oversight
costs)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-2(c)(3) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg.
Sess.) ($1,000 application fee)); Maine (Maine VCP Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 2 (initial fee of
$500 may be charged)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.20129a(4) (West Supp. 1996)
($750 fee for developer requesting a "letter of determination")); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.567(1) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(3)(8), (4)(8) (WESTLAW
through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) ($200 application fee and $5,000 deposit or lesser amount
the state deems sufficient; state usually requires a deposit of between $1,000 and $2,000)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15,184(6) (WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.) ($5,000
application fee)); Oregon (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Oregon requires $2,500 deposit for
entrants into a prospective purchaser agreement; $5,000 deposit for entrants into the program));
Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.703(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1996) ($250 fee upon
submitting report demonstrating compliance with background or statewide health standards; for
developers choosing site-specific standards, $250 fee on "submission of a remedial investigation,
risk assessment and cleanup plan and ... additional $500 [fee on] ... submission of the final
report")); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.§ 68-212-224(b) (Supp. 1995) ($5,000 fee for participation in program)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §361.604(b)(3) (West Supp.
1996) ($1,000 application fee)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(e)(1)(8), (g)(l) (Supp.
1996) ($500 application fee and $5,000 fee "to be applied toward the direct and indirect costs of
the secretary's review and oversight of the performance of the site investigation and any corrective action plan")); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.§ 10.l-1429.l(A)(5) (Michie Supp. 1995) (registration fee "not to exceed the lesser of $5,000 or one percent of the cost of the remediation"));
Washington (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Washington requires a $1,000 fee for review of
work performed in an independent remedial action; maximum fee is two percent of remediation
action costs up to a total of $15,000)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(5) (West Supp.
1995) (providing that the department may assess fees; current charge is $250 application fee, plus
a deposit of between $1,000 and $3,000 to cover costs of review and oversight; unused portion of
deposit is refundable)). See also O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61 (describing
filing fees and other administrative requirements of Indiana's program); Sweeney, supra note 20,
at 142 n.236, 149 n.285, 152 n.305 (describing the Indiana. Texas, and Virginia provisions); Survey
Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Wisconsin provisions); Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware, Missouri, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin
provisions).
353. States requiring developers to cover the costs of state oversight and involvement include: Arizona (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-285(8) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that "[a]ny
person who requests the director's approval of a remedial action shall reimburse the department
for the total reasonable cost to the department for the review of the remedial action," unless
requirement waived)); Arkansas (Survey Results, supra note 158 (indicating that Arkansas may
assess fees for staff time incurred in review and approval of work products submitted throughout
the process)); California (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (indicating that under the California VCP, the Voluntary Cleanup Agreement provides for recovery of oversight costs)); Connecticut (CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-133m(c)-(d) (West 1995) (providing for the state to
recover oversight costs at Type I sites, and pay costs of remediating Type II and Type III sites;
state may recover the latter through property leases)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 9109(e), 9113(b)(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of 138th General Assembly,
1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 14.4 (state may bring action in Superior Court to
recover all oversight costs incurred)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(b) (West Supp.
1996) (if the Remediation Applicant (RA) requests state oversight, the state may require that
the RA pay reasonable costs incurred by the state)); Indiana (IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-58(a)(1)(8) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:2289.1(8) (West Supp. 1996) (must pay costs incurred if state provides assistance)); Maine
(Maine VCP Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 2 (recovery of costs exceeding initial fee)); Missouri
(Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.569(1) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CoDE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(8)
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Minnesota (COMING CLEAN. supra note

No .. 4]

BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS

967

Beyond this, the levels of state oversight vary. The types of oversight can be divided roughly into three categories that correspond to
the amount of state review and level of responsibility delegated to
certified environmental professionals. 354 The highest level of involvement is in states that have active state oversight throughout the process in order "to provide technical guidance and oversight for any
stage of the cleanup process from site investigation through remediation that results in certification of completed work. " 355 The Indiana
Department of Environmental Management is involved in reviewing
and evaluating the site and documentation of site investigations, reviewing, approving, and overseeing implementation of the ~ork plan,
24. at 99 (in Minnesota oversight costs are recovered on a quarterly basis)); Montana (MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 75-10-733(3) (1995) (reimbursement for "any remedial action costs that the state
incurs in the review and oversight of a voluntary cleanup plan")); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 81-15,184(4) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 Reg. Sess.)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN,
supra note 24, at 78 (in New Hampshire, cost recovery is to be included, but state is "lax" in
recovering costs)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.3 & app. A,§ III (WESTLAW
through Aug. 19, 1996) (MOA will specify procedures for the recovery of oversight costs)); New
York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 85 (indicating that in New York, agreement must provide for indemnification of the state for its oversight costs)); Ohio (OHIO ADMIN. CoDE § 3745300-03(8)-(C) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (providing for recovery of direct and indirect
costs associated with reviewing no further action letters submitted for covenants not to sue and
other reviews)); Oregon (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 112 (indicating that in Oregon, the
state recovers oversight costs in excess of deposit, and refunds unused amount of deposit)); Tennessee (TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET, supra note 193, at 2 (consent order must provide for
oversight cost reimbursement)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.603(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1996) (all costs)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(j)(l) (Supp. 1996) (requiring eligible person or successor to pay costs above fees paid)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN.
CODE§ 173-340-550(1)-(2), (7)(a) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing that the state
may recover remedial action costs, and costs of review of independent remedial actions; state
charges two percent of the cost of the total remedial action to review an independent remedial
action, up to a total fee of $15,000)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.765(5) (West Supp. 1995)
(state recovers oversight costs)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 73, 83, 87 (describing the Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey provisions); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 142
n.236, 149 n.285, 152 n.305 (describing the Indiana, Texas, and Virginia provisions); Casserly,
supra note 26, at 265 (noting that a developer in Minnesota "pays for the investigation and
cleanup, including all assistance received from the MPCA "); Survey Results, supra note 158
(regarding the Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington provisions);
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington,
and Wisconsin provisions). A number of states require the developer to reimburse the state for
oversight costs when they exceed the application fee or deposit. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 1325-5-8(a)(l) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.).
California's approach in the Expedited Remedial Action Program requires that the responsible persons pay for all of the state's response costs, subject to apportionment among the parties. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 25398.2(b)(l)(B), 25398.8 (West Supp. 1996). Tennessee
employs a comparable cost recovery process for participants who enter into consent orders.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212-224(d)(2), -224(h) (Supp. 1995) (if state enters into consent order,
it may establish liability allocations and recover from program participants amounts spent on site
investigation and cleanup up to the participant's share of liability; although authorized by statute, this method of cost recovery is not feasible in practice, as monies from the Remedial Action
Fund are allocated to higher priority sites rather than voluntary sites); see also Survey Results,
supra note 158.
354. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14.
355. Id.
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and issuing a release from liability when the cleanup is completed. 356
Minnesota has adopted a similar approach. 357 The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency approves the initial site assessment,358 work
plans, and final reports (to determine whether liability protection is
appropriate), 359 develops cleanup standards for the site,360 and maintains a limited on-site presence during the assessment and cleanup. 361
Second, the state may adopt a "medium" level of involvement.
These states delegate certain responsibilities to certified environmental professionals, who undertake tasks that the state would otherwise
perform. These professionals "provide oversight and expertise
throughout the remediation process and present evidence of the completed work to the state agency. " 362 The state retains independent authority to review the work of the private sector professionals. 363 For
example, it may review the cleanup process that took place at a site
before it issues a limitation on liability such as a certificate of completion. 364 The new Illinois statute provides this type of approach: The
state delegates authority to conduct investigations, prepare plans and
reports, 365 and review and approve the progress of cleanups 366 to a
356. IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-9 to -17 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.).
Once the work plan is approved, a state agency manager or technical contractor hired by the
state supervises the remedial action. Id. § 13-25-5-9; see also IN DIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra
note 179, at 2; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61-62 (stating that "(s]chedules for
submissions, coordination of activities, estimated costs, and a timetable for state officials' actions
are included in the (Voluntary Remediation] Agreement"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 144; Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Other states that oversee
cleanups actively, usually under the supervision of state project managers, include Minnesota,
Oregon, Vennont, and Wisconsin. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160; cf Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.567(1) (West Supp. 1996) (calling for state oversight); id. § 260.567(8) (requiring review of
quarterly progress reports); id. § 260.567(10) (requiring review of the remedial action).
357. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that Minnesota's program
"offers a high level of technical assistance and oversight to the entire cleanup process").
358. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995).
359. Id. § 1158.175(3); see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19; cf CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.15(b) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring state review of a request
for certificate of completion).
360. Cleanup standards are to be set by the state, reflecting the planned use of the property.
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(3)(c) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that cleanups "must meet the
same standards for protection of public health and welfare and the environment that apply to
response actions taken or requested under section 1158.17, subdivision 1 or 2"); see also OTA
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19; Andrew, supra note 29, at 28. Cleanup standards
are detennined with reference to state guidance documents. Id.
361. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(3)(a) (West Supp. 1995). The state's involvement in this
phase of the cleanup is discretionary; it may "provide assistance to review voluntary response
action plans or supervise response action implementation." Id.; see also Andrew, supra note 29,
at 28; cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2286.l(A) (West Supp. 1996).
362. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14.
363. See id.
364. Id. at 17.
365. In Illinois, direct state review of activities other than required reports is not mandatory.
The state may provide oversight services for the Remediation Applicant's activities, in which
case it may require that the RA pay the state's costs in furnishing services. 415 ILL COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/58.7(b}(l} (West Supp. 1996). The RA may also contract with a "Review and Evaluation
Professional Engineer" (RELPE) for review and evaluation services; the contract with the
RELPE must provide that the RELPE will take directions from the state, submit reports to it,
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"Licensed Professional Engineer," 367 but the state retains final approval authority. 368
The most lenient level of oversight is in states which are involved
only in final reviews to verify that cleanups are complete and extend
liability protection. 369 An example of this type of oversight is that
contemplated under the Ohio statute. Ohio involves the state in the
process less than any other state program,370 authorizing the developer to evaluate and remediate a brownfield site on its own, acting
essentially unsupervised by the state EPA. 371 By statute, the Ohio
EPA maintains the power to audit cleanups; however, the state has
and work on behalf of the state. Id. §§ 5/58.2 (defining a "Licensed Professional Engineer" as "a
person, corporation, or partnership licensed under the laws of this State to practice professional
engineering"), 5/58.6(a), 5/58.7(c)(2).
366. Id. § 5158. 7(b )-( d).
367. Id. § 5/58.7(d).
368. Id. § 5/58.7(d)(3).
369. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14. This category includes states with
extensive devolvement to licensed environmental professionals, and states with "independent
remedial action" programs, as well as Colorado, where at present there is no statutory mechanism for state approval of the final cleanup. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 108.
"370. See Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the Ohio program as involving "minimal
state oversight"); Michel, supra note 20.
Both Connecticut and Massachusetts have also acted to vest substantial discretion with licensed environmental professionals. In Connecticut, the 1995 amendments to the Transfer Act
created a procedure for devolving responsibility to Licensed Environmental Professionals
(LEPs) in the remediation process at voluntary cleanup sites. 1995 Conn .. Pub. Acts 190, § 2; see
also Elizabeth C. Barton, Privatization of Environmental Cleanups, CoNN. L. TRIB., Dec. 25,
1995/Jan. 1, 1996, at 13A. LEPs are empowered to conduct site assessments, prepare remedial
action plans, supervise cleanups, and make final reports to the state at voluntary cleanup sites.
1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2. Regulations are currently under development to expand upon
the statutory mandate, and apply this procedure to Type I sites in the Urban Sites Remedial
Action Program. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Massachusetts relies extensively on
Licensed Site Professionals (LSPs) for oversight of assessment and cleanup actions at all but the
most serious disposal sites in the state. The LSP is required to make certain submissions (see
MAss. REGS. CoDE tit. 310, § 40.0015 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794)) but essentially
operates independently. The LSP may, for example, forego certain statutory requirements if, in
its judgment, the actions are unnecessary. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.0193 (WESTLAW
through Register No. 794). The state is required to audit only 20% of cleanups. Id. §§ 40.1101.1170.
North Carolina's statute specifies that cleanups in the state will eventually be implemented
and overseen by licensed professionals; the state is working on rules, based in part on the Massachusetts and Ohio programs, that would privatize cleanups. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.9(c)
(1995) (authorizing privatization of voluntary party cleanup oversight under the Registered Environmental Consultant (REC) program); Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160.
371. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.10 (Anderson 1995); cf PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6026.302(e)(3), .303(h)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (limiting the state's review for developers in
Pennsylvania choosing cleanups under background or statewide health standards to evaluating
final reports demonstrating that the standards have been met). For developers chopsing cleanups under site-specific standards in Pennsylvania, however, the state is required to review the
"remedial investigation report, risk assessment report, cleanup plan and" final report demonstrating compliance with the site-specific standard." Id. § 6026.304(n)(2).
In New Jersey, the amount of state oversight is determined by negotiation between the state
and the developer upon entering into the Memorandum of Agreement. N.J. ADMrN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 26C-3.3, app. A, § I (WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 1996); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at
82-83.
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undercut this authority by admitting it will examine no more than
twenty-five percent of sites taking part in this program. 372 A number
of other states provide that a developer may conduct "independent"
remedial action, operating on its own until making a final report to the
state. 373
b.

Time Limits

To reduce the time it takes to remediate a site, some states put
time limits on various stages of the decision-making process. States
restrict the time period for the state to approve or reject developers'
applications to take part in state programs, 374 site assessment reports,375 work plans, and progress reports, 376 or for issuing liability
assurances after requests. 377 In some cases, developers' activities are
372. See Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-14(0) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (providing for random audits of 25% of the "no further action" letters annually); Ohio Voluntary
Action Program, supra note 156, at 4; see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 29; Jones, supra note
156. The new Connecticut statute empowers the state to conduct audits of voluntary cleanups
supervised by LEPs but does not set a target number. A final remedial action report is deemed
approved unless the state determines, within 60 days of its submission, that an audit is necessary.
1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2(c); see also Paul Frisman, Massachusetts Model Bodes Well for
Voluntary Pollution Cleanups, CoNN. L. TRIB., Nov. 27. 1995, at 13. As noted above. the Massachusetts statute outlines an audit procedure and sets a goal of auditing 20% of sites. See supra
note 370 and accompanying text.
373. In these states, the developer proceeds at its own risk and typically has the option to
obtain more comfort by entering into more binding agreements with the state. For example, in
North Carolina, the developer may conduct an independent remedial action or negotiate a consent order with the state. N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-1 to 1-2. In Rhode Island, only
a "voluntary party" may proceed without state oversight; volunteers are encouraged to enter
into agreements with the state. RHODE ISLAND USER'S GuIDE, supra note 175, at 4-5. In Washington, the "independent remedial action" proceeds without state oversight, except for final review of the cleanup report. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-550(7) (WESTLAW through July
24, 1996).
374. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.2(c), app. A (WESTLAW through Aug. 19,
1996) (within 30 days of receipt, state must either inform developer that a site investigation is
required or submit a Memorandum of Agreement for developer's approval); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203
(WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.4 which requires acceptance
or rejection within 45 days of receipt).
375. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567(3) (West Supp. 1996) (180 days to review Phase I assessment); id. § 260.567(5) (180 days to determine whether remedial action is necessary, following
Phase II assessments; state has "not come close" to exceeding either time limit); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (for developers choosing cleanups under site-specific standards, remedial investigation report deemed approved if the state does not respond
with deficiencies within 90 days); see also Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the
Missouri provision).
376. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-16-306(1)(a) (West Supp. 1996) (deemed approved if not
acted on within 45 days after request, with independent review prohibited); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.567(6) (West Supp. 1996) (90 days); 1995 Mont. S.B. 382, § 10(1) (30 days to make "completeness" determination); id. § 10(2) (60 days to approve or disapprove plan); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (for developers choosing cleanups under site-specific standards, cleanup plan deemed approved if the state does not respond with deficiencies
within 90 days).
377. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398.15(b) (West Supp. 1996) (state has 90 days to
approve or deny a request for a certificate of completion from a participant in the ERAP);
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(1) (West Supp. 1996) (petition for no action determination
deemed approved if not acted on within 45 days of request); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108(b)
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deemed approved unless the state responds within the time limits, 378 a
provision intended to spur a rapid response.
c.

Administrative Appeal and Dispute Resolution Procedures

Several states provide administrative appeals for developers dissatisfied with the state's decisions, particularly decisions to reject applications to take part in state programs, or decisions to reject site
assessment reports and other progress reports. 379 Other states provide for dispute resolution mechanisms. 38° California's statute features the most comprehensive alternative dispute resolution process.
If a timely petition is filed with the Director of Environmental Health
Assessment, an arbitration panel must be convened to resolve disputes regarding any of a number of issues. 381
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (state required to grant or deny certificate of completion within 180 days of application); 415 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(b) (West Supp. 1996) (state has 30 days from approval of a Remedial Action
Completion Report to issue a No Further Remediation Letter); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20129a(2) (West Supp. 1996) (state has 15 business days to act on a request for a "letter of
determination"); 1995 Mont. S.B. 382, § 12(2) (state must review petition for closure within 60
days).
378. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(1) (West Supp. 1996) (petition for no
action determination deemed approved if not acted on within 45 days of request); 1995 Conn.
Pub. Acts 190, § 2(c) (final remedial action report from an LEP deemed approved unless the
state determines, within 60 days of its submission, that an audit is necessary).
379. 415 ILJ.,. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(d)(5) (West Supp. 1996) (Remediation Applieant
may appeal disapprovals of any plan or report, or approvals with conditions, by filing for appeal
within 35 days); IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-6(a)(l) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg.
Sess.) (applicant may appeal if its application is rejected); Mo. CODE REos. tit. 10, § 2515.010(9) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (providing for administrative appeal of any departmental action); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 75-10-732(4) (1995) (if application to
take part in the program is rejected, applicant may request a hearing before the state board of
environmental review); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Montana provisions).
380. IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-8(a)(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.)
(voluntary remediation agreement must include mechanism to resolve "disputes arising from the
evaluation, analysis, and oversight of the implementation of the work plan" through arbitration,
adjudication, or another dispute resolution procedure); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0)
(West Supp. 1996) (mediation may be used as part of a community only involvement plan, required if the affected municipality requests to be involved); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at
143 n.246 (describing the Indiana provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana provision).
381. Issues subject to arbitration include:
(1) The remedial action plan ... , including disputes regarding remedy selection, other
technical issues, conditions of approval, or any other element of the plan[;]
(2) The department's proposed apportionment of liability ... [;]
(3) Any proposed de minimis settlements ... [;]
(4) The department's approval or denial of a change in land use ... [; or]
(5) The department's approval or denial of a certificate of completion ....
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.lO(a) (West Supp. 1996). Petitions for arbitration may
be made by any responsible person, the affected community, or the public, at any time before the.
matter in dispute becomes final. Id. § 25398.10(b)(2). The arbitration panel must hold a public
hearing to take testimony and evidence, and make a decision by majority vote that is supported
by "substantial evidence in light of the whole record." Id. §§ 25398.lO(d), 25398.13. It must
provide notice of its decisions, and judicial review is available in certain instances. Id.
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Public Participation

A number of states do not mandate public participation in their
voluntary cleanup programs. 382 The reason for this is readily apparent: public involvement is often viewed as a "deterrent to undertaking a voluntary cleanup." 383 Ohio makes no reference to community
involvement in individual brownfield development projects. 384 Pennsylvania allows for public participation beyond notice only if requested by the affected municipality and then only if the developer
chooses to cleanup a site using the site-specific cleanup standard. 385
Illinois provides that the developer may elect to develop a "community outreach plan," but requires only that the state develop guidance
to assist developers in reaching out to the affected community.386
§ 25398.lO(d)-(e). Arbitrators may receive technical support from the state and are disqualified
for conflicts of interest or inadequate performance. Id. §§ 25398.11-.12.
382. These states include Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160. In Colorado, however, the April 11, 1996 Superfund Memorandum of Agreement with
the EPA requires that the developer give public notice within 30 days of approval of the cleanup
plan if the developer wants forbearance from EPA enforcement under CERCLA. Survey Results, supra note 158. In Washington, independent remedial actions may take place without any
public participation, unless the developer intends to seek contribution from other parties. In
that situation, the state would consider an independent remedial action to be the equivalent of a
state-conducted cleanup (and hence protective against third parties) if "reasonable steps have
been taken to provide advance public notice." WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-550(5)(c)(iii), 550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
383. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 160; see also Paul Frisman, Goldilocks and the Cleanup
Standards: Too Strict, Too Lax or Just Right?, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1995, at 14 (quoting the
statement of attorney Elizabeth C. Barton that "a proposal for a discretionary public hearing
and comment period could easily add more than three-and-a-half months to the remediation
process," which is critical to a developer because "often the projected time to get through a
[state] approval process is as critical as the projected cost of remediation"). See infra notes 54849 and accompanying text. Another justification asserted for excluding public participation is
that the developer has come to the state voluntarily and should control the project.
384. Ohio currently requires public participation only upon an application for a variance
from applicable cleanup standards. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-12(H)(3) (WESTLAW
through Aug. 31, 1996) (public meeting required). However, state regulators held public meetings to review the proposed rules. Ohio VAP Update, supra note 243, at 1 (noting that five
public meetings were held on the first set of rules).
385. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that if the affected
municipality requests to be involved, a community involvement plan is required); see also PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENVTL PROTECTION, 0PPORTUNmES FOR Puouc PARTICIPATION IN THE
LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM, LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM FACT SHEET No. 9 (1996) (copy on
file with author) (hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FACT SHEET]. This plan
must propose measures to involve the public, including (depending on the site) such measures
as:
• developing a proactive community information and consultation program that includes
door step notice of cleanup activities;
• holding public meetings and roundtable discussions;
• providing convenient locations where documents can be made publicly available;
• designating a single contact person for community residents;
• forming a community-based group to solicit suggestions and comments on reports; and
• retaining trained, independent third parties to facilitate meetings and discussions and perform mediation services.
·
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996).
386. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58_7(h) (West Supp. 1996).
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Some states provide that the developer may elect to conduct further
community. outreach efforts; Rhode Island mandates this. 387
In states that require public participation at each site, some require that the affected community be notified of proposed cleanup
activities. 388 "fhe most typical form of public participation is a brief
n<;>tice and comment period (often less than thirty days) on the pro. . 387.. Pennsylvania, as noted below in footnote 389, requires a "community involvement
plan"' only if one is requested by the affected municipality. Rhode Island requires a"community
involvement process." to be coordinated with the opportunity for notice and comment on the
proposed settlement agreement. R. I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-5 (Supp. 1995). Finding explicitly
that the state must consider "the effects that clean-ups would have on the populations surrounding each site" and ·'issues of environmental equity for low income and racial minority populations," the. statute requires the state to "develop and implement a process to ensure community
mvolvement throughout the investigation and remediation of contaminated sites." Id. That process is required to include, at a minimum, the following:
(a) Notification to abutting residents when a work plan for a site investigation is proposed;
(b) Adequate availability of all public records ·concerning the investigation and clean-up of
the site, including, where necessary, the establishment of informational repositories in the
impacted community; and
(c) Notification to abutting residents, and other interested parties, when the investigation of
·the site is deemed complete by the department of environmental management.
Id. There is no requirement that the abutting community approve the work plan. This process is
. expected to be clarified in forthcoming rules. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. In Washington, a "public participation plan" must be developed for cleanups other than independent
remedial actions. WASH. ADMIN .. CODE § 173-340-600(8) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996).
· 388. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523(d)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring notice of consent administrative order); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398(d)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring
notice of all activities and regular progress reports to the city or county in which an ERAP site is
·located; state applies this and comparable public participation requirements of the ERAP to the
.:VCP); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2(b) (requiring notice of remedial action plan); Delaware
'Regulations, supra note 172, § 12 (voluntary cleanup agreement will provide for public notice
once the proposed plan of remedial action is prepared); MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.1403(3)
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring notice to public officials and to the community); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.4(c)(2), -310.9(b) (1995) (requiring that notice of proposed
Areas of Concern (AOC) and proposed remedial action plans be given; a notice is to be mailed
at least 30 days before state enters into an AOC and 30 days prior to approving a remedial action
plan); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(e), -.303(h) (West Supp. 1996) (establishes a notice
obligation for developers who choose to clean up sites to meet either background or statewide
health standards); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1200-1-13-.10(3)(i) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring public notice in the form of a newspaper advertisement
upon party's entrance into the program and upon submission of the FS; all public notices must
·be approved by the Department); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30
TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.11 which requires, in particular, notice to property owners and interest
holders within two weeks of agency approval of a report describing contamination at a site at or
below residential health-based levels, and direct notice in the form of letters to "affected individual households, businesses,. and other interest holders, when concentrations of contaminants exceeding residential health-based levels have migrated off-site"); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173340-550(5)(c)(iii) to -550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (requiring public notice if independent remedial actions will lead to contribution actions); id. § 173-340-600 (requiring notice
for cleanups other than independent remedial actions); Wis. ADMIN. CODE§§ NR 714.05, 714.07
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring notice of proposed remedial action; responsible parties to decide whether additional notice is necessary, but public notice is
required only if the party plans to use "performance standards" defined under § NR 720.19(2));
see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87 (regarding the Delaware program); Survey Results,
supra note 158 (regarding the California, Delaware, North Carolina, Tennessee, Washington,
and Wisconsin programs). Arkansas is considering implementing additional public participation
requirements, including notice requirements and a notice and comment period. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
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posed remedial action plan. 389 The form of notice to be used varies,
with few states requiring direct notice to residents in the affected community. 390 A minority of states provide for more participation than a
In Pennsylvania, a developer must notify the department of its intent to remediate the site,
provide a copy of that notice to the municipality where the site is located, and publish the notice
in a local newspaper of general circulation. The developer also must provide the same notice for
the final report demonstrating attainment of the cleanup standard. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6026.302(e), .303(h) (West Supp. 1996). There is no requirement for community involvement
beyond this notice, unless the developer chooses a cleanup under the site-specific standard. Id.
§ 6026.304(n)-(o). If the developer submits the final report to the state within 90 days of a
release, these notice requirements do not apply. Id. § 6026.303(h)(4).
389. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25398(d)(l), 25398.7(c)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for a 30-day notice and comment period at an ERAP site); DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 7,
§ 9107(b) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995),
Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 12.1(3) (requiring a 20-day comment period on proposed plan of remedial action); IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-ll(b) (WESTLAW through end of
1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing for a 30-day notice and comment period); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.20120d(3) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for notice and comment opportunities for
proposed cleanups based on generic cleanup criteria or for sites where the state "determines that
there is a significant public interest"); MONT. CoDE ANN.§ 75-10-735 (1995) (requiring a 30-day
comment period); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.325(4)(d) (Supp. 1996) (requiring notice and comment
if the agreement is submitted as a proposed consent decree); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.320(2)
(1992), OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-100 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (requiring a 30-day
notice and comment period); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for a 30-day notice and comment period for cleanups to meet the site-specific standards);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-ll(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing for a 14-day notice and comment period before entry of .a settlement agreement as a final judgment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6615a(h)(5) (Supp. 1996) (providing for a 15-day notice and comment period on a corrective
action plan); WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-600(3)(e) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (requiring a minimum 30-day notice and comment period for cleanups other than independent
remedial actions); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, Indiana, and
Montana provisions). During Pennsylvania's notice and comment period, the municipality may
request to be involved in the cleanup plans. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(ii) (West
Supp. 1996). Then, and only then (and only if requested to do so by the municipality) would the
developer be required to develop and implement a "community involvement plan." Id.; see also
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FACT SHEET, supra note 385, at 1. Developers are encouraged to take a "proactive approach" in working with the community, however. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
In Massachusetts, a site may be designated as a "Public Involvement Plan" (PIP) site on the
request of 10 or more persons. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.1404 (WESTLAW through
Register No. 794). At a PIP site, additional public participation requirements are imposed, including both public meetings and a notice and comment period on the Public Involvement Plan
itself as well as cleanup activities. Id. § 40.1405.
390. California's notice requirement for the Expedited Remedial Action Program is one of
the most comprehensive, providing that the state must:
Notify the public, including those persons reasonably believed to be members of the affected community, of the response action proposed in the plan in a manner that provides
reasonable assurance of reaching those persons on a timely basis. The notice shall include
posting notices in the area where the proposed remedial action would be taken and notification, by direct mail, of the recorded owners of property contiguous to the site addressed by
the plan, as shown in the latest equalized assessment roll and all potentially responsible
persons identified in the plan.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 25398.6(i)(l) (West Supp. 1996); cf MAss. REos. CoDE tit.
310, § 40.1405 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring notice at PIP sites). More
typical are forms of notice such as those required in Indiana and Pennsylvania. Indiana requires
the developer to notify local government units, place a copy of the proposed work plan in at
least one public library, and publish a notice requesting comments on the proposed work plan.
IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-ll(a) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); see also
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 62; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 144 n.249; Survey
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notice and comment process allows by requiring that a public hearing
be held on the remedial action plan; the hearing, however, is often
available only upon a written request. 391 The California Expedited
Remedial Action Program is unique in providing that a public hearing
may be held on the proposed use of the site. 392 Several states require
the state to consider public comments and testimony in the decisionmaking process and provide discretion to require revisions to cleanup
plans if that is appropriate. 393 However, no statute mandates that a
Results, supra note 158. In Pennsylvania, a developer choosing a cleanup under the site-specific
standard must notify the department of its intent to remediate the site, provide a copy of that
notice to the municipality where the site is located, and publish the notice in a local newspaper
of general circulation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(i) (West Supp. 1996); see also
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FACT SHEET, supra note 385, at 1.
391. ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-5230) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE
§ 25398.6(i)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring one or more public meetings for information and/or
comment; information to be provided must include "an assessment of the degree of contamination, the characteristics of the hazardous substances, an estimate of the time required to carry
out the response action and a description of the proposed response action, the planned use, and
the remedial objectives"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9112 (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special
Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 12.1 (providing for a public hearing "if the Secretary receives a meritorious request ... from any person
on the ... proposed plan of remedialaction"); IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-ll(c) (WESTLAW
through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that if the state receives at least one written
request during the notice and comment period, a public hearing may be held, at which the state
is required to consider all written comments and public testimony); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310,
§ 40.1405 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring public meetings at PIP sites); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120d(3) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that a hearing be held if "(i)
[t]he department determines that there is a significant public interest or that for any other reason
a public meeting is appropriate[;] (ii) [a] city, township, or village in which the facility is located,
by a majority vote of its governing body, requests a public meeting[; or] (iii) [a] local health
department with jurisdiction in the area in which the facility is located requests a public meeting."); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-735(2) (1995) (providing for a hearing upon a written request
by "10 or more persons, by a group composed of 10 or more members, or by a local governing
body of a city, town or county"; the meeting must "be held within 45 days of the department's
completeness determination under [section] 75-10-736(1)"); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.320 (1992);
OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-100 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (providing for a hearing on a
written request by 10 or more persons or a group of 10 or more members); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 173-340-600(5) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (state may elect to hold public meetings;
provision applies to cleanups other than independent remedial actions and therefore, a public
hearing is required for consent decrees, orders, and agreed orders); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § NR
714.07(6)(d) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (public informational meetings
required if the developer or state decides they are necessary); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at
144 n.249 {describing the Indiana provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Del.
aware, Indiana, Montana, and Washington provisions).
392. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398(d)(2) (West Supp. 1996). The city's or county's
determination of the proposed use is to be presumed by the state to be the appropriate use for
the site and enjoys a rebuttable presumption of its validity in any subsequent proceeding. The
state may rebut that presumption by determining that there should be a different planned use for
the site. In making this determination, the state is required to hold a hearing, then determine
the planned use, and explain its determination in writing to the city or county and to any person
requesting an explanation. Id. § 25398(d).
393. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 25398.60) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring the state to
"review and consider any comments received at the public meeting or by other means within the
specified time period" and "consider the affected community's acceptance of the proposed remedial alternative or alternatives," in order to propose revisions to the cleanup plan, "if appropriate"); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(e)(3) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the
138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 8.7(3) (requiring final
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state reject a remedial action plan if it receives unfavorable public
input.
The following table summarizes the public participation requirements of the existing state voluntary cleanup programs.

PUBLIC

Requirement

TABLE 5
p ARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS

State(s)

Comments

Public Notice of Remedial Arkansas, California
Activities
ERAP, California VCP,
Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas,
Washington (independent remedial actions
where contribution
sought), Wisconsin

Arkansas: considering
additional forms of
public participation,
including additional
notice and a notice and
comment period
California: imposes a general notice obligation in
addition to other
requirements
Pennsylvania: provision
applies to cleanups to
meet background and
statewide health standards only

Public Notice and
Comment Period

Pennsylvania: provision
applies only to cleanups
under the site-specific
standard

California ERAP,
California VCP,
Delaware, Indiana,
Massachusetts.
Michigan, Montana,
Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington (cleanups
other than independent
remedial actions)

plan to be prepared "with due consideration of the comments received"); IND. CODE ANN. § 1325-5-ll(c) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring state to consider comments and public testimony); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120d(5)(e) (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring the state to prepare an administrative record that "summarizes the significant concerns raised by the members of the public and how they are to be addressed"); MoNT. CODE
ANN.§ 75-10-735(3) (1995) (requiring the state to "consider and respond to relevant written or
oral comments submitted during the comment period or at the public meeting"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 465.325(4)(d) (Supp. 1996) (directing the state, if the agreement is submitted as a proposed
consent decree, to "withdraw, withhold or modify its consent to the proposed agreement if the
comments, views and allegations concerning the agreement disclose facts or considerations
which indicate that the proposed agreement is inappropriate, improper or inadequate"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 465.320(3) (1992) (requiring the consideration of written or oral comments before
approving a cleanup plan); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-ll(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing that the
"state may withdraw or withhold its consent to the proposed settlement if the comments, views,
or allegations concerning the judgment disclose facts or considerations which indicate that the
proposed judgment is inappropriate, improper or inadequate"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6615a(h)(5) (Supp. 1996) (requiring the state to review public comments prior to approval of
corrective action plan); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, Indiana, and Montana provisions).
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Arkansas, California
ERAP, Delaware,
Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana,
Oregon, Washington
(cleanups other than
independent remedial
actions), Wisconsin

Colorado, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine,
Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio,
Washington
(independent remedial
actions where no
contribution sought)
Massachusetts394
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Delaware, Indiana,
Michigan, Montana, and
Oregon: require
requests for hearings
Massachusetts: applies to
all sites classified as
"PIP" sites (on public
request)
Washington, Wisconsin:
state may decide to
hold public meetings
(Washington: meetings
required for actions by
consent decrees. orders,
and agreed orders)
Colorado: notice required
if forbearance sought
from the EPA under
CERCLA

Technical and Financial Incentives

A few states have created state funds to make loans and grants
for site assessments and cleanups; these loans and grants are provided
to public entities and (in some cases) private developers. 395 Michi394. Massachusetts makes technical assistance grants (TAGs) available to qualifying
applicants and requires public notice of the availability of TAGs at all sites. MAss. REGS. CODE
tit. 310, §§ 40.1401(1)(a), 40.1450-.1462 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794). TAGs are
available for any group of affected individuals at a site, in amounts up to $10,000. Grants may be
used to secure expert assistance in evaluating project . risks, encourage more effective
participation (e.g., by affording more effective dissemination of relevant information), and allow
issues of concern to be addressed. Id. § 40.1451. Applications are evaluated on the basis of a
scoring system that awards points for such factors as the severity of contamination at the site, the
ability of the grant to foster public participation, and the nature of the applicant (including the
applicant's ability to represent the affected community). Id. §§ 40.1453, 40.1457.
395. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18 (stating that "[f]unding assistance for
initial site assessment, cleanup, or redevelopment typically comes in the form of public grants,
loans or loan guarantees, and tax incentives"); Andrew, supra note 29, at 29-30 (describing the
Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio programs); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 117 (describing the
Minnesota program); Clokey, supra note 26, at 36 (describing the Wisconsin program); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11 (noting that "New Jersey, Ohio and Michigan have created such
funds"); Casserly, supra note 26, at 273-74 (describing the Wisconsin program); Solo, supra note
23, at 318 n.177 (describing the Minnesota program). Delaware makes tax credits available to
certain developers under the authority of DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 30, §§ 2011(1), 2021(d)
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995). COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87; Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note
160.
States usually condition loans and grants on such criteria as "demonstrated need, the relationship of the volunteer to the contamination at the site (some states will not assist responsible
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gan's "Environmental Protection Bond Implementation Act" established programs for communities to apply for state bond funding for
cleanups and site investigations at brownfield sites. 396 Minnesota's
"Contaminated Site Cleanup and Development Account" has provided funding for cleanups to local governments or quasi-governmen~
tal units. 397 New Jersey provides up to a total of $55 million in grants
and loans for developers. 398 Ohio administers a number of programs
that provide financial assistance to developers and local governments. 399 Pennsylvania has created two funds, the "Industrial Sites
Cleanup Fund"400 and the "Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Fund." 401 The first of these provides grants and low-interest
loans for cleanup activities; the second is intended to finance site assessment activities at sites located in areas designated as "distressed
communities."402 Washington offers limited funding from the "Model
parties), and demonstrated potential of the site for economic development." OTA STATE OF
STATES, supra note 20, at 18; see also Casserly, supra note 26, at 274.
396. The Environmental Protection Bond Authorization Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 324.19301-.19306 (West Supp. 1996), authorizes bond funding up to $660,000,000, and the
Environmental Protection Bond Implementation Act, id. §§ 324.19501-.19513 designates
$35,000,000 for cleanups at contaminated sites, and $10,000,000 in grants to eligible communities
to perform site assessment activities. See also Andrew, supra note 29, at 29.
397. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1161.555 (West Supp. 1995); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note
24, at 99; Andrew, supra note 29, at 29; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 117.
398. The Hazardous Discharge Site Cleanup Program makes $55 million available in loan
and grant funding; a major use of funds to date has been for site evaluation and investigation
activities by municipalities. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.34 (WESTLAW through L. 1996, c.
30, apv. 5/16/96); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84; NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at
44; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Survey Results, supra note 158.
399. Developers may qualify for low-interest loans and loan guarantees from existing institutions, including the Water Pollution Control Loan Fund, Ohio Water Development Authority,
and Ohio Economic Development Authority. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 6111.036, 6123.032,
6123.041 (Anderson Supp. 1995); see also Andrew. supra note 29, at 30; Michel, supra note 20, at
464.
400. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.702 (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF
ENVTL. PROTECTION, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (GRANTS AND LOANS), LAND RECYCLING FACT
SHEET No. 8, at 1 (1996) (hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET].
401. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6028.1-.5 (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 1.
402. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.702, 6028.1-.5 (West Supp. 1996); see also COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 90. Both programs are administered by the Pennsylvania Department
of Commerce. PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 1; Survey Results, supra note 158. The Industrial Sites Cleanup Fund provides up to 75% of the costs
of site assessment and cleanup; the fund is capitalized at up to $15 million. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, §§ 6026.702(b), (g) (West Supp. 1996). Eligible applicants for grants include political subdivisions or their instrumentalities, and local economic development agencies. Id. § 6026.702(c); see
also PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 1-2. Eligible applicants for loans include these entities and others deemed eligible by the Department of Commerce. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.702(d) (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 2. The Industrial Sites Environmental
Assessment Fund empowers the Department of Commerce to make grants to municipalities,
municipal or other local authorities, nonprofit economic development agencies, and other similar agencies for site assessments in distressed communities as determined by the Department of
Commerce. The total annual amount authorized for this fund is $2,000,000. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, §§ 6028.2, 6028.4 (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT
SHEET, supra note 400, at 2. As of the end of 1995, a total of $4.7 million in requests for loans
THE
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Toxics Control Account" in certain instances.403 Wisconsin does not
have a brownfields-specific funding program, but offers other sources
of funding. 404
Connecticut's "Urban Site Remedial Action Program" has gone
further, specifying conditions under which the state will acquire
brownfield sites itself, clean them up, and offer them to developers;
the state also offers bond funding for cleanups. 405 The acquisition
program is limited, however, by the state's financial resources. 406 .

C. Federal Initiatives
1. The EPA's Brownfields Action Agenda
While the states have taken the lead in promoting voluntary
cleanups at brownfield sites, the EPA has also been active. In 1995, it
launched a "Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative,"407
with an "Action Agenda" consisting of several projects designed to
spur brownfield redevelopment. 408 The EPA announced its intent'to
remove sites from the CERCLIS database, expand an existing grant
program for local brownfield pilot projects, clarify liability issues
and grants had been made, and $1.62 million in loans and grants had been granted. PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTI! PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 8.
403. WASH. REV. CoDE § 70.105D.070(2){d)(xi) (West Supp. 1996) (making funds available
only to potentially liable parties who have entered into a consent decree at mixed funding sites);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-560 (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); see also COMING
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 114; Survey Results, supra note 158.
.
404. For sites contaminated with petroleum, funding is available from the Petroleum Environmental Cleanup Fund. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. ILHR 47 (1996). Funding is also available for
qualifying sites from the state's Agricultural Chemicals Cleanup Fund. Wis. STAT. ANN. §. 94.73
(West Supp. 1995). The Wisconsin environmental repair statute provides for grants to political
subdivisions for investigations and cleanups at "spill sites"; the state has begun to use this authority to fund Phase I and Phase II site assessments by municipalities. Id. § 144.442(9m); see
also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 103 {describing both funds); Clokey, supra note 26, at 36;
Casserly, supra note 26, at 273-74; Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the use of DNR
staff); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the funding of site assessments).
405. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m (West 1995). In 1995, Connecticut also established a "Special Contaminated Property Remediation and Insurance Fund," and provided for
the issuance of up to $30 million in bond funding for cleanups, secured by the Fund. 1995 Conn.
Pub. Acts 190, §§ 4-5; see also NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 45.
406. Tondro, supra note 20, at 811 (noting that less than five percent of the sites covered by
Connecticut's Transfer Act are within the Urban Sites program).
407. The EPA's Administrator, Carol M. Browner, announced. the "Brownfields Action
Agenda" at a press conference held on Jan. 25, 1995. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 87071; Solo, supra note 23, at 323; Jones, supra note 156; see U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, The
Brownfields Action Agenda {last modified on Jan. 25, 1995) <http://www.epa.gov/docs> (hereinafter Brownfields Initiative].
408. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870-72; Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at
1. The response to the EPA's proposals has been positive. Carol Andress, the Environmental
Defense Fund's economic development specialist, stated that "EPA's Brownfield Initiative helps
to make environmental cleanup a cornerstone of urban revitalization .... Prompt and thorough
clean-up can save jobs that might otherwise be lost to outlying areas." Brooks, supra note 158;
see also NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 608 (calling the Initiative a welcome "first step in
ensuring that environmental cleanup is a building block to economic development, not a stumbling block"); Holusha, supra note 136 (stating that local officials call the removal of sites from
the CERCLIS database "a great leap forward" in brownfield policy).
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under CERCLA (particularly for prospective purchasers, municipalities, and lenders),409 and work with states implementing voluntary
cleanup programs. 410
a.

Deletion of CERCLIS Sites

In early 1995, there were about 38,000 sites listed in the CERCLIS database of sites to be evaluated for cleanups under CERCLA.411 Many of these were sites where the EPA had performed an
initial screening (a "Preliminary Assessment") and determined that
no further investigation or remedial action was required. 412 Even
though a notation to this effect was added to the sites' listings,413 lenders had stigmatized these sites and routinely refused to extend loans to
developers. 414 In February 1995, as part of the Action Agenda, the
EPA deleted approximately 25,000 of these sites from the CERCLIS
list;415 it announced its intent to delete another 3,300 sites in 1996. as
part of a package of Superfund administrative reforms. 416
b.

Pilot Projects

The EPA is funding a number of brownfield "pilot projects" to
develop strategies for redeveloping brownfield sites,417 with individual
grants of up to $200,000. This seed money may not be used for actual
409. The Brownfields Initiative targeted the following liability issues as the subjects of EPA
guidance: (1) prospective purchaser liability; (2) the liability of owners of property containing
contaminated aquifers; (3) lender liability; (4) municipal acquisition liability; and (5) lender liability at Underground Storage Tank (UST) sites. Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 2; see
also Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 872 (stating that the EPA is "identifying options and
developing guidance" on these issues).
410. See Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 872 (testifying that "[o)ther elements of the
Agenda call for building strong and effective state and local cleanup programs which will prevent
the need for Federal involvement in many sites with economic development potential"). This
issue is largely addressed in the context of reform to CERCLA to allow the EPA to approve
cleanups taking place under a state voluntary cleanup program; see infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text.
411. RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 712 (noting that "[a]s of July 7, 1993, 37,921 sites
were listed on the CERCLIS inventory").
412. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Fields Testimony, supra note 3, at 224; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 712-13.
413. The notation "No Further Response Action Planned" was added to records in the
CERCLIS for sites where the EPA had decided not to proceed beyond the Preliminary Assessment stage. RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 712-13; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 79 n.144.
414. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871 ("The mere fact that these sites have remained in CERCLIS has caused potential developers to shy away from them and many lending
and real estate investment communities have denied loans for businesses in or near CERCLIS
sites as a matter of policy."); Fields Testimony, supra note 3, at 224; Brownfields: EPA Announces 11 New Pilot Projects to Return Brownfields to Productive Use, Daily Envtl. Rep. News
(BNA), Jan. 26, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 DEN 17 dll [hereinafter 11 New Pilot
Projects] (quoting EPA Administrator Browner's statement to the U.S. Conference of Mayors
that a listing in the CERCLIS database is "like a bad credit rating that never goes away").
415. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871.
416. 11 New Pilot Projects, supra note 414.
417. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870-71.
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cleanups. 418 Instead, it is intended to achieve three purposes: testing
of redevelopment strategies and models; 419 promoting cooperative efforts to bring together the stakeholders involved in brownfield policy;420 and forcing "jump start" assessment and evaluation activities at
individual sites. 421 Projects started in 1993 in Cleveland, Ohio, and in
1994 in Richmond, Virginia, and Bridgeport, Connecticut. 422 By July
1995, eighteen cities and localities had started pilot projects or had
projects approved by the EPA. 423 In the Action Agenda, the EPA
announced its intent to fund fifty new projects by the end of 1996.424
It announced eleven more grants in January 1996, for a total of forty
projects. 425 Participants in these pilot projects are involved in a wide
range of activities: developing intergovernmental cooperation networks for brownfield cleanups;426 identifying sites for cleanups (often
those within qualifying federal empowerment zones );427 and selecting
sites to use as test beds for site-specific evaluation and development
strategies.428 Although there is no typical pilot project, the tasks be418. See Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at
5; Brooks, supra note 158 (stating that "[f]unds are not for actual clean up, but for assessment
efforts to 'generate interest by pulling together community groups, investors, lenders, developers, and other affected parties to address the issues of cleaning up contaminated sites and returning them to appropriate, productive use,' according to EPA").
419. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871 (testifying that the Brownfields Initiative
"will give us, and others, an opportunity to observe which approaches are best suited for different types of communities"); Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 3.
.420. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 3.
421.. Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 5.
. 4i2. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Brownfields Iniiiative, supra note 407, at 5.
Administrator Browner testified to the success of the Cleveland pilot project. See Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871 ("Our first pilot in Cleveland, OH, has already leveraged $1.7 million in private investment, obtained a quarter of a million dollars in private donations, created
100 jobs with another 100 jobs expected within one year, and generated over $600,000 in new tax
revenue for the city.").
423. Pilot projects were underway in· the following cities and localities: Baltimore, MD; Birmingham, AL; Bridgeport, CT; Cape Charles, VA; Cleveland, OH; Detroit, MI; Indianapolis,
IN; Knoxville, TN; Laredo, TX; Louisville, KY; New Orleans, LA; Oregon Mills Site, OR; Richmond, VA; Rochester, NY; Sacramento, CA; St. Louis, MO; Trenton, NJ; and the "West Central
Municipal Conference" (Chicago, IL suburbs). COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 28; Brooks,
supra note 158.
·
424. ·Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 28;
Brooks, supra note 158; see Eric Rothenberg, New EPA Guidance Shields Buyers of Contaminated Sites, N.Y. L.J., June 12, 1995, at 53.
425. 11 New Pilot Projects, supra note 414.
426. Brooks, supra note 158 (noting that Sacramento is developing a "streamlined system
with all levels of government and the community to develop a future land use planning and
permitting process in conjunction with cleanup planning," and the West Central Municipal Conference pilot is "combin[ing] efforts of 36 municipalities in the Chicago area to create a regional
council of governments approach· to brownfield redevelopment").
427. Detroit, for example, is developing a relationship between empowerment zone activities and brownfield cleanups. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 33 (stating that Baltimore is
working to "coordinate empowerment zone and brownfields pilot activities"); Brooks, supra
note 158 (observing that "Detroit will marry empowerment zone activities with case studies of
assessment, cleanup and redevelopment").
428. Knoxville is using its funding "to focus on 25 inner city sites that have been chosen for
an urban business park." Brooks, supra note 158. The Richmond pilot project has selected one
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ing conducted in the Richmond pilot project are representative of the
range of activities involved. The Richmond "Project Team" includes
representatives from EPA Region III, staff from a number of city offices, and outside consultants. 429 This Team is working with a "task
force" of city and state staff, local and regional community leaders,
and economic development officials. 430 The project's activities include establishing a list of three or four sites deemed most suitable for
redevelopment, 431 evaluating these sites, which may include conducting Phase I and limited Phase II investigations,432 and developing
site-specific property redevelopment strategies. 433 Activities also include strategies designed to involve local residents and business in
brownfield redevelopment activities. 434
c.

Prospective Purchaser Agreements

Another EPA initiative to spur brownfield redevelopment is expansion of the coverage of its "Prospective Purchaser Agreement"
(PPA). 435 In a PPA, the EPA offers protection from liability under
CERCLA in the form of a release and covenant not to sue for prospective purchasers of contaminated properties who commit to specific cleanups. 436 Therefore, a prospective developer of a brownfield
brownfield site as a prototype site to implement the strategies developed in the program. RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 13. That site is a 64-acre
parcel owned by CSX Transportation, Inc., located in a state-designated enterprise zone. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 32.
429. RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 11.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 2.
432. Id. at 3-6.
433. Id. at 8.
434. CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 33. These include the use of the "Neighborhood
Teams Process" program and the development of courses to inform citizens about environmental
hazards. Id.
435. Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989) (hereinafter EPA PPA Guidance] (setting forth the criteria
under which EPA would enter into PPAs); see also CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 34-35;
Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 n.35; Howard M. Shanker & Laurent R. Hourcle, Prospective Purchaser Agreements, 25 ENVTL. L REP. 10,035 (1995).
436. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 86; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 158.
The Agency's criteria for entering into agreements with prospective purchasers of contaminated property included the following:
a. Enforcement action is anticipated by the Agency at the facility;
b. A substantial benefit, not otherwise available, will be received by the Agency for
cleanup;
c. The Agency believes that continued operation of the facility or new site development,
with the exercise of due care, will not aggravate or contribute to the existing contamination
or interfere with the remedy;
d. Due consideration has been given to the effect of continued operations or new development on health risks to those persons likely to be present at the site; and
e. The prospective purchaser is financially viable.
EPA PPA Guidance, supra note 435; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Berger et al.,
supra note 23, at 86; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 77-78.
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site may avail itself of the "innocent landowner defense" 437 and avoid
liability under CERCLA by entering into an agreement with the EPA
before buying the property. 438 The terms of these agreements are
based upon site-specific factors, particularly the nature and extent of
contamination discovered in a site investigation. 439
In May 1995, the EPA acted to redefine the criteria by which it
will consider entering into a PPA agreement. 440 Under the original
guidance, the EPA insisted on receiving a "substantial benefit" from
the developer such as either an agreement to perform cleanup work or
reimbursement of response costs.441 This proved, however, to be
more than most prospective purchasers were willing to spend. The
revised guidance document adds that the EPA may enter into a PPA if
it receives an "indirect public benefit in combination with a reduced
direct benefit to the EPA. " 442
One commentator calls the revised guidance on PPAs the "most
important step under the 'Brownfields Action Agenda. "'443 Given the
PPAs' track record to date, that may be overly optimistic. The availability of a PPA has had little success in spurring brownfield redevelopment as the EPA has entered into only sixteen such agreements since
1989.444 The EPA's decision to count a project's indirect benefits
removes a major obstacle, but others remain. The PPA is not a complete release from liability because it does not apply to contamination
437. Brooks, supra note 158.
438. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 34-35; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 158. The EPA derives its authority to offer a covenant
not to sue to prospective purchasers from CERCLA § 122(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1994), which
provides that the EPA may offer a covenant not to sue to any person if the covenant is "in the
public interest," "would expedite response action consistent with the [NCP]," and the person is
in "full compliance" with a consent decree for cleanup action. See generally Strock, supra note
105 (discussing settlement policy under CERCLA § 122).
439. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note
158.
440. Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers· of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792
(1995); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON SETTLEMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE
PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter MAY 1995 PPA GUIDANCE
MEMORANDUM]; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48
n.35; Rothenberg, supra note 424.
441. EPA PPA Guidance, supra note 435; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 34-35; Buzbee,
supra note 26, at 78; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728.
442. MA y 1995 ppA GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440; see also COMING CLEAN,
supra note 24, at 35; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 78-79; Rothenberg, supra note 424. This decision
was also consistent with the Clinton administration's earlier proposal for Superfund reform. See
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 748-4;}.
443. Rothenberg, supra note 424.
444. Shanker & Hourcle, supra note 435, at 10,036 & nn.9-10; see also Buzbee, supra note
26, at 80 n.148 (citing the Shanker and Hourcle count of PPAs and stating that the first four
PPAs entered into under the new criteria are awaiting EPA approval); McWilliams, supra note
20, at 728 (stating that "PPAs have an insufficient track record for prospective purchasers to
confidently rely on them when assessing the liability risks of purchasing an urban industrial
property"); Rothenberg, supra note 424.
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"unknown" at the time the Agreement is signed. 445 Finally, under
both the original and new guidance document, PPAs are targeted at
sites where the EPA believes it would otherwise be interested in
bringing an enforcement action. 446 This would preclude many brownfield sites from participation. Commentators also attribute the lack of
PPAs to the EPA's overall reluctance, given its statutory mandate, to
release parties from CERCLA liability. 447
2.

Superfund Reform Legislation (The "Reform of Superfund Act")
Brownfield redevelopment may also be encouraged by proposed
amendments to CERCLA that would remove disincentives to development. A wide variety of stakeholders currently support reforms to
CER CLA448 and view reform as more necessary than ever because
the basic authorizations for the Superfund expired in December

445. U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MODEL AGREEMENT ON SEITLEMENTS WITH PRO·
SPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY pt. IX (1996) (stating that the United
States •·reserves and the Agreement is without prejudice to all rights against Settling Defendants
with respect to ... (d) any liability resulting from the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances, pollutants or contaminants, at the Site after the effective date of this Agreement, not
within the definition of Existing Contamination"); see also Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks,
supra note 158.
446. MAY 1995 PPA GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440 (criteria for entering into a
PPA include whether "[a]n EPA action at the facility has been taken, is ongoing, or is anticipated
to be undertaken by the Agency"); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Buzbee, supra
note 26, at 77; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 158. The May 1995 memo states,
for example, that "sites designated by EPA as No Further Response Action Planned (NFRAP)
and removed from CERCLIS will rarely be deemed appropriate for a [PPA]." MAY 1995 PPA
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440. Many brownfield sites fit this definition, as indicated by the EPA's own action to remove 28,000 sites from the CERCLIS database as part of its
"Action Agenda" to spur brownfield redevelopment. See supra notes 411-16 and accompanying
text.
447. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 76-80 (noting the EPA's reluctance to offer true final settlements to PRPs); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728.
448. As any account of the calls for reform of Superfund can barely scrape the tip of the
proverbial iceberg, the following list is only representative.
Superfund reform is a high priority for industry groups. The Chemical Manufacturers Association's President, Fred Webber, recently called upon Congress to "pass a Superfund
reauthorization bill that reforms the program and funds cleanups into the next century." Interest
Groups Mixed on Impact of CERCLA Shutdown During Budget Impasse, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 3, at A-4 (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Interest Groups Mixed]; see also Reform of
Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 249
(Oct. 26, 1995) (testimony of George D. Baker, Executive Director of Superfund Reform '95, "a
coalition of over 1200 small and large businesses, trade associations, environmental professionals, insurance companies, municipalities, chambers of commerce, and concerned citizens, all of
whom are dedicated to comprehensive reform of the Superfund law") (testifying that the current
Superfund program is "horribly broken and wasteful").
The Clinton administration has recognized the need for legislative reforms to Superfund.
See, e.g., Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 856 (testifying that "there have been serious
proposals for improvement of the [CERCLA) statute which we agree need to be addressed");
Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 192 (Oct. 26, 1995) (testimony of Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental
& Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Schiffer Testimony] (testifying that
the administration supports "responsible reform" of Superfund).
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1995.449 Congress has been moving in recent years to promote comprehensive reform legislation;450 as of the date of this article, however,
prospects are unclear for the "Reform of Superfund Act" (ROSA), 451
the principal bill proposed to amend CERCLA. The Clinton administration opposes ROSA on a wide variety of grounds, prompting the
likelihood that the bill would be vetoed if passed in its current form. 452
State officials are critical of the proposal to "cap" the NPL and other
provisions which they perceive as shifting cleanup costs to them. 453
The bill's provisions redefining cleanup standards and public particiEnvironmental groups, though cautious about legislative proposals, also recognize the need
for reform. See, e.g., Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (Oct. 26, 1995) (testimony of Karen Fiorini, Senior Attorney,
Environmental Defense Fund) (hereinafter Fiorini Testimony] (testifying that "the Environmental Defense Fund supports improvement to the Superfund program"); NWF Testimony, supra
note 66, at 600.
The states' frustration with the current Superfund scheme is acute. See, e.g., Hearing on
H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of the House Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 8, 1995) (testimony of Robert M.
Cox, Jr., on behalf of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry), available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 668671 (testifying that "[t]he Chamber believes that unless Congress fundamentally reforms this important hazardous waste cleanup program now the drain on the
state's economy will only worsen"); see also BARNETI, supra note 98, at 268-82 (describing the
characteristics of a proposed revamped program); EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 607-18
(describing the problems of the current program and possible revisions to it).
449. Interest Groups Mixed, supra note 448. The provisions that expired included provisions
for the excise and corporate environmental income taxes that replenish the Superfund. See
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.2, at 699-700 (describing the tax provisions). BARNETI, supra note
98, at 223-27, contains a fascinating account of the legislative origins of these taxes. An agreement reached by the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee on
Nov. 12, 1995, extended Superfund excise taxes through Sept. 30, 1996, and corporate environmental income taxes through Dec. 31, 1996.
450. The "Reform of Superfund Act" is the second major recent attempt at Superfund reform legislation. Despite broad-based support, comprehensive legislative proposals to amend
CERCLA failed to be enacted in 1994, at the end of the 103d Congress. According to Professor
Abrams, "[p]opular wisdom has it that the amendment package died a political death or (failed]
because of a lack of consensus on other Superfund reform issues." Abrams, supra note 109, at
582.
451. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Senate counterpart to this bill is S. 1285,
introduced by Senator Robert Smith of New Hampshire. S. 1285, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
452. See, e.g., Schiffer Testimony, supra note 448, at 192 (testifying that "H.R. 2500 is not a
responsible proposal for reform of Superfund," and "[a]lthough the bill addresses each of the
key issues involved in Superfund reform, and proposes some innovative new ideas such as liability exemptions for municipal landfill sites and de minimis parties, it is fundamentally flawed").
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer also testified that the administration prefers the "consensus" reform bill reintroduced by Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) as H.R. 228. See id.; Superfund:
EPA Official Says Reform Bills Sacrifice Cleanup for "Exposure Control," Nat'l Env't Daily
(BNA), Nov. 8, 1995 (quoting the EPA's Jerry Clifford).
453. See State Officials Warn Superfund Bills Would Generate Serious Problems, Env't
Week, Jan. 5, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 7980833 (quoting comments of attendees
at the annual meeting of the National Council of State Legislatures).
The proposal to cap the NPL is detailed in H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1995),
which would amend CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994), to provide that "the President.
may not add any facility to the National Priorities List after December 31, 2002." No more than
125 facilities could be added through the year 2002 (under a schedule set forth in the legislation),
and a facility could be added only with the concurrence of the state and the affected local government. H.R. 2500, § 502.
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pation have drawn fire from the environmental community454 and interested community groups. 455
Nonetheless, ROSA is noteworthy because it contains a number
of initiatives intended to make cleanup costs and liability more predictable. 456 Title III, labeled "Brownfields and Voluntary Cleanups,"
calls for providing technical and financial assistance to qualifying state
programs457 and contains two major incentives to brownfield redevelopment: a limit on liability under CERCLA at brownfield sites cleaned up in an approved state voluntary cleanup program and a
clarification of the "innocent landowner" defense. 458 Provisions of
other titles, particularly those of Title I that would modify CERCLA
cleanup standards, are also relevant.
a.

Title III: Promoting State Cleanups

i.

No Liability for Sites Remediated in Approved State
Programs

ROSA's most significant direct incentive for brownfield redevelopment is a provision designed to decrease uncertainty generated by
the states' inability to release developers from CERCLA liability. 459
454. See, e.g., Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 270-80 (opposing these provisions and
others).
455. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 31,
1995) (testimony of Florence T. Robinson, representing the North Baton Rouge Environmental
Association, Louisiana Environmental Action Network, and the Communities at Risk Network),
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 668738 (hereinafter Robinson Testimony] (opposing provisions of H.R. 2500 on remedy selection, cleanup standards, and public participation, among
others).
456. Representatives Ralph Regula of Ohio and Peter Visclosky of Indiana have introduced
two free-standing brownfield bills, the "Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment Act" and
"Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment Revolving Loan Fund Pilot Project Act." See H.R.
1620 and H.R. 1621, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 54-56.
These bills called for federal financial support of state voluntary cleanup programs. H.R. 1620,
for example, "would authorize the EPA Administrator to establish a three-year, $20 million pilot
project providing revolving loans to states." Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on
H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House
Comm on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (Oct. 18, 1995) (testimony of Rep.
Peter J. Visclosky) [hereinafter Visclosky Testimony]; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 54. The
bills also would extend protection comparable to that envisioned by the omnibus Superfund
reform bill. See Visclosky Testimony, supra, at 6 (testifying that the provision of Title III of
ROSA limiting federal liability for sites cleaned up in an approved state program "is remarkably
similar to the process established by legislation Mr. Regula and I introduced in May, H.R.
1621 "). In his testimony before the House Commerce Committee, Rep. Visclosky expressed his
hope that brownfield legislation would be enacted separately if Superfund reform fails again. Id.
at 7.
457. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1995).
458. Id. §§ 304 and 303, respectively.
459. See Hearing on H.R. 2500, A Bill to Amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov.
2, 1995) (testimony of Michael A. Kahoe, Deputy Secretary, California Environmental Protec-
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Title III attempts to encourage participation in state voluntary
cleanup programs by limiting liability under CERCLA where a developer has cleaned up a site in accordance with the requirements of a
state program. 460 This could increase certainty for developers, who
would know in advance that complying with a state's requirements
will preclude the EPA from pursuing an action against them. State
programs would not qualify automatically for this deference; the EPA
would be required to approve the state program before developers
could receive a limit on federal liability. 461
ii.

Clarification of the Innocent Landowner Defense

Title III would clarify CERCLA's "innocent landowner" defense,
which, as noted above, is poorly defined and rarely available to
brownfield developers. 462 Section 303 of ROSA would amend CERCLA to provide that a purchaser of real property has "made all appropriate inquiry," as that term is used in the statute,463 if it conducts
a Phase I site assessment. 464 This would entitle the purchaser to avail
itself of the innocent landowner defense. 465 Changing the statute in
this fashion would be of great value to a brownfield developer, if it
were willing to underwrite the expense of a Phase I site assessment.
Clarifying the circumstances under which a purchaser can use the
innocent landowner defense is important.466 However, under the proposed Section 303, there would be no guarantee that those who use
tion Agency), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 645085 (hereinafter Kahoe Testimony] (observing that "[t]he primary value of [Title III] is its' [sic] release of federal liability for sites handled
under state voluntary or brownfield programs"); see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 748
(stating that "the federal government can streamline the remediation process by delegating or
deferring to efficient state programs").
460. Section 304 of H.R. 2500, as introduced, would add the following language to CERCLA § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1994):
( e) Facilities in states with approved remedial action programs.
(1) Enforcement prohibition.
(A) Releases subject to State plans. For any facility at which there is a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances subject to a State remedial action plan
adopted under a state program approved as provided in this subsection, neither the
President nor any other person may use any authority of this act to take a new
administrative or judicial enforcement action, or to bring a private civil action,
against any person regarding any matter that is within the scope of such plan.
461. Section 304 would provide that a state may apply for approval of its voluntary cleanup
program. At the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting, in January 1996, Rep. Thomas Bliley (RVA), Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, announced his intent to offer an amendment to delete this provision. Clinton Backs U.S. Mayors, supra note 29.
462. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
463. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1994).
464. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1995). Section 303 would amend CERCLA
§ 107, 42 u.s.c. § 9607 (1994).
465. If a purchaser has made all appropriate inquiries, it is not in a "contractual relationship" and may qualify for the defense set forth in CERCLA § 107(b)(3). See supra note 102 and
·
accompanying text.
466. See, e.g., NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 607 (testifying that the NWF "recommends
that some form of liability relief is provided to prospective purchasers, lenders and innocent
landowners").
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the defense are bona fide innocent purchasers. Opponents claim that
developers will be able to purchase brownfield sites without ensuring
that they are remediated. They point to Section 303's lack of a requirement that the property be cleaned up if the Phase I assessment
discovers the presence of contamination or that the purchaser cooperate with a cleanup (if one takes place).467
b. Title I: Revising Cleanup Standards
Like state voluntary cleanup statutes, ROSA contains provisions
that would relax cleanup standards expressly amending Section 121 of
CERCLA. It would require the EPA to conduct "objective and unbiased" risk assessments, implement "cost-effective and cost reasonable" remedies, and base cleanup remedies on anticipated future uses
of land, water, and other resources. 468 Section 102, for example, directs the EPA to use "the most plausible assumptions" for risk assessments and specifies that "remedies selected at individual facilities
shall be those necessary to protect human health and the environment
from realistic and significant risks through cost-effective and cost-reasonable means." 469 ROSA also removes the "ARAR" requirement
that other federal and state environmental standards be followed in
Superfund cleanups.470 Some have criticized these proposals as creating standards that fail to protect health and the environment, particularly in minority and lower-income communities. 471
3.

Other Federal Initiatives

The Clinton administration's budget proposal for fiscal year 1997
offers a tax deduction for environmental cleanup expenses in
"targeted areas," which include distressed areas such as the current
empowerment zone and enterprise communities areas472 and areas
467. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1995); see NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at
607-08 (testifying that "[i]n order for bona fide prospective purchasers to obtain Superfund liability relief, they must not contribute waste to the site, make a good faith effort to determine if
the site was contaminated, cooperate with the cleanup effort at a contaminated site and not
aggravate existing contamination conditions"); Schiffer Testimony, supra note 448, at 201 (testifying that "H.R. 2500's 'innocent landowner' liability exemption ... fails to require the purchasers to cooperate with cleanup of the property [which is) inconsistent with the purpose of the
provision to encourage the cleanup, as well as redevelopment, of brownfields sites").
468. Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 274-77; Robinson Testimony, supra note 455.
469. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1995); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra note
448, at 277. The Environmental Defense Fund's Karen Fiorini stated that this provision "implicitly disallows consideration of atypically sensitive subpopulations (e.g., developing fetuses, infants, children, asthmatics, the elderly)." Id. at 276.
470. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra
note 448, at 275.
471. See, e.g., Swanston, supra note 123, at 567-72.
472. Empowerment zones operate on the theory that removing governmental barriers to
investment, and providing incentives for redevelopment, will spur urban revitalization and
growth. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 752 n.232 (citing STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE
ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 3 (1981)). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
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where brownfield pilot projects are in place. 473 There is a direct relationship between the proposed tax deduction and other federal programs which focus on economic redevelopment activities, because
these activities are already targeted to the empowerment zones and
enterprise communities. 474 Moreover, federal agencies involved in redevelopment activities in these communities could work cooperatively
with state regulators administering voluntary cleanup programs. 475
Professor Michael Allan Wolf cautions, however, that targeting these
areas for cleanups raises distributional concerns. 476
IV.

COMPARING VOLUNTARY CLEANUP. STATUTES AND
NEGOTIATED COMPENSATION STATUTES

A broad-based coalition of industry, policy makers, and the public is prompting the states to take action to facilitate voluntary cleanups, touting the voluntary cleanup statutes' incentives for
1993 authorized the creation of six urban empowerment zones (later designated in Detroit, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, Chicago, and Atlanta) and 65 "enterprise communities"; Cleveland and Los Angeles were designated as "supplemental zones" qualifying for federal grants.
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 50; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 13; Michael Allan Wolf,
Compete and Empower, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1993 [hereinafter Wolf, Compete
and Empower].
473. See White House Statutory Language, Tax Notes Today, Tax Analysts, Mar. 20, 1996,
available in WESTLAW, TNT database, 96 TNT 56-1 (proposing Title IX, Subtitle D of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1996) [hereinafter Administration Tax Deduction Bill]; Administration Looking at FY 1997 Budget as Vehicle for Brownfields Tax Proposal, Daily Tax Rept.
(BNA), Feb. 1, 1996, at DTR 21 G7 [hereinafter FY 1997 Budget Proposal]. The administration's bill would add a new§ 198 to the Internal Revenue Code that would allow a deduction for
a "qualified environmental remediation expenditure" in the taxable year in which it was paid or
incurred. Qualifying expenditures would be those at a site within a "targeted area," defined as a
population census tract with a population of less than 2,000 if more than 75% of the tract is
zoned for commercial or industrial use, an empowerment zone or enterprise community, or a
site included in a brownfield pilot project. Administration Tax Deduction Bill, supra, § 9476(a);
FY 1997 Budget Proposal, supra; cf S. 1542, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing to allow
taxpayers to deduct costs incurred "in connection with the abatement or control of environmental contaminants located within an empowerment zone or enterprise community"); FY 1997
Budger Proposal, supra (describing S. 1542).
474. A wide variety of federal assistance is available in empowerment zones and enterprise
communities, including programs for economic development and job training. See Michael Allan Wolf; U.S. Urban Areas Seek New Paths to Prosperity, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & Pus. PoL'v,
Winter 1995, at 84, 87-88 [hereinafter Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas]; Wolf, Compete and Empower,
supra note 472. The University of Richmond School of Law's "EZ Project" maintains a site on
the Internet's World Wide Web to provide useful information about the federal program, including specific federal regulations regarding federal program enhancements to empowerment zones
and enterprise.communities. See Optimism Is Surviving for "Empowerment Zones," ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 25,. 1995, at B15 (mentioning the EZ Project); EZ Gazette: A Newsletter on Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities, and Enterprise Zones (last modified Sept. 25, 1996)
<http://www.urich.edu/-ezproj>.
475. See Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas, supra note 474, at 90.
476. Id. at 90:
.
Because of the high concentration of African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians in the nation's most distressed inner-city neighborhoods (in which there may be greater likelihood of
exposure to environmental hazards), any sweeping waivers of environmental controls in
such areas would directly conflict with the goals of the environmental justice movement.
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redevelopment. 477 Proponents claim that many sites have been addressed successfully in the pioneer state programs. 478 But most observers conclude that the state statutes are too new for their
effectiveness to be measured accurately and that there is still a high
degree of uncertainty about the investment climate for developers. 479
There are a number of unresolved issues in the implementation of voluntary cleanup programs, many of which may hamper the states' ability to fulfill proponents' expectations over the long run. 480
This part will assess the challenges facing the voluntary cleanup
statutes by comparing them to "negotiated compensation" statutes.
The negotiated compensation statutes represent a notable effort to
overcome "NIMBY-ism" and facilitate the siting of new waste disposal facilities. 481 Scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) and Harvard University, recognizing that previous approaches
had failed to address NIMBY opposition adequately, created the concept of negotiated compensation. They drafted the Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute, hailed at the time of its enactment in
1980 as a "major advance in siting policy by both industry and envi477. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS P01.1cY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that at the recent NEPI forum, "not one panelist spoke in favor of the status quo"); Buzbee,
supra note 26. at 109; Black, supra note 42, at 51.
478. In its "Six-Month Progress Report," Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Protection claims that since the Pennsylvania statute took effect in July 1995, 13 brownfield sites
have been remediated, and cleanups are underway at 47 other sites. PENNSYLVANIA S1x-MoNTH
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 6-7. Of the 13 completed cleanups, eight had met statewide health standards, three met background standards, and two met the requirements for "special industrial areas"; none had met the requirements for site-specific cleanups. Id. at 7; see also
Casserly, supra note 26, at 271 (describing the Minnesota program):
Four hundred and twenty two parcels have been examined by developers with the assistance
of the VIC program. Of the 222 completed projects, 58 sites were completely cleaned up, 57
required no cleanup, 57 were referred to other programs more appropriate for their
cleanup, 26 received off site source determination letters, and 13 received no association
determination letters.
The OTA report describes a successful voluntary cleanup under the California program at the
former Culver City Kite site, a 4.5-acre property used for manufacturing purposes. The site was
cleaned up, and the developer received a certificate of completion from the state. The site,
according to the OTA, is "currently being developed as an industrial park ... expected to provide approximately 100 new jobs." OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 21 (citing
DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROTEcnON AGENCY,
THE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM, May 1995, at 6, and Interview with Javier Hinojosa, Site
Mitigation Branch, California Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Substances Control (June 1, 1995)).
479. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 12;
OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 28.
480. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2-3.
481. See Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in Wisconsin, 66 MARO. L. REV. 223 (1983); Bernd Holznagel, Negotiation and Mediation:
The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 329
(1986) (discussing the Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin statutes);
Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting
Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1994) (discussing the failure of the Massachusetts statute); Mary
Beth Arnett, Comment, Down in the Dumps and Wasted: The Need Determination in the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 543.
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ronmentalists. "482 The Massachusetts statute served as a model for
other states, such as Wisconsin, that subsequently enacted negotiated
compensation statutes.
States now have over a decade of experience with these statutes.
Like the voluntary cleanup statutes, the enactment of negotiated compensation statutes was accompanied by heady optimism and a consensus among a variety of stakeholders about the need for a process to
foster decision making by developers and communities. 483 But the negotiated compensation statutes have had a rather poor record of success in addressing the difficult issues of the siting process,484 despite
strong arguments that they might have succeeded. An analysis of the
similarities between the two types of statutes, and an assessment of
the shortcomings of negotiated compensation statutes, offer a framework for examining challenges that lie ahead in the implementation of
voluntary cleanup programs. Scholars have articulated criticisms of
features of compensation schemes (particularly those of the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act) that find parallels in the
voluntary cleanup programs. These include the lack of effective public participation, both before the initial decision to site a facility has
been made and during the siting process; the chronic problems with
the legitimacy of the states' decision making; the moral hazards inherent in trusting developers' motives and actions; and the failure to address issues central to the programs' success. Following a brief
introduction to the negotiated compensation statutes, this part will address each of these sets of issues in tum, primarily with reference to
the Massachusetts statute.
A Brief Introduction to Negotiated Compensation Statutes
The Waste Disposal and "NIMBY" Problems

A.

1.

For the foreseeable future, we will continue to rely on building
new facilities to dispose of our waste. 485 In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to site solid waste landfills and hazardous
waste disposal facilities, due in large part to the "NIMBY syndrome."
People benefit from waste disposal facilities, but no one wants these
facilities to be located "in my backyard." Thus, fierce opposition is
482. Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 787, 811 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Compensated Siting Proposals].
483. For a discussion of the theory of the negotiated compensation approach, see Lawrence
S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The
Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv. 265 (1982).
484. Comprehensive analyses of the successes and failures of the "negotiated compensation" approach are found in Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, and Wheeler,
supra note 481.
485. A number of commentators have advocated source reduction, but its full implementation is still many years away. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at
Twenty·Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 424-26 (1995) (calling for economic incentives to reduce
waste generation).

992

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1996

likely whenever a developer attempts to site a new disposal facility. 486
The "negotiated compensation" statutes promised to alleviate
America's waste disposal crisis487 and the role of "NIMBY-ism" in
perpetuating it.
2.

The Principle of Negotiated Compensation
By the early 1980s, many states required developers to provide
compensation to the community that hosted a waste facility. 488 The
innovation of the negotiated compensation approach was to encourage developers and communities to negotiate compensation
awards-both their amounts and forms of payment.489
The negotiated compensation approach attempts to recast the economics of NIMBY opposition to proposed projects. The conflict
over any siting dispute involves diffuse benefits for a large number of
people (e.g., customers of a waste disposal facility) at the expense of
concentrated costs to the immediately affected community. A facility's opponents are therefore able to organize a group of residents to
protest the imposition of the facility on them. There is usually no corresponding group of potential beneficiaries, because individuals may
not perceive the gains from supporting the facility. 490 Negotiated
compensation attempts to solve this problem by providing compensation to residents who perceive that a project may harm them. Under
this approach, private waste facility developers are required to bargain with communities to establish terms for accepting facilities.
There are several types of compensation that a developer of a waste
disposal facility may offer a local community: (1) measures to avoid
486. See Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 788-89; Denis J. Brion, An
Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 8.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REv.
437 (1988); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198 (1990);
Ivan Fong, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Through Negotiation, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 161 (198687); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste
Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 8.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv.
239 (1991); Bruce J. Parker & John H. Turner, Overcoming Obstacles to the Siting of Solid Waste
Facilities, 21 N.M. L. REV. 91 (1990); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the I980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES L. 429
(1984); Wheeler, supra note 481.
487. Parker & Turner, supra note 486 (discussing the magnitude of America's solid waste
problem).
.
488. See, e.g., Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 794 n.46 and statutes
cited therein; Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed
Siting Model, 13 VA. ENVTL L.J. 375 (1994) (describing compensation programs in states such as
Colorado, Connecticut, and Minnesota). In these programs, compensation is often fixed as a
lump-sum amount, or as a percentage of the facility's gross receipts or amount of wastes
processed. Mata, supra.
489. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 253. As Professor Wheeler indicates, the "political symbolism" of allowing the host community to bargain freely with the waste developer was intended to
represent "a clear departure from regulatory regimes under which the state merely awards damages to a community chosen to host a facility." Id.
490. This phenomenon, and the corresponding need for collective action, was described in
James E. Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons from a "Study" Council, 23 STAN. L.
REV. 623, 662-64 (1971).
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or reduce a facility's adverse impacts on the community (e.g., installation of a groundwater monitoring system, double liners, and a
leachate collection system); (2) measures to reverse or mitigate adverse impacts that occur (e.g., provision of money or equipment to
improve fire and police response capabilities in case of an accident);
and (3) compensatory benefits (e.g., provision by the developer of tax
benefits to the municipality or direct cash payments to individuals).
3.

Features of Negotiated Compensation Statutes

The negotiated compensation statutes create a process that, as
the name implies, involves negotiation between communities and
waste facility developers. A developer triggers the negotiation process by contacting the host community itself,491 or it may contact a
state agency that has oversight responsibility for the siting process,
often a new agency created in the statute. 492 The developer declares
its intent to site a facility in a host community.493 Then, the commu491. In Massachusetts, the process of siting a proposed facility begins when the developer
files a "notice of intent" with the responsible state agency. The notice of intent is required to
include a description of the facility (including the wastes that would be processed on the site and
the techniques that would be used to treat or dispose of them), the developer's prior experience
in constructing or operating waste facilities, and the developer's plans for financing the project.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); see Been, Compensated Siting
Proposals, supra note 482, at 811; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 358-59; Wheeler, supra note 481,
at 264-65. In Wisconsin, the developer's first step is to apply for "local approvals" (e.g., building
permits, licenses, and zoning approvals or variances) from the host community. By taking this
step, the developer becomes eligible to proceed in the process envisioned by the statute. This is
a two-track process that involves the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in evaluating the project's feasibility and the host community in negotiating with the developer over compensation and other issues. Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.44(lm)(b)-(c) (West 1989); see Arnett, supra
note 481, at 548.
492. Recognizing that existing agencies "lacked the neutrality necessary to facilitate the negotiations" between developers and host communities, the Massachusetts statute created a new
state agency, the "Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council" (HWFSSC), to oversee the
process. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 4 (WESTLAW, MA-STANN96 database, 1996)
(repealed 1996); see Holznagel, supra note 481. at 358. Other state agencies involved in the
process include the Department of Environmental Quality and Engineering, and the Department of Environmental Management (DEM). Id. It was the HWFSSC, however, that bears
responsibility for evaluating the siting agreement. Id. There were 21 members of the HWFSSC:
eight state officials (or their designees), seven representatives of interest groups, and six representatives of the general public. In addition, two "temporary" members from the host community may be appointed. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, § 4 (WESTLAW, MA-STANN96
database, 1996) (repealed 1996); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 358.
The Wisconsin statute created the "Waste Facility Siting Board" (WFSB), a state agency
with similar responsibilities. The WFSB has seven members: four state officials (or their designees); two town officials, and one county official. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 15.105(12) (1986); see Arnett, supra note 481, at 547 n.23.
493. Typically, a developer may either select the host community or ask the state to select
one. In Massachusetts, the notice of intent may name a specific proposed site, or describe the
type of site that the developer would prefer, and ask the state to select potential candidates.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 9 (West 1988); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals,
supra note 482, at 812; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 360. In the latter case, the state conducts a
site suggestion process, accepting suggestions from interested individuals and entities (state
agencies, the developer, communities, and other persons). The state may suggest a site if it
receives no proposals using this process. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 9 (West 1988);
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nity and the developer enter into a negotiation process;494 in Massachusetts, a preliminary review of the proposal by the state has already
taken place. 495 Representatives of a number of constituencies are ap-

Holznagel, supra note 481, at 360. In practice, most developers identified specific sites in which
they were interested, bypassing the state. In Wisconsin, the developer is also free to choose the
location of the proposed facility. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 481, at 551 (stating that "[w]ithout
state or local input, the applicant [in Wisconsin] selects the location of the proposed landfill site
and proceeds to obtain the necessary local permits and state operating license").
494. In Massachusetts, the negotiation process involves the developer and a "local assessment committee" (LAC) from the host community; these parties negotiate the terms (e.g., compensation and protective measures) under which the host community agrees to accept the
facility. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5 (West 1988); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 257. In
Wisconsin, the negotiation process starts when the host community adopts a "siting resolution"
in response to the developer's request for local approvals. The siting resolution declares the
community's intent to negotiate with the developer. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(6)(a) (West
1989); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at
548. There is a strong incentive for the host community to adopt a siting resolution: if it does
not do so within 120 days after the developer applies for local approvals, the developer may
continue in the state's process for determining the need and feasibility of the project without
being subject to any local approvals. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(6)(f) (West 1989); see Been,
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 548.
495. In Massachusetts, the HWFSSC is required to make a threshold assessment whether
the notice of intent is "complete." If the HWFSSC finds this to be the case, it must review the
proposed project and make a further finding within 15 days whether the proposal is "feasible and
deserving of state assistance." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 7 (West 1988); see Been,
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 359;
Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266. This finding indicates only that the proposal is appropriate for
further review. Holznagel, supra note 481, at 359; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266. Shortly after
the enactment of the Massachusetts act, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a
HWFSSC decision about whether a developer's proposal was "feasible and deserving of state
assistance" was not subject to judicial review. Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site
Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1984). In Town of Warren, the HWFSSC had decided that
a site in the town of Warren proposed as the location of a hazardous waste facility was "feasible
and deserving of state assistance." The town argued that the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act entitled it to judicial review of this decision as a "final decision of [an] agency in an
adjudicatory proceeding." The court disagreed, holding that the HWFSSC's determination was
a preliminary step in a lengthy siting process. Town of Warren, 466 N.E.2d at 107-08. For further
commentary on Town of Warren, see Been, Compensated Siting Propornls, supra note 482, at
816-17; Note, The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Controversy: The Massachusetts Experience,
12 AM. J.L. & MED. 131 (1986).
There is no analogue in Wisconsin to the Massachusetts "feasible and deserving" screening
process. Instead, the ONR conducts a separate determination of the need for the proposed
facility; if it determines that the facility is not necessary, the developer may not build it. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 144.44(2) (West 1989); see Arnett, supra note 481, at 555.
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pointed to a committee496 that negotiates on behalf of the community497 with .the developer.
The developer and host community negotiate on such issues as
the facility's design, construction, maintenance, operation, and monitoring procedures.498 The committee and developer are usually required to negotiate the amount and type of services the host
community will provide the developer and the compensation, services,
and benefits that the developer will provide the community. 499 Some
issues, particularly the need for the facility, are expressly precluded
from negotiations. 500 To obtain information to enhance its ability to
negotiate, the committee is authorized to receive technical and financial assistance from the state. 501 While the negotiations are ongoing,
496. In Massachusetts, the LAC consists of as many as 13 members, five of whom are defined by the statute: the chief executive officer of the host community, the chair of the local
board of heal~h, the chair of the local planning board, the chair of the local conservation commission, and the chief of the fire department. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5 (West 1988);
see Been,. Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813-14; Holznagel, supra note 481, at
362. The five statutory members select four additional members, three of whom must be residents of the host community. The chief executive officer may nominate, and the city council (or
other municipal legislative body) may approve, up to four additional members.
In Wisconsin, a "local committee" negotiates with the developer. The city council or other
municipal governing body of the municipality. may appoint four members, no more than two of
whom may be elected officials or municipal employees; the host county may appoint two members; and if it is another "affected municipality" as defined in the statute, any other affected
community may appoint one member. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§ 144.445(7)(a) (West 1989); see Been,
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 547 & n.25.
497. In Massachusetts, the LAC is authorized to bind the community to the siting agreement. The LAC is charged with representing the "best interests of the host community" by
negotiating with the developer "to protect the public health, the public safety, and the environment of the host community, as well as to promote the fiscal welfare of said community through
special benefits and compensation." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 5 (West 1988); see Been,
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813-14; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 362. In
Wisconsin, the siting agreement becomes binding when, and only when, it is approved by the
governing body of the host community. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§ 144.445(9)(k) (West 1989); see Been,
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 548.
498. Massachusetts requires the siting agreement (and, therefore, the negotiation process)
to address facility construction and maintenance, design and operation, and monitoring procedures. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West 1988); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364.
In Wisconsin, these issues (along with compensation) may be the subject of negotiation between
the committee and the developer, but are not specifically enumerated as issues that must be
included in the siting agreement. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 481, at 548 (stating that
"(c]ommonly negotiated items include property diminution, municipal costs of negotiation activities, facility appearance and hours of operation, road maintenance, control of noise, dust, debris,
odors and rodents, and other neighborhood concerns").
499. Massachusetts requires the siting agreement to describe services to be provided by the
developer to the community; compensation to be provided by the developer to the community;
services and benefits to be provided by the state agencies to the community, among other components of the agreement. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West 1988); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 814; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364.
500. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West 1988); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(8)(a)(2)
(West 1989); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364 (describing the Massachusetts approach);
Arnett, supra note 481, at 544 (describing the Wisconsin approach) .. The negotiators also cannot
agree to relax the environmental, or health and safety standards of state and federal laws. See,
e.g., Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364 (describing the Massachusetts approach).
501. In Massachusetts, an LAC may obtain a technical assistance and planning grant from
the HWFSSC to enable it to assess the project more effectively. In deciding whether to award a
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there is a separate state review of environmental issues. 502 In addition, the community is usually precluded from changing its local laws
to block the project. 503 The negotiations are intended to culminate in
a siting agreement that sets forth the agreement between the parties. 504 There are time limits for the negotiations; if negotiations reach
an impasse, there is recourse to either state-authorized mediation,
binding arbitration,505 or both, to resolve contentious issues. Finally,
grant, the HWFSSC evaluates the proposal's merit, deciding whether the funds will be expended
for purposes clearly related to the siting process, whether the budget for the project is reasonable, and whether the proposed project itself is necessary. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11
(West 1988); see Holznagel, supra note481, at 362; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 257.
502. In Massachusetts, the proposed facility is subject to the state's environmental impact
process under the "little NEPA" statute, the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (WESTLAW through c. 76 of 1996 2d Annual Sess. of the
General Court); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 363; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 267.· To
facilitate this review, the developer prepares a preliminary project impact report, consisting of an
environmental impact report and a socioeconomic appendix, that detail the proposed facility's
environmental impacts. Preparation of the final environmental impact report begins at this
point and concludes only after a siting agreement is in place, with information from the negotiations added to supplement the initial report. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 10 (West 1988);
see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813 n.182; Holznagel, supra note
481, at 363. In Wisconsin, environmental review takes place in the ONR's process of determining the feasibility of the proposed project. This process, as noted above, is a decision"making
track for the project that parallels the negotiation process. Arnett, supra note 481, at 550. Its
principal component is the approval of a "feasibility report" submitted to the ONR. Wis. STAT.
ANN.§ 144.44(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); see Arnett, supra note 481, at 550. The feasibility
report contains a general summary of the site and surrounding area (including topography, soils,
geology, groundwaters, and surface waters), preliminary engineering design concepts, and information about the wastes to be treated, stored, or disposed. This information, together with information obtained at public hearings, enables the ONR to complete its environmental review of
the facility. The ONR also approves a plan of operation setting forth operational details for the
proposed facility and issues the facility's operating license. Id. at 550 & n.43.
503. A developer might need a number of local approvals; for example, approval of a traffic
plan, or a building or fire permit. See Holznagel, supra note 481, at 367 & n.269. The host
community, in Massachusetts, is prohibited from imposing new permit requirements, if they had
been unnecessary prior to the effective date of the statute. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 16
(West 1988); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 367. The host community is also prohibited from
excluding the facility by changing the zoning of the proposed site. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
210, § 16 (West 1988); Holznagel, supra note 481, at 367-68. In Wisconsin, there is a similar
prohibition of new local approvals. The host community may require the developer to secure
only those local approvals that would have been required at least 15 months before the developer submitted either an "initial site report" or "feasibility report." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.445(3)(fm), 144.445(5) (West 1989); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note
482, at 819 n.226.
504. In both Massachusetts and Wisconsin, the terms upon which the host community and
developer agree are documented in a written siting agreement. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210,
§ 12 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(9)(g) (West 1989). See Been, Compensated Siting
Proposals, supra note 482, at 814, 820 (describing the Massachusetts and Wisconsin approaches);
Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364 (describing the Massachusetts approach); Arnett, supra note
481, at 548-49 (describing the Wisconsin approach).
505. In Massachusetts, the developer or the LAC may notify the HWFSSC that an impasse
in the negotiations has been reached. The HWFSSC is then empowered to require the parties to
submit disputed issues to arbitration. The arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators) creates a siting
agreement, taking into account the presentations made by the host community, the developer,
and abutting communities. The arbitrator or arbitration panel's determination is binding upon
the parties and is subject to limited judicial review. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 15 (West
1988); Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 814-15; Holznagel, supra note
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there are additional approval and enforcement responsibilities for the
state after a siting agreement has been reached. 506

B.

Learning from the Successes and Failures of Negotiated
Compensation
The negotiated compensation statutes have had a decidedly
mixed record of success and have been largely unsuccessful in facilitating the siting of hazardous waste facilities. The Massachusetts statute has been completely unsuccessful5°7 and has prompted criticism
and legislative proposals for its abolition or change. 508 One commentator calls the Massachusetts statute a "conspicuous failure ... [that]
became a focal point for community resistance. "509 Wisconsin, by
contrast, has had modest success with its statute. One analysis indicates that by the end of 1993, communities and developers had
reached siting agreements at five hazardous waste sites and forty-one
solid waste. sites in Wisconsin. 510
The siting of a waste disposal facility, unlike certain reuses of
brownfields, is guaranteed to impose environmental and other costs
on its host community. 511 Th~ opposition of local residents to waste
disposal facilities and siting of other "locally undesirable land uses" is
well-known and documented. 512 Such opposition, however, is unlikely
to exist at every brownfield site because residents may welcome certain development activities. Nevertheless, voluntary cleanup programs and negotiated compensation statutes share a number of
common attributes, and the lessons learned from the shortcomings of
the latter are instructive.
481, at 365; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 271-72. Although the Wisconsin statute also provides for
arbitration after an impasse occurs, the Wisconsin provision for arbitration is more limited. Topics for arbitration are restricted to eight specific areas: (1) compensation for adverse economic
impacts caused by the facility; (2) reimbursement of the local committee's negotiation, mediation, and arbitration costs not exceeding $2,500; (3) screening and fencing; (4) operational concerns including noise, dust, debris, Odors, and hours of operation; (5) traffic flows and patterns;
(6) postclosure site use; (7) economically feasible methods for reducing the quantity of waste
disposed at the site including recycling; and (8) applicability of local approvals. The WFSB
makes arbitration awards, choosing between offers made by the committee and developer.· This
decision is binding on the committee and developer. See Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.445(8)(b), (10)
(West 1989); Arnett, supra note 481, at 549.
506. In Massachusetts, for example, after the siting agreement is entered into, the HWFSSC
is required to review and approve it, and the licensing and permitting processes begin. See
Wheeler, supra note 481, at 267-68.
507. For comprehensive descriptions of the unsuccessful attempts to site hazardous waste
facilities in Massachusetts, see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 815-18
and Wheeler, supra note 481, at 259-61.
508. See Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 818; Wheeler, supra note
481, at 261-64.
509. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 244.
510. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 821.
511. · As Professor Wheeler notes, "The magnitude of such costs may vary markedly with
both the type of facility and the setting in which it operates, but there should be little question
about the existence of such costs." Wheeler, supra note 481, at 248.
512. See, e.g., Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 789.

998

1.

UNNERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1996

Promoting Effective Public Participation

The relative failure of the negotiated compensation statutes may
be traced in large part to deficiencies in involving the affected community in the decision-making process. The statutes have been widely
perceived as hampering consensual decision making, largely because
communities believe their opportunity to participate in the siting process is not meaningful. As a result, they have resisted projects from
the outset; as one commentator stated recently, this resistance was entirely rational. 513
Similarly, states with voluntary cleanup programs fail to encourage direct communication among developers, state regulators,
and representatives of the affected community.514 Although there has
been considerable focus on relaxing cleanup standards and providing
for liability releases, little attention has been paid to issues related to
public participation. 515 Indeed, providing for effective public participation is often viewed as a potential deterrent to redevelopment activities. As experience with the negotiated compensation statutes has
shown, this could not be further from the truth. The voluntary
cleanup programs are likely to encounter public resistance precisely
because they do not provide an opportunity for meaningful public
participation.
Negotiated compensation statutes establish mechanisms to deal
with a number of fundamental public participation issues. Thus, the
comparison between the two types of statutes is not perfect. The
premise of negotiated compensation statutes is that unless communication between project developers and communities takes place, few
facilities can be sited, and the statutes establish mechanisms to facilitate that communication. In the case of voluntary cleanup statutes,
the states operate on the premise that timely and meaningful communication is largely unnecessary, and, as a result, provide weak mechanisms for community involvement. Nevertheless, the primary lesson
of experience with negotiated compensation statutes applies equally
to voluntary cleanup programs: if communities do not view opportunities for participation as meaningful, even meritorious projects will
encounter resistance.
To illustrate this proposition, this subpart examines the public
participation provisions of Michigan's voluntary cleanup program,
which provide a typical process for community input. The brownfield
redevelopment process in Michigan calls for the developer to assess
513. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 274.
514. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 32 (noting that
the panel on "A New Stakeholder Empowerment" discussed "the failure of many existing statutes and policies to encourage direct communication between the local community and the decision makers").
515. Id. at 33 (quoting the statement of Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation).
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contamination at the site and notify the state of proposed cleanup activities. 516 The statute provides for public input at the investigation
stage only for sites where the state is spending cleanup funds or where
the state decides there is "significant public interest";517 neither of
these is likely to be the case at most brownfield sites. 518 Public input
is required, however, on cleanup plans at sites where developers propose to meet generic statewide standards. Michigan, like a number of
other states, provides that the state may develop a number of specific
categories of generic cleanup standards, including "commercial," "industrial," and "limited" categories such as "limited industrial." 519 The
developer has the option to choose the cleanup category, subject only
to state approval. 520 Before the state approves a remedial action plan
consisting of a cleanup to meet a generic standard, it must, at a minimum, provide for notice and comment,521 and hold a public meeting if
the municipality or local health department requests one. 522 The state
also may hold a public meeting if it determines such a meeting is appropriate. 523 With its approval of the remedial action plan, the state
must document the comments received and the state's responses to
"significant" concerns. 524
516. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996) provides that a purchaser of a brownfield site can avoid liability under the state mini-CERCLA statute by performing a "baseline environmental assessment." See NEPI BROWNFIELDS Poucy FoRUM
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 40 (quoting David Fink, Partner, Cooper, Fink and Zausner);
Andrew, supra note 29, at 29. If this assessment reveals the presence of contamination at the
site, the purchaser must perform cleanup activities or face liability under the state's mini-CERCLA law. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20107a (West Supp. 1996). The first step in the remedial process would be the submission of a proposed plan for remedial action. See id. § 324.20118.·
Occasionally, other states use the same terms as negotiated compensation statutes to describe the developer's request to enter into the cleanup process. In Pennsylvania, the voluntary
cleanup process starts with a developer's "notice of intent" to remediate the site to background
standards. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(e)(l) (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA
S1~-MoNTH PRoGREss REPORT, supra note 33, at 6 (describing the "Notice of Intent to Remediate" as the "initial notice requirement" of the Pennsylvania program).
517. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20120d(l) (West Supp. 1996).
518. · In Michigan, state funds are only spent on cleanups of sites listed on the state analogue
to the NPL. Id. §§ 324.20105, 324.20113(2). According to one commentator, this excludes ~4%
of all sites from eligibility for state cleanup funding. Anderson, supra note 109, at 24.
519. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120a(l) (West Supp. 1996).
520. Id.
521. Before the state approves a remedial action plan based on categorical criteria, it must
publish "a notice and brief summary of the proposed remedial action plan," and "[p]rovide for
public review and comment pertinent to documents relating to the proposed remedial action
plan, including, if applicable, the feasibility study that outlines alternative remedial action measures considered." Id. § 324.20120d(3)(a)-(b).
522. Id. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i)-(iii) provides that the state must hold a public meeting if any
one of the following occur:
(i) The department determines that there is a significant public interest or that for any other
reason a public meeting is appropriate.
.
(ii) A city, township, or village in which the facility is located, by a majority vote of its
governing body, requests a public meeting.
(iii) A local health department with jurisdiction in the area in which the facility is located
requests a public meeting.
523. Id. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i).
524. Id. § 324.20120d(5).
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The Role of the Affected Community

There is considerable agreement that a voluntary cleanup program's success depends on meaningful input by the surrounding community in decisions on site uses and cleanup activities. 525 The
community often has concerns about a project's potential for economic development. 526 In addition, complex judgments must be made
about the acceptable level of risks to health and safety in a community. 527 Relaxing cleanup standards at brownfield sites may lower
cleanup costs for developers and speed up cleanups, but it also shifts
health risks to the neighboring communities. 528 Legislatures529 and
commentators530 often state explicitly that the voluntary cleanup statutes codify a tradeoff of increased health risk for new jobs and increased tax revenues. To take just one example, some states allow a
525. The recommendation of several panelists at the National Environmental Policy Institute 's brownfield policy forum, for example, is to "[e]ncourage early participation with local
community stakeholders in establishing the level of cleanup and devising redevelopment plans."
NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 10; see id. at 34 (quoting
the statement of Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc., that "[s]takeholder empowerment [at brownfield sites] is not a luxury, as many people think, it has to be done to get an
effective program going"). Among the commentators advocating early participation by the community are McWilliams, supra note 20, at 772, and Solo, supra note 23, at 319. See also Andrew,
supra note 29, at 31 (stating that "[t]here is general agreement that community support is necessary to succeed with a voluntary cleanup"); Frisman, supra note 383 (citing a statement by Donald S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that "[c]leanup
plans must be prepared in the full light of day, with adequate opportunity for affected citizens to
... voice their concerns and suggest improvements"); cf. Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas, supra note 474,
at 89 (concluding that if "local residents and community organizations are not actively involved
in the [empowerment zone-enterprise community] initiative's economic, political, and social
goals, the (initiative] is likely to repeat the costly failures of its precursors").
526. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9.
527. Of course, the question of !'acceptable risk" to the community has wide-ranging moral,
political, and scientific dimensions. See generally ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND v ALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) [hereinafter
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE]; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (1983); Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks
Through Law, 30 JuRIMETRICS J. 271 (1990); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995).
528. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767. Professor Tondro expresses the challenge as
follows:
If we establish a given level of pollution as the maximum acceptable, and have clear and
well established procedures for accomplishing a clean-up to those levels, any flexibility benefitting the owner or lender will shift the environmental risk from that person to someone
else-to the public, if the DEP pays for the clean-up, to the neighbors if the site does not
have to be cleaned up as much as before, or to a future developer if a full clean-up can be
postponed.
Tondro, supra note 20, at 798-99.
529. Legislative findings frequently specify that a voluntary cleanup program intends to alter
the relative risk calculus to consider future land uses. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 51
58(1) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that "[i]t is the intent of this Title ... [t]o establish a riskbased system of remediation based on protection of human health and the environment relative
to present and future uses of the site").
530. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 154 (praising the Michigan approach of allowing standards for carcinogens to be set at a health risk of 1in100,000 which "trad[es] a slightly greater
health risk for the prospect of jobs and taxes").
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developer to clean up a site to meet a site-specific standard set at a
level of cancer risk higher than a 1 in 1,000,000 lifetime risk. 531 The
opportunity for developers to relax cleanup standards based on the
proposed land use is particularly troubling in this respect. Limiting
the future of a site to industrial or commercial uses 532 may be viewed
as turning the community into a "sacrifice zone" where residents are
forced to live with industry in their midst for the foreseeable future. 533
Many states attempt to prevent future site conversions to residential
uses without.additional cleanup activities. 534 But a community may
want the first cleanup to anticipate a future conversion to residential
uses. It may reject the use of engineering or institutional controls as
unprotective. 535 It may believe a cleanup should anticipate future
uses of the site536 or decide that it wants a cleanup to residential levels
of contamination because it is difficult to predict what use a site will
be put to in the future. 537 Moreover, if a cleanup fails, the community
will have to shoulder some or all of the additional cleanup costs; in the
531. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767 (criticizing this aspect of the Ohio scheme).
532. This will occur, for example, in states such as Michigan that specify different cleanup
standards for sites to be used for industrial and residential purposes, with the latter being more
strict. See, e.g., M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.20120a (West Supp. 1996).
533. See, e.g., Robinson Testimony, supra note 455; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767; Swanston, supra note 123, at 568; Casserly, supra note 26, at 272 (suggesting that some might view
reduced cleanup standards for industrial zones as a "loophole"); Solo, supra note 23, at 310
(stating that "[p]roposals which simply call for differentiated standards based on [the] designated
use [of a brownfield site] may not provide adequate protection to eurrent and potential residents
of urban industrial areas"); Evans, supra note 159 (citing the statement in the minority report in
Maryland that a "[c]leanup based on background levels would be particularly unacceptable for
79 percent of industrial properties that are located near residential communities," and should
"be allowed only when there is buy-in from the communities that live near and work at the
site").
534. See supra note 343 and accompanying text; see also Tondro, supra note 20, at 799
(describing the proposal in Connecticut to require additional cleanups when a commercial or
industrial site is converted in the future to residential use).
535. The Environmental Defense Fund's Karen Fiorini addressed the potential for the use
of engineering and institutional controls at Superfund sites:
Engineering controls can fail: fences can fall down, fallible human beings can disregard
institutional controls (as, for example, the Niagara School Board disregarded the "do not
excavate" notice in the deed by which Hooker Chemical conveyed Love Canal to the township of Niagara). Because excluding people by fencing and perhaps paving sites will generally be far cheaper than actually cleaning them up enough to allow productive use, Title I of
ROSA is a recipe for creation of dead zones-a result fundamentally at odds with the purposes of Titles III and IX of the same bill, to •·return ... contaminated sites to economically
productive or other beneficial uses" ....
Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 275 & n.14; see also Swanston, supra note 123, at 570
(criticizing proposals to use remedies other than permanent remedies).
536. See, e.g., Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 18 (stating that "[t]hose addressing the
Brownfields problem should plan not only for a site's initial cleanup and reuse, but also for the
subsequent reuses of the site and the buildings on it").
537. See, e.g., Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 275-76 (pointing out that "redevelopment often occurs in ways that may not be easily anticipated. Who would have envisioned housing on the site of the old Denver airport, or rapid redevelopment for residential use of formerly
industrial properties in Minneapolis?"); Swanston, supra note 123, at 568.
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view of some observers, this lends added urgency to making the first
cleanup a thorough one. 5 38
The legitimacy of a voluntary cleanup program depends to a great
extent on whether the program provides the community a voice in
making these judgments. 539 This is especially true for minority and
lower-income communities where brownfield sites are concentrated.
As the environmental justice movement has vividly illustrated, these
communities are often excluded from decisions that can profoundly
affect their health and quality of life. 540 Some commentators have advanced the proposition that voluntary cleanup statutes may foster an
equitable solution to the urban redevelopment problem, suggesting it
is inequitable to leave brownfield sites abandoned. 541 But brownfield
redevelopment strategies may perpetuate environmental inequities by
538. See, e.g., Maryland Proposal, supra note 159.
539. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that ··community groups ...
expect some assurance that remediation will adequately protect their health and the environment"); Swanston, supra note 123, at 569; Frisman, supra note 383 (citing a statement by Donald
S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that "reducing public
input could undermine confidence in the new system," because a community will resist any attempt by the state to "hand over the fate of public resources to private interests without giving
the public even a minimal opportunity to [make) comments").
540. The ·•environmental justice" movement is a rapidly growing coalition that focuses on
inequities associated with the current distribution of environmental hazards, particularly the disproportionate imposition of these burdens on minority and lower-income communities. See
BUNYON BRYANT & PAUL MOHAI, RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
A TIME FOR D1scouRsE (1992); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST CoMM'N FOR RACIAL JusncE,
Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE
L.J. 1383 (1994); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Robert D. Bullard,
Environmental Racism and 'Invisible' Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1037 (1994); Robert D.
Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1993, at 23;
Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Means to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A
Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495 (1992); James H.
Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENvn.. L.J. 125 (1994); Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice":
The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993); Naikang
Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting
of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U.L. REv. 366 (1992); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 52.
A common criticism advanced by environmental justice advocates is that the environmental
protection laws designed to redress inequities fail to allow for effective participation by affected
communities. See, e.g., Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in the Name of Environmental Justice: A
View from State Government, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 769 (1995) (stating that "[f)or decades, citizens
bearing the brunt of our collective environmental insults have been excluded from environmental decision making affecting their lives"); Solo, supra note 23, at 289.
541. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73 (stating that the "[f)ailure to clean these sites perpetuates the existence of health hazards in depressed urban regions"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 45 (stating that "[w)hile ... decisions [to shun brownfield sites] may be
justified as economically efficient, their consequences are equally pernicious to inner-city communities as are the more traditional forms of environmental racism allegedly occurring in siting
decisions"); Solo, supra note 23, at 289 n.21 (claiming that the existence of brownfields creates
"additional unfairness" for inner-city residents).
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increasing the high degree of risk that affected communities are already forced to bear. 542 In lower-income or minority communities,
environmental justice advocates who view streamlined and lenient
cleanup processes as adding to the community's environmental burden may be on a "collision course" with brownfield redevelopment
proponents. 543
Thus, communication between the developer and community will
often be indispensable to a project's success. 544 At the same time,
there is widespread discomfort on the part of developers about addressing issues related to public participation and environmental justice.545 The historical ignorance and distrust of developers and
residents for each other fuels tension among stakeholders. 546 Community involvement can enhance a project's chances of success,547 but
it creates risks for developers. Soliciting the community's input takes
time548 and may threaten to delay the project or prompt a developer
542. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 758 (stating that "low income, urban communities have a
higher rate of exposure to industrial pollutants because they tend to be in close proximity to the
industries that emit these toxins"); Swanston, supra note 123, at 566; see also Andrew, supra
note 29, at 31 ("A developer's interest is in cleaning up the site just enough so that. it can be
redeveloped as an industrial facility. Certain public interest groups claim that this approach
perpetuates the disproportionate impact of urban industrial pollution on the economically
disadvantaged.").
543 .. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 540, at 770 (stating that ."[c]ommunities that demand selfdetermination will rally against projects imposed on them without their consent"); id. at 780
(stating that "[t]he interest groups battling in the area of brownfields are on the verge of a headon collision"); Solo, supra note 23, at 325 (citing a number of environmental justice advocates
for the proposition that "[t]he general public may prefer to have property sit idle (and even
contaminated) than to have their tax dollars used to profit private individuals who have no obligation to benefit the community"). McWilliams, supra note 20, at 707, states:_
One group seeks to attract potentially hazardous industries back to urban "brownfields"
while the other strives to shut them out. One group seeks to lower cleanup standards in
urban areas, a policy that the other denounces as racist. One group seeks to streamline .
government oversight while the other wants to expand opportunities for public
participation.
544. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9-10.
545. NEPI BROWNFIEIDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 32 (noting, that
"many public officia_ls and potential investors are uncomfortable addressing this issue"); Tondro,
supra note 20, at 801 (terming public participation the "wild card" of brownfield policy).
546. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 32; see id. at ~35 (quoting the statement of Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc., that the stakeholders in brownfield projects "are generally ignorant of each other's needs, are inclined to
distrust one another, and may even fear each other").
547. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 774; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 65;
Frisman, supra note 383 (citing the statement of Donald S. Strait, Executive Director, Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that when the public is involved in the cleanup process, "[s]tudies
have shown that people comment in only a small percentage of cases, and that their comments
. are usually constructive and often help speed the process along").
548. NEPI BROWNFIEIDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 35. One commentator argues, however, that the time spent on public participation efforts would be outweighed by time saved in the development process. Kelly, supra note 540, at 782 (stating that "a
receptive, informed, non-resistant community outweighs any losses resulting from a time-sensitive development option").
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to abandon the project entirely. 549 Public ventilation of issues raises
the possibility that a debate over the project might scuttle it, and local
politicians often prefer to "balance sensitive environmental and economic issues without high profile proceedings. "550 Developers also
may face tougher cleanups than would otherwise be the case. If the
community rejects the proposed standard of cleanup as insufficient to
protect the health of the site's neighbors, it can threaten to stop a
project. 551
· b.

Public Participation Ex Ante

There are critical issues associated with public participation in
making threshold decisions at brownfield sites, such as determining
the proposed use of the site and cleanup standard. Should the developer, the community, or the state make these decisions? If, as is frequently the case, the developer controls these decisions, should the
community have power to veto or modify them? Suppose a developer
proposes to build a manufacturing plant at a site, and residents living
immediately nearby reject reindustrialization as "repollution."552 If
the affected community wants a park or a hospital to be located on a
brownfield site, not another polluting industry, should that desire be
honored? 553 If a developer chooses a cleanup to a statewide health
standard for soil and residents reject that choice as not protective
549. NEPI BROWNF1ELDS POLICY FoRUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that
"[p)rotracted conflicts among [local residents, developers, and regulators) can cause the 'window
of opportunity' for a redevelopment project to close"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 773. At
the National Environmental Policy Institute's brownfield policy forum, Mary Gade, Director of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, was asked "whether investors would still prefer
greenfields to brownfields if public participation requirements were too onerous." Her response
implied that Illinois does not mandate public participation for this reason. NEPI BROWNFIELDS
POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 24.
550. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 775.
551. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 35 (quoting the
statement of Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc., that residents "already have the
power to ignore, to delay, to interfere, or to negate"); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770 (stating that
"communities that demand the right to participate in every level of decision making will resist
efforts to streamline or privatize the cleanup process"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 766 (noting that environmental justice advocates can mobilize community opposition to redevelopment
projects that rely on inequitable standards for cheaper site remediation); O'Reilly, Indiana's
Incentives, supra note 24, at 65-66.
552. Patricia Williams, the legislative representative for the National Wildlife Federation,
recently testified before a municipal forum that not all communities want to participate in cleaning up a brownfield site only to see another type of industry move in. She stated that many
affected communities did not want "repollution," but instead want "parks and hospitals on those
sites." Brownfields: Contaminated Site Cleanups Solve Only Some Problems in Urban Areas,
Haz. Waste News, May 29, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407245; see also NEPI
BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 34 (quoting the statement of
Patricia Williams that "[y]ou would be amazed at how many people think of re-industrialization
as 're-pollution"').
553. The community often may expect to have input in this decision. See OTA STATE OF
THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that "[w)hen considering the prospects for site redevelopment, community members may feel that they have a stake in the type of activity that is
planned for the property"); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770 (stating that "communities that insist on
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enough, should the developer have to perform additional cleanup activities? The timing of community input is an important consideration. Community participation would be merely symbolic if
opportunities for public involvement came after significant decisions
had already been made.ss 4
Michigan largely ignores these questions, joining the vast majority of states that provide for public participation only after a remedial
action plan is prepared.sss Indeed, no state other than California extends any power to the affected community to affect threshold decisions. ss6 Moreover, certain critical decisions such as the choice of an
appropriate cleanup standard are, by design, removed from community scrutiny. Experience with the negotiated compensation statutes
suggests. that these features of voluntary cleanup programs may foster
·
community resistance to brownfield redevelopment projects.
i. · Decisions About Project Siting and Proposed Land Uses

, A developer always faces difficult decisions in assessing how
much of its plans it should reveal to a community and when it should
do so.ss 7 If a developer approaches a community with an incomplete
proposal, the community may suspect that the developer is withhold.ing information or is contriving to change its plans.sss In some cases,
the developer may risk losing the. project to a rival developer that
•
takes advantage of its groundwork.ss 9
. Negotiated compensation statutes recognize this by allowing developers to make initial decisions about facility locations. In Massachusetts, for example, the process begins when a developer submits a
"notice of intent" with accompanying documentation about a proposed site.s 60 But to communities, decisions to site facilities in their
midst "seem[ ] more like a preemptive strike than an invitation to
redevelopment consistent with their neighborhood vision will demand participation in redevel·
.. opment decisions before· a project is packaged for public review") .
. 554. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 34 (citing the statement of Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation,
that "[g]oing in early is particularly important, as many local stakeholders will need time to
become familiar with the issues and form their own opinions"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at
773-74 (labeling public participation under these terms a "hoax").
555. Indiana, for example, mandates public involvement only in commenting on a proposed
voluntary remediation work plan. IND. CODE ANN.§ 13-25-5-ll(b) (WESTLAW through end of
1996 2d Reg. Sess.); Survey Results, supra note 158; cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278
(stating that under the current Superfund law, "citizen participation in the cleanup process is not
mandated to occur until after EPA has selected a proposed cleanup plan-well after critical and
often irreversible cleanup decisions are made").
556. Rhode Island, as.noted later, provides for public input at an early stage; however, its
"environmental equity and public participation" process does not mandate involvement other
than notice and comment opportunities. See infra notes 573-77 and accompanying text.
557. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 265.
558. Id. (commenting on reasons why waste facility developers approached communities
with fully formed proposals).
559. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 757 (1986).
560. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 264.

1006

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1996

negotiate."561 Not surprisingly, many communities react as if they
have only two options: to accept projects or resist them. 562 In Massachusetts, this has prompted communities to spurn the negotiations envisioned by the statute563 and choose instead to resist projects as
assaults on self-determination. 564 One commentator explains that the
Massachusetts statute failed to recognize that communities instinctively resist proposals in which they had no input, regardless of their
merits.565 This defensive posture has been exacerbated by the perception that the state has approved a project: in Massachusetts, for example, when proposals received rapid threshold determinations from the
state that they were "feasible and deserving," communities perceived
that the state had already approved them. Communities readily observe that a developer who has secured financing and passed initial
reviews has a vested interest in the project. 566
Thus, communities may react to proposed brownfield redevelopment projects in the same fashion as communities facing the negotiated compensation process did: by resisting them due to a lack of
input in threshold decisions. 567 As noted above, Michigan, like virtually every other state that requires public participation, defers input
from the community until the developer formulates a remedial action
plan. Therefore, when a community first becomes involved in a
brownfield redevelopment project, three critical decisions will already
have been made: the decision to develop the site, the proposed use of
the site, and the proposed cleanup standard. If the community per-

561. Id.
562. Professor Wheeler describes this "defensive posture" as follows:
From the outset, the law cast communities in a defensive posture, forcing them to cope with
unfamiliar regulations and to respond to proposals which they neither solicited nor desired.
Residents and officials in both Haverhill and Warren first learned that they had been
targeted for hazardous waste facilities through press conferences the developers held in
Boston.
Id. at 259-60.
563. See Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 815; Wheeler, supra note
481, at 261.
564. For example, when officials in Haverhill learned that a developer intended to site a
facility there, they promptly sued the state Siting Council. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals,
supra note 482, at 816; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 264-65.
565. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 264-65; see also Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra
note 482, at 791 (stating that "[s]tudies show that risks a community assumes voluntarily are
more likely to be accepted than those foisted upon a community"); McWilliams, supra note 20,
at 766.
.,
566. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 773 (discussing this feature of brownfield redevelopment ); cf. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266.
567. Several commentators have already suggested this as a possible reaction. See Kelly,
supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 710 (stating that "much of the resistance to
(brownfield redevelopment] projects probably stems from a community's experience that decisions about its future are made by others, leaving residents with only two options: resignation or
resistance").
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ceives that it has no opportunity to influence these decisions, projects
may be thwarted by local resistance. 568
Consider the community's reaction to a hypothetical proposal to
clean a site in Michigan to meet a generic cleanup standard for "industrial" ·purposes. The decision to specify the industrial use already has
been made by the developer in its proposed remedial action plan with
no community input. Limiting the community's freedom to determine
the use to which a site will be put invites criticism that uses other than
industrial uses have been precluded. 569 This is particularly true when
the cleanup is proposed to be based on a cleanup standard that the
state already has approved. The proposed use of the site is tied· to a
specific cleanup standard, and the community may perceive that by
approving the generic cleanup standards, the state has "approved" the
proposed level of cleanup. Like the "feasible and deserving" determination in the Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute, the
state's threshold approval of a cleanup standard seems likely to provoke a response that the project has received the state's. endorsement.570 Other states make threshold decisions such as determining
that an application is "complete" that may have the same unintended
impact. 571
There are two appropriate responses to this concern. First, states
such as Michigan should modify their programs to involve communities in the decision-making process before decisions are made to redevelop brownfield sites.572 Rhode Island, in a section of its statute
entitled "Environmental equity and public participation," attempts to
do this. 573 The state is required to "develop and implement a process
to ensure community involvement throughout the investigation and
568. See Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 757 (stating that "[a]ny
attempt to impose redevelopment on ... a community without community consent ... is more
likely to face inspired opposition").
569. See, e.g., Swanston, supra note 123, at 568. It also invites speculation about how sites
will be used many years after initial cleanups are completed. Thus, an environmental problem
may be transferred to future generations, which forces us to consider the nature of our obligations to them. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 825; Swanston, supra
note 123, at 568.
570. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266 n.100 (stating that "[a]lthough this procedure (the 'feasible and deserving' screening] was intended merely as a threshold to be crossed before the
agency could award technical assistance to a community, the unfortunate choice of statutory
language made the 'feasible and deserving' designation seem like a hasty endorsement of the
proposal").
571. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN.§ 13-25-5-4 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.)
{determination of program eligibility); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 75-10-736(1) (1995) ("completeness" review); VT. STAT. ANN.§ 6615a(e)(2) (Supp. 1996) (determination of eligibility); see also
Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Montana provisions).
572. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 711 (stating that
"I conclude that those most impacted by redevelopment should be involved early in planning
redevelopment projects and in promoting neighborhood sites to attract projects consistent with
the community's development vision").
573. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-5 (Supp. 1995).
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remediation of contaminated sites." 574 That process is to be coordinated with a notice and comment opportunity already required for the
proposed settlement agreement. 575 Such notice must be given to
nearby residents when a site investigation is proposed and when it is
deemed complete. 576 The state is also required to make public
records about the site investigation and cleanup process available to
the community.577
Although this effort is commendable, it is insufficient to ensure
meaningful input by the community in threshold decisions. Neither
Michigan nor Rhode Island has structured a decision-making process
that gives a community the ability to help define the scope of redevelopment activities early in the planning process; 578 at present, Rhode
Island merely provides another notice opportunity. A better proposal
to empower the community would involve the community in the site's
planning process and accord substantial deference to the community's·
recommendation regarding the proposed land use.
Second, the states should provide for public review of the initial
screening processes, such as decisions on the "completeness" of a developer's application. This will help alleviate the perception that the
state has "approved" a project.
ii.

Issues Precluded from Community Scrutiny

Another criticism of the negotiated compensation statutes is that
certain decisions are deliberately removed from public scrutiny. The
primary decision treated in this fashion is any consideration of the
need for the waste facility, which the community often views as the
single most important issue to be discussed. Massachusetts and Wisconsin preclude the developer and community from negotiating this
issue, on the theory that if the community could open discussion on it,
the negotiations would quickly reach a stalemate. This, however, ignores the possibility that the community would find the resulting constraint on the negotiation process to limit its ability to provide
meaningful input. Not surprisingly, this was one factor in leading
communities to shun the statutory negotiation process.
The analogue in the voluntary cleanup context is the community's
lack of an opportunity to influence the development of a cleanup standard, particularly a statewide generic cleanup standard. Having the
ability to help determine the appropriate level of cleanup at a brownfield site has been identified as the single most important issue for
574. Id.
575. Id. §§ 23-19.14-5, -11.
576. Id. § 23-19.14-5(a), (c).
577. Id. § 23-19.14-S(b).
578. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 772-73, identifies this as a central characteristic of a
"community-responsive" voluntary cleanup program; see also Kelly, supra note 540, at 770.
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many communities. 579 But the voluntary cleanup statutes substitute
critical decisions at the state level for local, site-specific decisions.
Consider again the hypothetical developer in Michigan who elects to
clean the property to meet a cleanup standard set for the "industrial"
category. Limiting the required level of cleanup to that prescribed in
a generic standard necessarily precludes a local decision to require a
stricter cleanup. This, of course, is the raison d'etre of the gep.eric
standard: its certainty and predictability in preempting local variations in cleanup requirements. Thus, Michigan provides no mechanism for a community to challenge the decision to choose a cleanup to
a statewide health standard,580 and industrial groups can sway cleanup
decisions for years to come by influencing the development of a statewide health standard. 581
Proponents of voluntary cleanup programs tout the generic statewide cleanup standards as streamlining regulatory oversight. However, they have overlooked the potential that a community might
resist a brownfield redevelopment project because it rejects cleanup
standards set at different levels for different communities. 582 Cleanup
standards set at a statewide basis at levels less than those of CERCLA
also invite a characterization that the state is discriminating against a
community.583 Again, the appropriate remedy is to modify the statutory approach to involve the community in making the fundamental
decision about applicable cleanup standards at a brownfield site.
c.

Public Participation Ex Post

A favorable response from the community to a proposed brownfield redevelopment project that involves risks is more likely when
legitimate representatives of neighborhood interests have been in579. See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 29, at 31 (stating that "(t]he primary concern of these
public interest groups (and citizens] is the level of contamination allowed to remain after the
cleanup is certified as complete."); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at
764.
580. If a community objected to a proposed remedial action plan on this basis, the state
would almost certainly be required to respond to this as a "significant" concern. M1cH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 324.20120d(5) (West Supp. 1996). But there is no requirement that the state require a stricter cleanup.
581. See Solo, supra note 23, at 317 n.176 (stating that "(s]tates which allow for varying
degrees of cleanup and little public participation could more easily use favoritism and politics to
determine which plans are 'beneficial' and what standards of cleanup are required").
582. See, e.g., Robinson Testimony, supra note 455; Swanston, supra note 123, at 568-69.
583. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 764; Tondro, supra note 20, at 801; Frisman,
supra note 383 (citing a statement by Donald S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut
Fund for the Environment, criticizing lenient cleanup standards for industrial and commercial
uses, warning that "the standards could be perceived as founded on a disregard for the health of
occupants of these areas, which are often inhabited by lower-income groups and minorities~').
Professor Tondro claims, however, that the political pressure to do a "complete" cleanup might
be deflected by applying formal, numerical, nondiscriminatory standards. Tondro, supra note 20,
at 801-02.
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volved in a meaningful decision-making process. 584 Defining the "affected community" and selecting its representatives requires a great
deal of care, particularly in view of the environmental justice movement's claims about exclusion from participation in decision-making
processes. A system of public participation is problematic if it requires the community to evaluate a project's risks in too short a time
frame. In addition, the weight given to community representatives'
recommendations is of paramount concern, because public participation is meaningless if a developer is free to disregard community input. Finally, if the disparity in access to technical and financial
resources renders it difficult for the community to make an informed
decision, that too is problematic. 585
Each of these have been exposed as weaknesses of ex post decision making under the negotiated compensation statutes, and each
finds an analogue in the voluntary cleanup programs' systems of public participation. Again, a discussion of the Michigan statute and
others will illustrate the similarities.
i.

Threshold Conditions on Participation and Designation of
Community Representatives

Michigan's public participation provisions, like those of a number
of other states, differ from those of the negotiated compensation statutes in one significant respect: they impose threshold conditions on
public participation. The state may hold a public hearing if it decides
to do so, but it must hold one if the elected representatives of the
community or the local health department request it. 586 This provision is comparable to Pennsylvania's provision conditioning public
584. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 714; Frisman, supra notP. 383 (citing a statement by
Donald S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that
"[n]eighbors are more likely to stall or block approval of a cleanup if they have no formal opportunities to be heard that [sic] if they do").
585. Despite recent efforts by the EPA, urban communities continue to lack basic information about the nature of the hazardous waste problems in their communities. See OFFICE OF
POI.ICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AND AGENCY FOR
TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHEMICAL RISKS IN Six COMMUNmES: ANALYSIS OF A
BASELINE SURVEY 53 (1990) [hereinafter EPA/ATSDR BASELINE SURVEY] (concluding that
survey respondents have a "low level of perceived knowledge" about chemical risks in their
areas); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278.
586. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1996); cf DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 9112 (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly,
1995) (providing for a public hearing "if the Secretary receives a meritorious request ... from
any person on the proposed consent decree and the proposed plan of remedial action"); IND.
CoDE ANN.§ 13-25-5-ll(c) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that if
the state receives at least one written request during the notice and comment period, a public
hearing may be held); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 75-10-735(2) (1995) (providing for a hearing upon a
written request by "10 or more persons, by a group composed of 10 or more members, or by a
local governing body of a city, town or county"); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Montana provisions).
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participation on a request by the affected municipality. 587 The ultimate condition precedent to public participation, of course, exists in
those states with no specific provisions for mandatory community
input.
Given the broad consensus that public participation is desirable,
the imposition of threshold conditions on participation is. wholly unwarranted. This is particularly true of statutes such as Michigan's that
place decisions about whether hearings should take place in the hands
of local officials. Although some have suggested that brownfield sites
pose issues of interest to a city as a whole, 588 there is no guarantee
that a city's elected representatives represent the specific views of the
community that abuts a proposed development site. 589 If the affected
community is represented primarily (or, in this case, exclusively) by
elected officials, significant questions arise as to whether they would
consider fundamental questions about the distributional consequences
of a brownfield project. 590 In this respect and others, states such as
Michigan have failed to provide for a genuine forum for articulating
the affected community's concerns, because they do not mandate that
the developer communicate directly with specific members of the affected community, other than by notice and comment opportunities or
public hearings. This is likely to provoke criticism from the commui:iities most directly affected by the projects; Professor Wheeler, for example, cites a definition of a "public hearing" as "an event where the
public speaks and the officials don't listen." 591
Moreover, having a voice in remedial decisions does not necessarily give the community a stake in the future of a project. Michigan,
like several other states, requires nothing beyond responding to public
comments and taking those comments into account. 592 Without an enforceable right to have their input considered in the process, communities could perceive that their recommendations will be disregarded
by the developers and states. There is an asymmetry in the value put
on parties' input. Although the states provide sc:ant assurances that
587. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996).
588. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 33 (quoting
Charles Graves, Director of Planning, Baltimore, MD).
589. Id. (quoting Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation) ("We cannot afford to presume that everyone in federal, state, or local government is going
to empower these communities and make sure that these stakeholders are active participants in
the remediation process.")
590. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Conceptions of Fairness in Proposals for Facility Siting, 5 Mo. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13 (1993-94) [hereinafter Been, Conceptions of Fairness]; cf Fiorini
Testimony, supra note 448, at 277 (criticizing § 102 of the Reform of Superfund Act, which would
amend CERCLA § 121(f)(l)(D) to provide that "only elected officials-not the community as a
whole-get to have their views 'considered' in remedy selection" at Superfund sites).
591. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 246 (quoting the definition advanced by the Citizens'
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste).
592. In Michigan, for example, the state is required to develop a document summarizing
significant public comments and how the state addressed them. M1cli. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20120d(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1996); cf statutes cited at note 393 and accompanying text.
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the community can have its views considered, the developer is given
every reason to believe its decisions will find favor with the state. In
addition to informal assurances of lax enforcement, developers enjoy
the benefits of provisions such as those deeming their reports approved unless the state acts within a specified time frame. 593
For brownfield projects to succeed, the members of the affected
community must be partners throughout the entire redevelopment
process. 594 At the National Environmental Policy Institute's recent
policy forum, one panelist stated that redevelopment efforts require
the willing cooperation of the community, which includes agreement
on a "common plan for redevelopment." 595
ii.

Time Limits and the Perils of Turning to ADR

Both voluntary cleanup statutes and negotiated compensation
statutes impose severe time limits on public participation. Under the
Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute, the waste facility developer could request arbitration within sixty days of the commencement of negotiations if an impasse was reached. 596 Professor Wheeler
states that the quick recourse to arbitration in the Massachusetts statute prompted residents in communities selected to host waste facilities
to act as if they were taking part in "gun-point negotiation." 597 If the
experience with these statutes is instructive, members of the public
who want to have input on the scope of brownfields redevelopment
projects may feel as if they have little meaningful input in the decision.
The time limits set on public participation in the voluntary
cleanup statutes, particularly the brief notice and comment periods,
invite comparison. The period of review of a developer's proposal is
often as short as fifteen days. 598 This is a woefully insufficient" period
to review the project. There is no guarantee that the members of the
community will receive notices that are printed in a newspaper or
placed in a library. The required form of notice is likely to be useless
593. See supra note 377.
594. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 13 (stating the
common recommendation that "[e]xisting reform proposals should enhance the level of community participation by enacting requirements for early public involvement in the cleanup and redevelopment decisions"); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 766 (calling
for "collaborative solutions" to brownfield redevelopment); cf Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas, supra
note 474, at 90 (calling for early public involvement in decision making in the "empowerment
zone-enterprise communities" initiative).
595. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 35 (quoting Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc.); cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278
(stating that "the adversely affected community members should determine the future use of any
Superfund parcel in their community").
596. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 271.
597. Id. at 276.
598. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. § 6615a(h)(5) (Supp. 1996); cf statutes cited at note 389 and
accompanying text.

No. 4]

BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS

1013

to residents whose primary language is not English. 599 Even those
who receive the notice will feel that their options for participation are
limited. Because the state solicits comments on the full cleanup plan,
the community must, in that short time period, develop sufficient expertise to comment on the proposed use of the site, the choice of
clean.up standards, and other issues. Residents in the communities
where brownfield sites are located, who typically have not worked
with state regulators or developers in the past,600 will have little opportunity to alter redevelopment proposals.
In some states, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods
are a possible means to provide for additional community input.
ADR has some, useful applications in resolving environmental disputes.601 For example, negotiation over the content of federal regulations (regulatory negotiation, or "reg-neg") is increasingly taking
place. 602
However, experience under the negotiated compensation statutes
indicates that it would be counterproductive to turn to ADR in the
brownfields context. Again, the availability of arbitration under the
state-negotiated compensation statutes provides an analogy. In Professor Wheeler's view, when mediation or arbitration is available
under a process with severe time constraints, it resembles "conven599. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 34 (citing the
statement of Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation, that
"[p]roviding information to the community may require notice in several languages"); Kelly,
supra note 540, at 783.
600. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 13.
601. Joel B. Eisen, Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Environmental Conflicts: A
Framework for Analysis and Application to Environmental Protection in Israel, in VI A PRESERVATION OF OUR WORLD iN THE WAKE OF CHANGE 321 (Y. Steinberger ed., 1996). See generally
·Richard C. Collins, The Emergence of Environmental Mediation, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. vi-x (1990)
(discussing the ADR program at the University of Virginia's Institute for Environmental Negotiation, by its Director); Carol Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute
Resolution in a Litigious Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,398 (1984); Frank P. Grad, Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 157 (1989); Nancy Kubasek
& Gary Silverman, Environmental Mediation, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 553 (1988); Charlene
Stukenborg, The Proper Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Environmental Conflicts, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1305 (1994).
602. Regulatory negotiation, or "reg-neg," seeks to create agreement on potentially divisive
government rules and regulations before they are issued and thus preempt unnecessary or protracted litigation. See Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 583-590 (1994), has been the catalyst for increased reg-neg activity by the EPA. See, e.g.,
Chris Kirtz, Regulatory Negotiation: The New Way to Develop Regulations?, ENVTL. PERMITTING, Summer 1992, at 269 (article by the head of the EPA's reg-neg project, describing the
EPA's successes and failures in reg-neg implementation). Vice Pr~sident Al Gore's "National
Performance Review" recently recommended that federal agencies put added emphasis on regneg. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993); OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT,
ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS (1993). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical
Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994) (criticizing the use of reg-neg).
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tional collective bargaining in which a neutral party is called in to
avert a strike." 603 As Professor Wheeler notes, "[T]he collective bargaining model offers a poor analogy to siting decisions," because
third-party neutrals, developers, and communities have no shared history from which to draw guidance. 604 Moreover, a substantial number
of commentators criticize ADR processes as reducing the influence of
disadvantaged communities. 605
Professor Wheeler describes the arbitration provision of the Massachusetts statute as asymmetrical in its treatment of developers and
communities. 606 A community might perceive that it enjoyed substantial leverage with a developer, because it could proceed to arbitration
if it was offered too little compensation, but it would have no recourse
if the arbitrator rejected tl:ie community's position; it would "have to
swallow the result. " 607 On the other hand, the developer always had
an alternative to accepting an unfavorable decision: it could decide
not to build the facility if it did not approve of an arbitrator's
award. 608 In practice under the voluntary cleanup statutes, the same is
likely to be true: developers can walk away from the table if their
proposals are not accepted, whereas communities cannot appeal unfavorable results. Given this and other limitations of ADR, the states
·
should not rely on it in brownfield cleanups.
d.

Addressing Disparities in Technical and Financial
Resources

Finally, if the disparity in access to technical and financial resources renders it difficult for the community to make an informed
decision, that, too, is problematic. Given the wide range of proposed
brownfield redevelopment projects, and the complex judgments that
the community is being asked to make, it is reasonable to ask whether
the affected community has sufficient information to evaluate the
projects. Douglas McWilliams, for example, argues that "[b]ecause
the pathways of risk exposure vary greatly from industry to industry,
the community needs reliable and adequate information about the
particular facility proposed in order to assess the increased risk it is
being asked to accept as compared to the benefits the facility offers. "609 Moreover, little empirical evidence exists on how redevelop603. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 270.
604. Id.
605. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risks of Prejudice in ADR, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers
for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
606. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 272.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 723; see also Kelly, supra note 540, at 777 (stating that "it
is important to provide communities with the technical assistance that will enable them to know
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ment projects have worked, so communities may find it difficult to
learn from the experience of other communities. 610
The states that have allocated substantial sums to developers to
facilitate cleanups611 provide no funding for communities to perform
independent health and safety analyses, or even to retain their own
consultants to review developers' remedial action plans and site investigations. The states should provide technical and financial resources
to the community to assist it in performing these functions. 612 Professor Wheeler cautions that in the negotiated compensation context,
communities used these grants to hire experts who would generate
studies intended to defeat projects. 613 That, however, is not a reason
to deny communities meaningful rights to assistance under the voluntary cleanup statutes.

2. · Proposals for Adequate Community Input
For the reasons noted above, states such as Michigan have failed
to provide for an enforceable right to effective participation by those
members of the community most directly affected by decisions being
made in voluntary cleanup programs. Without such a right, notice and
comment opportunities and public hearings are essentially meaningless. 614 A number of different approaches have been proposed for ensuring the community's input. These include the "community impact
statement" approach, the creation of nonprofit organizations to perform cleanups, and the "community working group" concept.
a.

The Community Impact Statement

One possible means of soliciting additional community input in
brownfield redevelopment projects is to allow the community to prepare a statement of a project's environmental impacts. This "community impact statement" (CIS) would be similar in purpose to the
environmental impact statement of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) and its state analogues. 615 That is, it would seek to force
as much as possible, and as much as necessary about the complex regulatory provisions and
processes that are intrinsic to environmental law and policy").
610. Anecdotal evidence of brownfield "success stories" offers some useful information
(see, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 117-37), but more targeted information will be
necessary for communities grappling with the difficult issues addressed in specific projects.
611. See supra notes 395-406 and accompanying text.
612. This assistance could take the form of "Technical Assistance Grants," similar to those
given by Massachusetts to qualifying groups of citizens. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310,
§§ 40.1451-.1453 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); Kelly, supra note 540, at 777-78.
613. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 268-69.
614. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 772; cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 (criticiz·
ing public participation provisions of CERCLA on similar grounds).
615. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); see generally Dinah Bear, The National Environmental
Policy Act: Its Origins and Evolutions, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 3. About 26
states have "little NEPA" statutes. Bear, supra, at 71; see, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL Pus. RES. CoDE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1996). NEPA requires that an environmen-
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state regulators and developers to consider environmental impacts of
their project decisions, such as the community's perception of added
health risk stemming from the proposed project. The CIS idea has
already been proposed in environmental justice legislation advanced
in Congress,616 where, in Professor Been's view, it attempts to reflect a
"treatment as equals" notion of fairness by trying "to bring the concern shown to poor and minority communities up to par with that already shown to wealthier and white communities."617
Environmental impact statements, however, have proven to be
largely unhelpful in changing agency decisions. As Professor Been
and a number of others have indicated, experience to date with NEPA
and the state "little NEPAs" engenders "great dissatisfaction with the
impact statement as a tool for 'making bureaucracies think. "' 618 A
community impact statement would therefore be unsuccessful in
prompting regulators and developers to consider the consequences of
their actions and act accordingly. Another problem is that impact
statements create only a procedural mandate and confer no rights of
review of their substance. 619 However, legislation creating the obligation to allow the community to prepare a CIS, unlike NEPA and the
state "little NEPAs," could feature a substantive component. A resident of an affected community, for example, could be given an enforceable right to challenge decisions such as a state's approval of a
remedial action plan over the community's objection. In light of the
prevailing interpretation of NEPA, however, states would almost certainly not follow this course. For these reasons, the CIS appears unlikely to promote effective community involvement.
b.

Creating Nonprofit Organizations

In a number of communities, newly created nonprofit organizations have become "a popular structure for facilitating the remediatal impact statement (EIS) be prepared for "every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." NEPA§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Bear, supra, at 6.
616. Been, Conceptions of Fairness, supra note 590, at 22.
617. Id.
618. Id.; see also Lynton K. Caldwell, A Constitutional Law for the Environment: 20 Years
with NEPA Indicates the Need, 31 ENv'T 6 (1989) (article by one of NEPA's authors calling for
an environmental protection amendment to the Constitution to remedy NEPA's shortcomings).
619. The Supreme Court has constrained the interpretation of NEPA to a procedural mandate. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978), the Court concluded that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for
the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." See also Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (holding that NEPA is procedural
and not substantive); Bear, supra note 615, at 5. As Professor Rodgers observes, "Some observers believe the procedural nature of the endeavor robs it of consequence and reduces it to a
paper-pushing formality." RODGERS, supra note 76, § 1.4, at 58.
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tion and rehabilitation of contaminated sites." 62° For example,
Bartsch and his coauthors describe the efforts of the "Rejuvenate
Davenport" group in Davenport, Iowa, to reclaim and reuse an abandoned manufacturing plant, as a "model of broad-based community
involvement in reuse projects."621 There is no evidence, however, to
indicate that these organizations would be more effective than other
entities at representing residents of the community. 622
c. The Community Working Group Concept
Deficiencies in the public participation provisions of the voluntary cleanup statutes might be alleviated by statutory amendments
calling for the establishment of "Community Working Groups"
(CWG) similar to those provided for in H.R. 3800, the CERCLA reform proposal that failed to be enacted at the end of the 103d Congress.623 A CWG could be formed either when a state deemed it
necessary624 or when a sufficient number of citizens requested the
state to do so. 625 In order to facilitate community involvement, the
state would be required to provide sufficient notice to the community
by posting notices in the area near the site,626 notifying residents by
direct mail, and, in some communities, providing doorstep notice of
program activities. Once a CWG is formed, its responsibilities, as in
the Superfund context, would be to provide input on actions taken at
all stages of the voluntary cleanup process, including, for example, the
designation of a cleanup standard. Although it is unlikely that a CWG
would reach a consensus about each step in the remedial process, it
would enable a community to articulate common concerns about
brownfield projects throughout the decision-making process. 627 This
would meet the environmental justice advocates' desire to allow the
community to take part in fundamental decisions about its future. 628
620. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 775; see, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 131-34
(describing the efforts of the "Williams Economic Reuse Advisory Board" in overseeing the
redevelopment of the Williams Air Force Base in Mesa, Arizona).
621. Charles Bartsch et al., REVIVAL OF CONTAMINATED INDUSTRIAL Sims: CASE STUDIES
5 (1992).
622. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 779.
623. H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1994); see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 774
(describing the administration's proposal); Solo, supra note 23, at 316 n.160.
624. The state, for example, might provide that it could establish a CWG on its own initiative if it deemed it to be "in the public interest" to do so. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20120d(3)(c)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may hold a public meeting on a
remedial action plan when it deems that "there is a significant public interest").
625. H.R. 3800 directed the establishment of a CWG when either the President determines
such a group will be helpful or 50 citizens, or at least 20% of the population of the locality in
which an NPL site is located, requested it. H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1994). This
threshold would be an appropriate one for brownfield sites as well, as it would.ensure the formation of a CWG when there is a high level of community interest in the proposed project.
626. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(i)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring this
form of notice for public meetings on approval of remedial action plans).
627. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 775.
628. Id.
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The CWG would be composed primarily of local residents near
the proposed site, because their health is directly at risk. 629 This
would avoid the flaw inherent in provisions of the negotiated compensation statutes that specified the composition of local committees.
The CWG's representatives would be local residents and others most
directly affected by the project, not elected officials. 630 Provisions establishing the CWGs would require the states to impose a mandatory
obligation to foster public participation throughout the voluntary
cleanup process, at each of the important stages of the process from
project planning through to completion of the cleanup. 631 This would
require the state to allow for the formation of a CWG immediately
upon receipt of a notice of intent by the developer to enter into the
voluntary cleanup program. Pennsylvania's statute already allows for
"the formation of a community-based group which is used to solicit
suggestions and comments," 632 but this is neither a mandatory obligation nor required from the commencement of the project.
Existing statutes should be amended to require consultation with
the CWG in addition to existing notice and comment and public hearing opportunities at each of the following points in the process: (1)
determining the planned use of the site; (2) approving the developer's
application for participation in the program; (3) performing and approving a Phase I and/or Phase II site investigation; (4) approving the
cleanup standard; (5) approving the remedial action plan; and (6)
making a decision on extending liability protection to the developer. 633 In addition, the CWG would have to be consulted any time a
state official with authority to make significant decisions meets with
anyone else who would be affected by the decision, and the subject of
the meeting involves identification, investigation, or remedial activities at the site. 634
To provide an obligation to consider the CWG's views, the states
should amend their statutes to follow the "substantial weight" standard of the 1994 Superfund proposal, a consensus bill that nevertheless failed to be enacted into law. That bill directed the EPA to give
629. H.R. 3800 provided that local residents would make up no less than 50% of a CWG.
H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1994); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278
(criticizing provisions of the Reform of Superfund Act that would allow fewer than 50% of a
"Community Assistance Group," the citizens' group formed for purposes of informing
Superfund decisions, to be local residents).
630. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 774 (observing that direct representation is necessary for
community input to avoid bypassing of community input); cf H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 102 (1994).
631. Cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 (calling for changes to the Reform of
Superfund Act to "confer on EPA a nondiscretionary obligation to foster community participation in the process at all significant points in the cleanup process").
632. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996).
633. Cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 (calling for community participation at
similar points in the Superfund cleanup process).
634. Id. (calling for this provision in the Superfund cleanup process).

No. 4)

BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS

1019

substantial weight in remedial decisions to a consensus recommendation of a CWG, or, absent a consensus, to the views of the affected
community. 635 This would give the community influence in helping
make decisions such as one regarding the proposed use of the site. 636
A community that felt aggrieved by a state's decisions would have an
enforceable right to challenge any or all of the state's actions at an
individual brownfield site.
The community also should be given an enforceable right to
make the most fundamental decision at a brownfield site: the determination of an applicable cleanup standard. To facilitate this, the
states should amend their statutes to reverse the existing hierarchy of
cleanup standards. Unless a community indicates that it is willing to
accept a lower level of cleanup, the cleanup at every brownfield site
should be presumed to meet residential standards. 637 This is the only
approach that guarantees meaningful community involvement in
cleanup standard setting. Ohio's approach-allowing individuals to
coniment on statewide rules setting cleanup standards while precluding involvement by an affected community in setting the cleanup standard for an action affecting its health and welfare-is especially
egregious in this respect.
If the states will not take this action, another intriguing option is
available to communities. They could conceivably use their zoning
power to displace a generic cleanup standard. Unlike the negotiated
compensation statutes, which prevent localities from adopting zoning
provisions that would defeat proposed facilities, 638 voluntary cleanup
statutes contain no preemption provisions. In Michigan, for example,
it does appear that redevelopment foes could achieve their goal
through the zoning process. Michigan imposes an affirmative obligation to satisfy zoning requirements, because cleanups based on any
635.

H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 502 (1994) (proposing to amend CERCLA
.
636. See, e.g., Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278.
637. See, e.g., id. at 276 (testifying that Superfund cleanups "should routinely seek to make
sites available for unrestricted (residential) land use, unless the proponent of a less-stringent
cleanup can demonstrate that such a use is implausible"). It has been argued elsewhere that the
appropriate response to a community's resistance to a more lenient cleanup standard is
negotiation:
For redevelopment to occur, the community and the developer, with the government's approval, must reach a point of equilibrium where the community is comfortable with the
standard and the developer is willing and able to pay for the remediation. Assuming that
the government considers the agreement an appropriate risk, then the developer's liability
should be capped at that level of equilibrium.
Kelly, supra note 540, at 781; see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767. However, given the
potential inequities of generic cleanup standards, and the disparity in technical and financial
resources between developers and communities, any negotiations should start with a presumption that differential cleanup standards are inapplicable. My proposal would give tlie initial entitlement to the community, which it could bargain away, but only if it so chose. Cf McWilliams,
supra note 20, at 767 (excluding the application of tiered cleanup standards from collaborative
solutions).
638. See supra note 503 and accompanying text.
§ 121(b)(2)(B)).
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land use other than residential are made expressly contingent on existence or adoption of appropriate zoning for the site. 639
3.

Problems Related to State Decision Making
The rise of the voluntary cleanup statutes is consistent with the
trend of devolving responsibility for environmental protection to the
states. The states are bearing an increased share of the environmental
protection burden, and some states are moving forward aggressively
with environmental protection programs. However, there is reason
for concern. The federal environmental laws were developed in large
part because the states' environmental protection efforts were viewed
as dismal failures, 640 and concern about state regulatory efforts has
not abated. 641 States may be inclined to approve less stringent cleanups at brownfield sites because they want to attract businesses and the
tax revenues and jobs they provide. 642 State involvement in both the
negotiated compensation and voluntary cleanup contexts invites two
specific forms of criticism: regulators are captured by pro-development interests643 or are otherwise unaccountable to the public.
a. Capture of State Regulators
Developers have strong incentives to participate politically in the
states' decisions influencing waste facility siting or brownfield sites. 644
The experience with the negotiated compensation statutes has evoked
the frequent criticism that state regulators' decisions are swayed by
the predominant influence of in<;tustrial interests. For example, state
siting councils, established to make fundamental decisions in the
waste facility siting process, were criticized for a lack of neutrality. 645
In the voluntary cleanup context, the various regulatory bodies estab639. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(6) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that
the state may not apply remedial action plans specifying cleanups for any use other than residential use without documentation that "the current zoning of the property is consistent with the
categorical criteria being proposed, or that the governing zoning authority intends to change the
zoning designation so that the proposed criteria are consistent with the new zoning designation,
or the current property use is a legal nonconforming use"). The state may not approve a remedial action plan that depends on a zoning change, "until a final determination of that zoning
change has been made by the local unit of government." Id.
640. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 14; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 111; James R.L. Jones,
Beyond the Beltway Buzzwords, ENVTL F., SeptJOct. 1995, at 35. The most frequent criticism
of the states' efforts is that those states interested in business projects will compete with other
states to attract the projects by relaxing environmental standards and spurring a "race to the
bottom." See Buzbee, supra note 26, at 11.
641. See generally Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARYL. REV. 823 (1990) (discussing the limitations
of state environmental protection efforts); Anderson, supra note 109, at 417-22; Buzbee, supra
note 26, at 111.
642. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 114-15.
643. Butler, supra note 641, discusses this limitation of state environmental programs.
644. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 113. .
645. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 277; cf. Krier, supra note 490, at 665 (suggesting that a
lesson learned from the actions of California's Environmental Quality Study Council is that "en-
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lished to streamline the regulatory process feature little or no public
representation. These include, for example, the bodies constituted to
establish statewide health standards, as in Pennsylvania, where there
will be few public representatives on the standard-setting board. 646
Ohio also empowers a "Property Revitalization Board," composed of
state.bureaucrats, without representation from the public, to influence
whether a variance should be granted from a specific cleanup standard
at a given site. 647 Experience from the nego~iated compensation context suggests that unless there is more significant public representation
on these boards to guarantee neutrality, they will be criticized as captured by the interests they purportedly regulate. 648 A board such as
Ohio's Property Revitalization Board appears to be a potential "regulatory 'backroom' for cutting deals that shift risk to the excluded community,"649 because it does not require any representation from
affected communities. The states should take action to expand public
representation in these bodies that will be making critical decisions in
the voluntary cleanup programs. 650
b. The Lack of Meaningful State Oversight
Besides the prospect of regulatory capture, there are other reasons to be suspicious of the likely quality of state regulatory decision
making in voluntary cleanup programs. By definition, the developer's
compliance with the voluntary cleanup process earns it redu~ed oversight by state regulators, with streamlined regulation and limited likelihood of enforcement actions. In imposing time limits on various
stages of the pr:oceedings, the states are embodying the spirit of what
Gregg Easterbrook has called "ecorealism": .the preference for rapid,
"reasonable" action over the "quest of hypothetical perfection" in siting decisions or cleanups. 651 In many cases, the state's role in the
cleanup at a brownfield site will be merely to confirm the soundness
of what a developer has already done. 652 In some cases, decisions will
be devo,ved ev~n further to private individuals not responsible to the
vironmental interests, as a general rule, will be underrepresented before legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and courts").
646. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 6026.105(b) (West Supp. 1996).
647. The "property revitalization board" consists of "the directors of commerce, development, environmental protection, health, industrial relations, natural resources, and taxation or
their designees." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.08 (Anderson 1995); see also McWilliams,
supra note 20, at 771 (describing the proposal embodied in the statute); Michel, supra note 20, at
463.
648. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 277.
649. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 771.
650. Kelly, supra note 540, at 782 (stating that "[p)articipation at this (state) level is central
to the environmental justice movement and cannot be compromised in such redevelopment
efforts").
651. EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 611.
652. This will be the case, for example, in states such as Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington (in the Independent Remedial Action Program) that Confine their oversight role to approval of the reports submitted by the developer.
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public. 653 A number of states, most notably Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio, contemplate that regulators
will approve the activities of developers and their licensed environmental professionals without performing independent investigations.
Given the lack of state resources to devote to oversight, the states will
often-and intend to-find themselves rubber-stamping developers'
decisions. For example, when a state is determining whether a
cleanup is complete (e.g., for purposes of issuing a certificate of completion), it will often rely on an after-the-fact analysis of a licensed
professional's assessment that the cleanup has been satisfactorily completed.654 Ohio has indicated that its goal is to audit only twenty-five
percent of all cleanups. 655
This has the potential to undermine the public's confidence in
state oversight abilities. Although purportedly devoted to serving the
public interest, state regulators are making decisions that have the appearance of creating a deregulated climate for business interests. 656 A
developer can obtain the state's imprimatur regarding the finality of a
cleanup, complete with liability protection, while leaving the impression that contamination remains unabated. 657 Similar situations have
arisen in the negotiated compensation context. Professor Wheeler
states that the neutrality of the Massachusetts siting board was undermined in the public eye by the board's involvement in such decisions
as certifying a project's feasibility. 658 The states should guard the neutrality of their decision making by taking a more proactive role in
overseeing the cleanups at brownfield sites and by rejecting approaches such as Ohio's assignment of responsibility to the private
sector. This might take the form, for example, of adopting approaches
such as those of Indiana, Vermont, and Wisconsin, with comprehen-

See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.302-.304 (West Supp. 1996); see supra notes 362-68 and
accompanying text.
653. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 751 (stating that under Ohio's statute, "removing the responsibility for assessing public risk one step further from an accountable public servant could make it more difficult for community activists to obtain full disclosure regarding
contamination at a site").
654. See, e.g., 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(e)(4) (West Supp. 1996) (considering approval of the "Remedial Action Completion Report").
655. Ohio Voluntary Action Program, supra note 156, at 4 (stating that "Ohio EPA will
audit at least 25 percent of the properties which have been cleaned up in the Voluntary Action
Program to make sure that cleanup standards are met"); see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 29.
656. See Dunlop Testimony, supra note 123, at 237 (testifying that "[t)he cleanup process
will be streamlined, the regulatory approach is non-confrontational and emphasis is placed on
achieving compliance-not heavy-handed enforcement actions"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at
772. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this new attitude is the large logo on Ohio's
Internet (World Wide Web) site, which displays the word "SUE" with the international sign for
"no" prominently displayed across it. Ohio Voluntary Action Program, supra note 156, at 1.
657. See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 29, at 31.
658. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 277.
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sive state involvement and oversight in the redevelopment and
cleanup process. 659
4.

Moral Hazards

There are serious moral questions raised by programs that have
as their express goal rewarding voluntary participation by developers,
as is the case under both types of statutes.
·a.

Promoting Effective Risk Communication

~oth types of statute make the fundamental assumption that requiring developers to communicate environmental risks accurately to
the community would frustrate the goals of the statute. Thus, in
neither case is the developer forced to fully disclose environmental
risks to the community. The risk communication provisions of the
voluntary cleanup statutes are thin, typically requiring only that the
developer notify the public of its proposed remediation activities. 660
Given the lack of knowledge· in most communities about basic risk
concepts,661 let alone the ability to understand complicated information necessary to make a judgment on a brownfield redevelopment
project, this turns effective decision making on its head. 662 Communities' abilities to judge project risks require a careful presentation of
evidence about risks, 663 not ineffective risk communication. This is
particularly true in the context of cleanup of contaminated sites, because current risk assessment methodologies have shortcomings that
must be presented as qualifications to the community. 664
In the negotiated compensation context, it turned out to be a serimis mistake to rely upon companies' voluntary disclosures. Communities distrusted promises made to them about companies'
environmental records. 665 This was particularly true in one case in
Massachusetts where the developer obfuscated the risks by refusing to
disclose what wastes it would treat at the site. 666 To avoid this result,
states should require developers to make a more substantial effort to
659. See Frisman, supra note 383' (citing statements by Donald S. Strait, Executive Director
of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, criticizing the proposal to rely upon licensed
environmental professionals for voluntary cleanups, expressing concern that "the [Connecticut
DEP] won't give LEPs enough guidance, ... [and that] the department should retain its supervisory role").
660. See supra notes 382-93 and accompanying text.
661. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and
Risk Communication, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, supra note 527, at 48, 50; EPA/ATSDR BASELINE SURVEY, supra note 585, at 99.
662. EPNATSDR BASELINE SURVEY, supra note 585, at 99.
663. Slovic, supra note 661, at 62.
664. See, e.g., Brian D. Israel, An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 469, 520-22 (1995).
665. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 269.
666. The would-be developer in Warren, Massachusetts, "antagonized local residents and
state officials by refusing to reveal what kinds of wastes it intended to treat." Id. at 259.
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educate the community about the risks involved in a voluntary
remediation project. The California provision requiring the information to be provided to the community is a good starting point.667
Before development activities proceed, developers should be required
to conduct targeted educational programs to explain the risks of
brownfield projects to affected communities.
b.

Some Developers Are Not "Good Actors"

There are additional moral hazards in the brownfield context.
The reduced likelihood of enforcement actions guarantees that the
primary responsibility for ensuring cleanups' efficacy rests with the
developers. The "reopener" provisions in many statutes that allow
the state to sue the developer if it violates the terms of its agreement
may not be invoked668 or may come into play too late669 to stop irreversible damage.
The states therefore place a premium on trusting developers to be
"good actors," 670 that is, entities with good environmental records.
But, as in the negotiated compensation context, there are reasons to
be wary of developers' honesty. 671 The expense of site assessment
may limit participation in the process to large corporations with suspect environmental records because "they alone have the funds to invest in site assessment and cleanup. " 672 Because developers
voluntarily provide information to regulatory agencies that might later
use it against them in enforcement actions,673 the potential exists for
deceitful behavior. Developers can obscure the real nature of con667. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 25398.6(i)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring information to be provided that includes "an assessment of the degree of contamination, [and] the characteristics of the hazardous substances").
668. In this era of limited enforcement resources, the state may be too preoccupied with
other enforcement actions to revisit the subject of the efficacy of a clea11up at a brownfield site.
669. Solo, supra note 23, at 308-09. If a site is initially cleaned up to meet standards applicable to commercial and industrial uses, it may be too late to clean up the property later, when
converting the site to residential use: "A change in use from industrial to residential, or to a
school or playground could have serious results if cleanup procedures are not extremely protective from the outset." Id. at 309; see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 743.
670. See, e.g., Dunlop Testimony, supra note 123, at 237 (testifying that Virginia's voluntary
remediation program rewards "good actors").
671. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 77 (citing "an unfortunate history of environmental
misdeeds and a deep public skepticism" as factors inhibiting redeveloPIJlent). Even if developers are honest, there is no guarantee that contamination has been remediated. Cleanups may fail
to work after the state has certified their effectiveness.
672. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 737; see also Clokey, supra note 26, at 43 (noting that the
Wisconsin program will "see its primary application in the purchase of large industrial properties
where the parties can afford the costs of investigation and cleanup and can tolerate the delays
inherent in administration of the program").
673. If a cleanup proves ineffective, or if additional contamination is discovered later, a state
retains all of its enforcement authority to force a cleanup at the site. See, e.g., O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 62. O'Reilly notes that this gives a developer an incentive to
"make the site cleanup successful." Id. This assumes that developers are concerned with environmental liability only in the short term. If a developer knows it may face liability in the future,
it may conceal contamination and rely on the state's lack of investigative resources.
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tamination at a brownfield site in a number of ways. 674 They can build
a structure or other improvement that makes discovery and cleanup of
contamination more difficult. 675 In addition, because they are assessing and remediating the preexisting level of contamination, developers
are not guaranteeing that they will not cause pollution in the future. 676
The states should extend additional consideration to the existing
environmental record of their remediators. States currently allowing
PRPs to take part in their programs should disqualify them from participating, as these parties have demonstrated that there are reasons
for serious concern about their environmental records. A person's
conduct elsewhere should be relevant as well. Developers should not
be required to have faultless records; however, a pattern of violations
at other sites may be a sign of potential problems in the cleanup at a
brownfield site. Thus, a developer's persistent failure to comply with
state and federal environmental laws at other sites and facilities
should disqualify that developer from participation in a state's voluntary cleanup program. "Persistent failure" could be defined with reference to pending enforcement actions but should also incorporate
considerations for past conduct viewed as egregious.
5.

The Failure to Address Central Issues

Finally, proponents of both statutes oversell their ability to address the underlying problems that the statutes are intended to address. Both involve the states taking the lead to solve a national
problem with local land use implications, NIMBY-ism and the onerous nature of Superfund liability, respectively, in situations where the
federal government is perceived as either unable or unwilling to address the central issue.
a. The Shortcomings of Site-Specific Urban Development
The negotiated compensation statutes failed in part because they
did not address the central concern of their proponents: pervasive
NIMBY-ism. Perhaps their greatest failure in this regard was assuming that a site-specific approach to development would work. 677 The
statutes, with their focus on benefits and costs of individual projects,
addressed only the dynamic in a single community. The offer of compensation, no matter how lucrative, could not prevent a community
from resisting a facility and forcing it to go elsewhere. The community, in other words, was not required to internalize the external costs
674. See generally RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 20-21.
675. Id. at 21; Solo, supra note 23, at 309 (noting that "[t]he prospect of conducting full site
remediation after foundations and buildings have been constructed on the property could be
enormously costly").
676. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 20-21. A developer may also be a
"good actor," but lack the ability to control future contamination at the site. See id.
677. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 282.
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imposed on the unfortunate community that wound up hosting the
waste facility. Professor Wheeler, an original supporter of the negotiated compensation statutes, now calls for structured regionwide discussions of waste facility siting to address this concern. 678
As in the negotiated compensation context, a more comprehensive solution to the brownfield paradox may be the adoption of a
more regional approach to urban development, instead of the piecemeal, site-specific development approaches inherent in voluntary
cleanup programs.679 The voluntary cleanup statutes may not be successful in reversing the loss of worthy projects to greenfield locations.
States tend to sidestep the question of how much their voluntary
cleanup programs will benefit the local economy. Cleanups may still
be too difficult680 or perceived as too expensive for redevelopment
activities to take place,681 unless the real costs of suburban and exurban development are factored into the decision. Moreover, cleaning up a site and resolving liability problems of owners and lenders
does nothing to address the other barriers to redevelopment, such as
the crime rates and shrinking population bases near brownfield
sites. 682 Although some form of regional approach may be necessary,
the design of a regional land development process is beyond the scope
of this article.
b.

The Need for Effective Federal Involvement

Without some form of federal approval of states' actions, states
cannot address what developers term the central issue in brownfield
policy-the fear of environmental liability. 683 State agreements to
limit liability, release prospective purchasers, or certify a site as clean
do not preclude private party lawsuits 684 or interfere with the EPA's
678. Id. at 281-82 (calling for regional interdependence and reciprocity in the siting process).
679. See Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 17.
680. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 64-65 (noting that "three of the earliest
projects [under the Indiana program] involved groundwater contaminant cleanup, one of the
most challenging environmental remedies").
681. Solo, supra note 23, at 313 (noting that liability releases may not encourage prospective
purchasers to develop on brownfield sites if they have to pay remediation costs). Casserly, supra
note 26, at 272, cites one example of a site in Minnesota that remains undeveloped notwithstanding the incentives offered by the state.
682. Voluntary Cleanup Programs Downplay Enforcement, Emphasize Cooperation, Haz.
Waste News, Apr. 3, 1995 (quoting Lydia Duff of the Baltimore firm Miles & Stockbridge),
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407170.
683. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that "[o]ne option is to encourage the development of credible, EPA-certified state voluntary cleanup programs that allow
states to define a remediation process, and give states final oversight and sign-off on remediations at low and medium priority sites"); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 37; OTA STATE
OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 n.36 (citing the statement of
Mark Anderson, Editor of The Greenfields Report, Comments at the 1995 University of Georgia Red Clay Conference (Mar. 11, 1995) that "state programs are a step in the right direction,
but ... a federal signoff is needed to reduce disincentives to voluntary cleanups").
684. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 305; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at
26.
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ability to bring a RCRA or CERCLA enforcement action in states
where the applicable EPA Region has not entered into a "Superfund
Memorandum of Agreement" with the state. 685 Professor Buzbee
notes that CERCLA is the only major federal environmental statute
that lacks a "feedback" mechanism whereby a developer or state government can obtain a federal response about the legality of its conduct. 686 The need for some form of approval will become particularly
acute as the states, in their zeal to redefine cleanup standards and offer liability protection, create programs that depart further from
CERCLA's mandates. 687
Untilthe EPA offers significant releases from liability or covenants not to sue under federal law, or CERCLA is reformed to redefine the federal role at sites taking part in a state program,688 state
brownfield programs will face some uncertainty. 689 Some commentators suggest that sites will be developed even without releases from
federal liability, noting that the EPA will focus its limited enforcement
resources on NPL sites, not brownfield sites (which typically are not
on the NPL). 690 They also claim that if a state informs a developer
that the site is clean, that would constitute a defense against federal
enforcement action. 691 But it is also possible that in a state such as
Ohio or Pennsylvania, the EPA will monitor the state program by
commencing enforcement actions at high profile sites. 692 Although
the risk of this occurring is probably min:imal,693 it leaves an amount
685. Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony, supra note 74, at 258 (claiming that the Pennsylvania
voluntary remediation statute "cannot overcome the major disincentives that the federal
Superfund's liability system produces"); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26;
Clokey, supra note 26, at 38; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 733; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives,
supra note 24, at 59-60; Solo, supra note 23, at 288 n.20 (stating that ·"[s)tate and local laws,
however, cannot override federal Jaw, and sites that contain sufficient contamination, which have
been targeted by the federal government will still be dealt with under CERCLA"); Jones, supra
note 156; see OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 305.
686. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 71-72.
687. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26.
688. See supra notes 448-70 and accompanying text.
689. Jones, supra note 156.
690. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 96 (stating that "[b)ecause the sites which are the focus
of this report would have made it to neither the state nor the federal priority list, chances are
slim that they will ever be the target of a federal Superfund action"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 60. However, this might not be the case in a.state where virtually any site
qualifies for the voluntary cleanup program. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
691. O'Reilly, lndiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 59 (suggesting that "federal comity"
gives the developer "an implicit shield against the threat of federal cleanup action suits" if it
complies with a state's requirements). One commentator goes further, suggesting that "voluntary cleanup activity [in a state program] should be asserted as a defense at federal environmental enforcement proceedings." Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165. However, this would fit none of
the commonly available defenses to a CERCLA action. See CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3) (1994).
692. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 733; Casserly, supra note 26, at 272 (stating that "[o]ne of
the biggest complaints of developers is the remote, but possible threat that the U.S. EPA will
target a 'recycled' parcel through the federal Superfund program").
693. Casserly, supra note 26, at 272. The EPA's guidance memo on Prospective Purchaser
Agreements supports this proposition, suggesting that "future EPA activity at such a site [being
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of uncertainty that may discourage brownfield investments. There is
also the uncertainty generated by the state's ability to sue for additional contamination discovered at the site. 694
In sum, the federal government may be "in the best position to.
define a framework for determining the true risks involved with old
industrial sites and to identify standards for cleanup and remediation. "695 This could be accomplished in a number of ways. Congress
could redefine the CERCLA cleanup standards, as Title I of the Reform of Superfund Act proposes to do. 696 The EPA could be more
aggressive in entering into more Prospective Purchaser Agreements697
or entering into other agreements, such as the Superfund Memorandum of Agreement between EPA Region V and Minnesota, to recognize the primacy of state voluntary cleanup programs. 698 Professor
Buzbee suggests that the EPA go further and develop an omnibus
"Cleanup Approval Process" (CAP} that would delegate authority to
the states but retain federal oversight and review capabilities. 699 The
CAP scheme would involve a federally created model cleanup process
that states could implement and administer in a fashion similar to
state administration of the Clean Water Act or Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit schemes. 700 A considerable disadvantage of this approach is that it would almost certainly require
congressional action to alter the basic nature of the Superfund
cleanup and settlement scheme. 701 The EPA has not shown interest to
date in creating a federal voluntary cleanup program, viewing it as a
dilution of the statutory mandate to clean up hazardous waste sites
and punish the responsible parties. 702 Congress appears more inclined
to provide credibility to the state programs with some form of explicit
cleaned up in a state program] is extremely unlikely." MAY 1995 PPA GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440.
694. Solo, supra note 23, at 301.
695. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 30.
696. A number of panelists at the National Environmental Policy Institute's recent forum
advocated this approach. NEPI BROWNFlELDS PouCY FoRuM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at
11 (stating that "many panelists looked to Superfund reauthorization as the catalyst for rationalizing cleanup standards").
6CJ"7. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165, advocates this approach.
698. See supra note 348. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection is negotiating a "Performance Partnership" with the EPA's Region III, which may include a provision
that the EPA will not initiate federal enforcement actions at sites taking part in the Pennsylvania
program. PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 13. The DEP has
also participated in discussions aimed at developing a model Superfund Memorandum of Agreement. Id.
699. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 41-42, 100-04. A CAP scheme would involve developers and
the EPA in agreeing to consent decrees that would differ from current consent decrees negotiated under CERCLA in a number of respects. For example, a CAP consent decree would preclude future state and federal enforcement actions. Id. at 103.
700. Id. at 100-04, 115.
701. Id. at 100-01 (stating that because "it is unlikely EPA would ever voluntarily create
such a procedure, ... statutory modification is likely necessary").
702. Id. at 95, 106.
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approval of state programs from the EPA, such as that contemplated
under the approval process proposed in Title III of ROSA.
As the Office of Technology Assessment has recognized, the relationship between the state and federal governments in this area requires considerable attention, far more attention than Title III of
ROSA empowers the EPA to devote to the task. 703 One state official
testifying before Congress strongly opposed federal involvement in
approving state voluntary cleanup programs. 704 Federal oversight,
however, is necessary to ensure the efficacy of cleanups,705 and federal
approval of state programs should be a condition to any decision to
certify cleanups. 706 Federal approval can reduce the state's ability to
approve lax cleanups and provide developers with additional
certainty. 707
Given this, there are reasons to be concerned about the effectiveness of the proposed system of approvals. There would be no opportunity for public participation in the decisions. 708 The EPA's ability to
disapprove a state's program would be severely limited. 709 Under the
proposal, it could not, for example, consider a state's prior performance in supervising remedial actions (e.g., under a state's CERCLA
law). If the EPA were concerned that a state might sanction cleanups
that did not protect the environment, its ability to disapprove the program or condition approval on the adoption of modifications would be
limited. 710 An application would be deemed approved unless EPA
703. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26.
704. Kahoe Testimony, supra note 459 (testifying that "[w]e strongly oppose expansion of
federal.authority to [brownfield] sites, a situation which would only add to the time~ cost, and
complexity of a working system"). Deputy Secretary Kahoe testified that the state of California
was working with the EPA's Region IX to secure an administrative release for sites in the California cleanup program. Id.
705. See supra notes 651-59 and accompanying text (regarding the legitimacy of state decision making in the brownfield context); see also Buzbee, supra note 26, at 110-11.
706. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 115.
707. Id.
708. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304.(1995); Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at
279. This is especially troubling, given the ability of federal involvement to offset the ability of
developers to influence political choices at the state and local level. See Buzbee, supra note 26,
at 115.
709. Section 304 would allow the EPA Administrator to disapprove a state's application
only if the Administrator finds that "the State does not have the legal authority and the financial
and personnel resources, organization, and expertise to carry out such [a] remedial action program." H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995). The Administrator would not be able to
place any condition on approval. See id. A disapproval of a state program would be subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act as a "final agency action." Id.; see 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (provision for judicial review of a "final agency action").
·
710. The EPA might be expected, for example, to express concern about the delegation of
decision-making responsibility to private individuals in the Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Ohio programs. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26
(noting that the EPA viewed unfavorably a proposal in the Illinois legislature to privatize the
cleanup process and "only involv[e] the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA} on
completion of remediation to enable closure at a site with a [no action] letter by the state").
However, it could not reject the state's program on that basis, nor could it condition approval on
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disapproved it within sixty days. 711 This has been called "an absurdly
inadequate period given the massively increased workload imposed by
other provisions of the [Superfund reform] bill as well as the lack of
resources provided." 712 Although there is a provision for withdrawal
of federal approval if the EPA finds deficiencies in the program,713
that too is subject to criticism if the EPA is not provided sufficient
resources to monitor state performance.
Title Ill's proposal to exempt from CERCLA liability sites that
have been cleaned up in an approved state program amounts to a license to evade CERCLA's protective cleanup standards. 714 At a minimum, the EPA must be given latitude to disapprove of a
nonconforming program on substantive grounds (e.g., if the cleanup
standards are not strict enough, in the EPA's view, to protect health
and the environment). 715 The EPA must require that a state's program provide for effective public participation, both in decision making at individual sites and in statewide fora that set brownfield
policy. 716 Finally, because the states' programs are evolving rapidly,
the states should be required to recertify their programs frequently:
Representative Visclosky proposes that this take place every two
years. 717
V.

CONCLUSION

The incentives for brownfield redevelopment are based on a
"Brownfields of Dreams" premise: "if you provide the appropriate
climate, they [developers] will clean and invest." 718 At the National
Environmental Policy lnstitute's brownfield policy forum, Mary Gade,
the state's adoption of more comprehensive review procedures. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 304 (1995).
711. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995).
712. Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 279 (adding that "the bill elevates the form of
federalism over the substance of cleanup"). For an opposing view, see Kahoe Testimony, supra
note 459 (stating that "[i]nstead of applying [the release from liability] voluntarily or as a matter
of state right, litle III exacts the price of federal review and approval of state laws that are now
solely within the purview of the states").
·
713. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995).
714. NEPI BROWNFIELDS PouCY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 26 (citing the
statement of Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN) that "minimum standards must still be met
[because] 'a race to the bottom must be avoided'"); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20,
at 26 (stating that the EPA's difficult task in this area is to "develop criteria for agreements that
would be flexible enough to meet individual state needs, yet rigorous enough to ensure adequate
cleanups").
715. See Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 279 (criticizing the Reform of Superfund Act
because "EPA's sole ground for rejecting a delegation application is that the state lacks adequate
authority," and neither the "adequacy of resources" or "the state's prior performance" are
considered.).
716. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 26 (citing the
statement of Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN) calling for this requirement).
717. Id.
718. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 27 (quoting the
statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Institute).
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Director of the Illinois EPA, was asked "whether investors would still
prefer greenfields to brownfields if public participation requirements
were too onerous." She responded that Illinois does not mandate
public participation. 719 Proponents of the voluntary cleanup statutes
say that the command-and-control regime of pollution control laws
has backfired, in this case spawning a pervasive fear of environmental
liability that chills productive redevelopment. Cleanups, they say, are
too slow and expensive, and only a streamlined cleanup process with
economic incentives to developers will get abandoned sites back into
commerce. The transition away from the rigorous cleanup standards
of the regulatory regime, however, is prompting the states to move too
far to relax cleanup standards and requirements for contaminated
sites, jeopardizing public health and safety. Experience from the negotiated compensation context, moreover, shows that the voluntary
cleanup statutes. may fail to attain the goal of revitalizing moribund
urban economies.
As one commentator notes, the "ultimate test of success" of the
programs established for brownfield cleanups is "the development of
procedures that ensure the legitimate remediation of contaminated industrial property." 720 The nascent state voluntary cleanup programs
stake a claim to legitimacy with their frequent references to "recycling" and "reuse. " 721 All recycling activities are not beneficial,
however, 722 and neither are the state programs, in their present form.
Some states' voluntary cleanup programs may produce abandoned
cleanups, not clean up abandoned sites. 723
The shortcomings of the state programs include the lack of effective public participation, the likelihood that state regulators will be
captured by industry or otherwise unaccountable to the public, and
the moral hazards inherent in trusting developers' motives and actions. Experience with the negotiated compensation statutes suggests
that, without statutory amendments to address these concerns, even
meritorious projects will be stymied by local resistance. The states
must provide for meaningful opportunities for community input in the
719. See id. at 24.
720. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165.
721. Stakeholders in the brownfield debate frequently use the tenns "recycling" and "reuse"
to invoke the image of pollution prevention (that is, by preventing the despoliation of greenfields by reusing brownfield sites). See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 606 (calling brownfield redevelopment a fonn of pollution prevention);
Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-49 (describing "recycling [of] manufacturing sites in the inner city"); Solo, supra note 23, at 326 (stating that
"[s]afely redeveloping previously contaminated sites is essentially 'recycling' of industrial land").
722. "Recycling" involves some activities so dangerous that fonner recycling facilities find
their way on to the NPL in substantial numbers. See Philip L. Comella, Understanding a Sham:
When ls Recycling, Treatment?, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 415 (1993); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Solid
Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16 EcoLOGY L.Q.
623, 634 (1989); Barry Needleman, Hazardous Waste Recycling Under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act: Problems and Potential Solutions, 24 ENVTL. L. 971 (1994).
723. See Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6.
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process, both in the planning stage and during the cleanup process.
The suspect legitimacy of the states' decision making under voluntary
cleanup statutes should be addressed by increased public participation
in statewide decision-making bodies. The moral hazards should be
addressed by amendments requiring effective risk communication and
disqualifying prospective developers who are not "good actors." Finally, the EPA should be given authority to disapprove of a state's
program if it does not impose protective cleanup standards or provide
for effective community input. Then, and only then, will the voluntary
cleanup programs begin to fulfill their tremendous promise.
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APPENDIX: AUTHORITIES FOR STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP
PROGRAMS
States' voluntary cleanup programs operate under a combination
of authorities. These include new statutes intended to promote voluntary cleanups, existing statutory authorities (typiCally state CERCLA
laws), regulations promulgated under th~ authority of new statutes,
existing regulations, and informal policy and guidance documents.
In the following list, the first citation is to the legislative enaetment commonly considered to be the "voluntary cleanup statute" (abbreviated herein as VCP Statute). The second citation, where
applicable, is to regulations promulgated under the authority of that
statute (abbreviated herein as VCP Regs). The third and fourth citations, where applicable, are to state CERCLA laws and regulations
promulgated thereunder, where applicable (abbreviated, respectively,
as State CERCLA Law and State CERCLA Regs). If a state bases a
feature of its program substantially on guidance or policy documents,
that fact is noted as well. Indiana's voluntary cleanup statute, for example, makes no reference to applicable cleanup standards; that feature of the program is dealt with in guidance documents. Telephone
Interviews, supra note 160.
The programs in Iowa and Kansas are pilot projects and are listed
as such in this appendix. The Utah statute is listed; however, no developer has entered into an agreement in the Utah program. See
supra note 158. Connecticut's program includes a voluntary cleanup
program that operates in conjunction with the requirements of the
Transfer Act (with authorities listed below as State Transfer Act/VCP
Statute) and the Urban Sites Remedial Action Program (with authorities listed below as VCP Statute).
STATE

AUTHORITIES

ARIZONA:

VCP Statute:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-285(B) (West
Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
VCP Statute:
ARK. CooE ANN. §§ 8-7-503, -520(a), -523
(Michie Supp. 1995).
(brownfield program that the state is
considering merging with existing
administrative voluntary cleanup program;
see Telephone Interviews, supra note 160)
VCP Statute (Expedited Remedial Action
Program):

ARKANSAS:

CALIFORNIA:
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CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 2539625399.2 (West Supp. 1996).

VCP Regs:
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 67401-67401.12
(WESTLAW through Oct. 25, 1996).

(regulations for ERAP)
State CERCLA Law:
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25201.9
(West Supp. 1996)

(authorizing charges for consultation)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 2539625399.2 (West Supp. 1996).
COLORADO:

(elements of Voluntary Cleanup Program)
VCP Statute:
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-16-301 to -311 (West
Supp. 1996).

VCP Regs:
None expected. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
CONNECTICUT:

State Transfer Act/VCP Statute:
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 22a-452d, -452e,
-432, -133k, -134(e), -133(0), -133(p), -134d
(West 1995); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190 §§ 1-6,
14).

(allowing additional voluntary cleanups;
defining the role of LEPs and other issues)
1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 183.

(redefining responsibilities under the transfer
act)
VCP Statute:
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133m (West
1995).

(Urban Sites Remedial Action Program)
State Transfer Act Regs:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133k (West
1995).

(authorizing regulations for all hazardous
substance spill sites)
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 22a-133k-1 to -3
(WESTLAW through Sept. 24, 1996).

(defining cleanup standards)
VCP Regs:
CONN. AGENCIES REGS.§§ 22a-133m-1 to -3
(WESTLAW through Sept. 24, 1996).

(governing Type III site cleanup process in
the USRAP)
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DELAWARE:

ILLINOIS:

INDIANA:

low A:
KANSAS:
LOUISIANA:

MAINE:

MASSACHUSETTS:
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State CERCLA Law:
70 Del. Laws ch. 218 (1995), amending DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 9101-9120.
State CERCLA Regs:
Delaware Regulations Governing Hazardous
Substance Cleanup §§ 1-15 (1996).
VCP Statute:
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58-58.12 (West
Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
State CERCLA Law:
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22.2 (West Supp.
1996).
VCP Statute:
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-1 to -23
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg.
Sess.).
VCP Regs:
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
Guidance Documents:
Define applicable cleanup standards.
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
Pilot project.
Pilot project.
VCP Statute:
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2272.1, :2285-90
(West Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
None at present.
VCP Statute:
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E (West
Supp. 1995).
VCP Regs:
None expected. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
State CERCLA Law:
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (West
Supp. 1996).
State CERCLA Regs:
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 4.01-.10
(WESTLAW through Reg. No. 794).
(fee structure)
Id. § 40.0001-.1600.
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MICHIGAN:

MINNESOTA:

MISSOURI:

MONTANA:

NEBRASKA:

NEw HAMPSHIRE:
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(Massachusetts Contingency Plan)
State CERCLA Law:
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.20101 to
-.20142 (West Supp. 1996).
State CERCLA Regs:
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 299.5101-.5823
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996
Release).
(cleanup standards to be defined in MICH.
ADMIN. CoDE r. 299.5701-.5727)
VCP Statute:
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 115B.175-.179 (West
Supp. 1995).
State CERCLA Law:
Id. § 115B.17.
(directing that land use be taken into account
in setting of cleanup standards)
Guidance Documents:
Define a number of program features,
including the scope of certain liability
assurances. See supra note 176.
VCP Statute:
Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 260.565-.575 (West Supp.
1996).
VCP Regs:
Mo. CoDE REGS. ANN. tit. 10, § 25-15.010
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996
Release).
Guidance Documents:
Define applicable cleanup standards. See
Helfrich, supra note 156; Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160.
VCP Statute:
MONT. CODE. ANN.§§ 75-10-701, -721, -722
(1995); id. §§ 75-10-730 to -738.
VCP Regs:
None expected. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
VCP Statute:
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-15,181 to -15,188
(WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.).
VCP Regs:
None.
VCP Statute:
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NEW JERSEY:

NEW YORK:.

NORTH
CAROLINA:

OHIO:

OREGON:
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None. Program operates under administrative
discretion. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at
77-78.
State Transfer Act:
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West Supp.
1996).
State Transfer Act Regs:
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, chs. 26C, E
(WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 1996).
VCP Statute:
None. Program operates under administrative
discretion. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at
84-85.
VCP Statute:
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.8, -310.9, -310.12
(1995).
VCP Regs:
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
Siate CERCLA Law:
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310 to -310.23
(1995).
(defining certain features of current program;
see Survey Results, supra note 158)
Guidance Documents:
Define most features of current program.
. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160.
VCP Statute:
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§§ 3746.01-.99
. (Anderson 1995 & Supp. 1995).
· VCP Regs:
.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-01, 3745-30003 to -05, 3745-300-12 to -14, 3745-300-99
(WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996). .
VCP Statute:
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 465.315, -.325 (Supp. 1996);
1995 Or. Laws 662, §§ 4, 8 (to be codified at
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 465.200-.455).
VCP Regs:
Required to be promulgated by 1997 for
certain aspects of the 1995 law; applicable to
other cleanups as well; forthcoming. Survey
Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews,
supra note 160.
State CERCLA Law:
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PENNSYLVANIA:

RHODE ISLAND:

TENNESSEE:

TEXAS:

UTAH:

VERMONT:

VIRGINIA:
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OR. REv. STAT. §§ 465.200-.391 (Supp. 1996).
State CERCLA Regs: '
OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-010 to -140
(WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995).
VCP Statute:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.101-.908 (West
Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
VCP Statute:
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-19.14.1 to -19, 23-63-4.2
(Supp. 1995).
VCP Regs:
In development and will include generic
cleanup standards. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
VCP Statute:
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212(4), -207(b), -224
(Supp. 1995).
State CERCLA Regs:
TENN. CoMP. R. & REGS. §§ 1200-1-13-.01 to
-.13 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996
Release).
VCP Statute:
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 361.601.613, 361.133(b), (c) (West Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996)
(adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §§ 333.1-.11).
State CERCLA Regs:
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 335.554-.569
(WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996).
(defining applicable cleanup standards)
VCP Statute:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-325 (1995).
VCP Regs:
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
VCP Statute:
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a (Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
VCP Statute:
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VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1 to .3 (Michie
Supp. 1996).
VCP Regs:
Forthcoming. See supra note 175.
State CERCLA Law:
WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 70.1050.010 to
.921 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
State CERCLA Regs:
WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 173-340-100 to -890
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996).
(Independent Remedial Action Program is
found in w ASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340550(7).)
VCP Statute:
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1995).
VCP Regs:
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 160.
State CERCLA Law:
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.442, 144.76 (West 1989
& Supp. 1995).
State CERCLA Regs:
Wis. ADMIN. CODE chs. NR 140, 700-726
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996
Release).
·

